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This dissertation considers the place of the short story in the post-war efflorescence of 
American Jewish writing.  If focuses particularly on the strategies that Jewish writers deployed, 
through their uses and meta-fictional portrayals of the short story form, to negotiate between Jewish 
and professional personae.   The short story is at once a vehicle of entry into single-author 
publication and a generally insufficient guarantor of further publication, a forum for 
experimentation and an emblem of high-art mastery.  In works foregrounding the liminality of the 
short story as a marker of professional attainment, I argue, writers of Jewish fiction interrogated 
their professional, Jewish, and Jewish-professional identities in the postwar American literary scene.  
Many writers of Jewish descent or of Jewish subject matter have professed ambivalence (if not 
hostility) to being labeled Jewish writers.  Between their own Jewishness and their work, these 
writers maintain a barrier of professionalism, arguing that their work, whatever else it is, stands in 
relation to them as work and not as scarcely-mediated expression of their selves or their cultural 
origins.  Chapter one compares two approaches to the definition of Jewish writing—Jewish 
communal and literary-professional—in anthologies edited by Harold U. Ribalow (This Land, These 
People, 1950) and Saul Bellow (Great Jewish Stories, 1963).  Chapter two examines Tillie Olsen’s 
enlistment of the short story form in Tell Me a Riddle (1961), in the service of a post-Communist 
politics that draws on narratives of Jewish socialism to link the discontinuities in a writer’s career 
with the political ruptures confronting the political Left in the early Cold War.  Chapter three moves 
from Olsen’s concern with gaps in political commitment to Cynthia Ozick’s treatment of the 
truncated careers of Yiddish writers in her 1969 story “Envy; or, Yiddish in America.”  Chapter four 
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concludes with an analysis of Philip Roth’s investigation of Jewish literary professionalism in his 




In an essay titled “Clearing My Jewish Throat,” (2005) written for Who We Are: On Being (and 
Not Being) A Jewish American Writer, a collection in which Jewish writers discuss the place of 
Jewishness in their work, Grace Paley offers this account of the beginning of her career as a writer: 
In 1959, three volumes of short stories were published to reviews that cheered the 
authors.  They were then told by their publishers that they’d have to write a novel.  
Short stories were not a popular genre.  (The collections, Tell Me a Riddle, Goodbye, 
Columbus, and The Little Disturbances of Man, are still in print some forty-five years 
later, still read at homes, libraries, schools.)  Obediently, Tillie Olsen and I made an 
honest effort.  She labored at Yonondio [sic] for years, starting and stopping as life 
permitted, and it was finally published.  I tried for about two years and a hundred 
pages to make a novel, saw that it was no good, and have written short stories and 
poems ever since.  Philip Roth, equally obedient, was successful, writing the big 
books so truthfully and well that the Jews were angry at him for at least fifteen years 
before they became extremely proud.  In any event we were all Jews.  Of course we 
hoped that Americans, the regular kind, were listening too. (13) 1 
 
Paley’s career is admittedly unique, and not only among Jewish writers, in being constructed almost 
entirely out of stories and poems (and then mostly out of stories) with no published novel either 
buoying or weighing down her oeuvre.  But nonetheless Paley’s suggestive relation of the short story 
form to the situation of the Jewish writer has significance beyond her own career.  In Paley’s report 
of her career’s beginning, the Jewish identity that she, Olsen, and Roth share appears incidental.  “In 
                                                 
1 In fact, as I discuss in chapter two, the story of Yonnondio’s composition is more complicated: the 
novel was begun, as a novel, early in Olsen’s career.  Half of its first chapter was published as a short 
story in Partisan Review in 1934, earning Olsen a contract for the novel then in progress.  Ultimately, 
the novel remained unfinished, however, and thus was unpublished until after Olsen’s reputation 
had been secured by her story collection and her widely acclaimed 1973 critical essay, Silences.  When 
the novel finally saw publication, its lack of completion was central to the rhetorical work that it 
performed. 
 Significantly, Olsen’s collection was published in 1961, not, as Paley writes, in 1959.  This 
error suggests that the cohort of Jewish story writers that Paley creates for herself in this essay is 
even more a matter of chosen self-presentation than the coincidental dates of their first collection 
publications would imply. 
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any event,” they were all Jews.  Indeed, Roth’s case, the writer’s aggravation of a large segment of 
the Jewish community testifies to how “truthfully and well” he writes.  More meaningful to their 
experiences as writers is their relative comfort with a particular form (the novel) and their relative 
preference for another form (the short story).  The publishers’ desire for novels, in Paley’s account, 
signifies the larger compromise between an author’s formal inclinations and extra-literary 
considerations that the writer makes in the service of access to a wider audience.  This wider 
audience is not identical to “Americans, the regular kind,” but neither is it entirely different.  In this 
context, Jewishness occupies an ambiguous position in relation to artistic autonomy: its relevance to 
Paley’s specific argument about the pressures that the publishing industry exerts on aspiring writers 
is not immediately obvious, but it is included in Paley’s account nonetheless.  The publishers’ 
dictation of the authors’ next form strikes an oppressive tone, casting the writers’ subsequent work 
as acts of obedience or disobedience, but the desire for access to a wide and unknown audience 
motivates the writers’ assent.  In the context of the market’s demand for novels, the short story, for 
Paley, is a rebellious form.  Writing stories, and attempting to get those stories published in single-
author collections, Paley suggests, is a matter of professional integrity: of dedicating herself to her 
own particular art.  The apparent marketplace pressure to produce novels manifests a larger pressure 
to tailor one’s fiction to publishers’ preferences. Paley’s point, posing the difficulties that she and 
Olsen faced in composing a novel against Roth’s comparatively easy success, is primarily feminist: 
though the gender of the authors suggests a reading of the short story in line with Tillie Olsen’s own 
argument about the social politics of fragmented authorial careers (discussed at greater length in 
chapter two of this dissertation), their shared Jewishness seems to sit alongside the more central 
issue of the exploitation of talent in a context of gender inequity.  Paley’s invocation of Jewishness, 
understandable in the context of a volume subtitled “On Being (and not Being) a Jewish Writer,” 
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appears in this section of her essay without much argumentative context at all.  Jewishness at best 
suggests an audience insufficient to the writers’ ambitions. 
 And yet, the titular clearing of Paley’s “Jewish throat” is clearly an artistically significant 
event, intimately related to the aesthetics and politics of Paley’s short stories.  For Paley in particular, 
voice is a central feature through which Jewishness (among other ethnic identities) is encoded in her 
fiction.  The development of a colloquial narrative voice is, in Paley’s account of becoming a writer, 
a mark of independence from the norms of formal and academic writing that presented her with a 
blocked literary pathway (Auden, reading one of her poems when she was his student at the New 
School, asked her “if I used words like ‘subaltern’ frequently” [15]).  As such, the development of 
Paley’s colloquial voice echoes her resistance to composing a novel for the sake of custom or 
commerce.  “It took me years,” she writes, “to clear my Jewish throat.  This did not happen until I 
began to write stories—in my midthirties.  The people in my stories were often opinionated, 
sometimes took over all the telling.  These women and children, the men also, were mostly New 
Yorkers, occasionally Irish or Black, frequently two or three generations of Jews. [. . . .] I had to let 
them speak and I noticed that when they were telling the truth, any truth, they spoke well, or at least 
interestingly” (15–16).  Here, Paley links truth telling—an act with unambiguous social and political 
significance—with a mode of self-expression that her fiction codes as casual (and that characterizes, 
too, the voice in her non-fiction essays), and that thereby appears aligned with an ideal of 
authenticity (as opposed to market-driven self-interest), and with a humanistic appreciation for her 
characters’ complete personhood, suggested by their embeddedness in robust social worlds that give 
them their characteristic modes of expression. 
The effect of allusive exposition of a full life, the significance of which runs beyond the 
incident of the story—expressed in Paley’s story “A Conversation With My Father,” (1974) in the 
comment that “Everyone, real or invented, deserves the open destiny of life” (232)—is largely 
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conditioned by Paley’s reliance on brief narratives that emphasize the flavor of her characters’ 
speech, often over and above the specific events that they relate.  The various opinionated people 
who “sometimes took over all the telling” are given large presence in minimal space.  Paley’s 
discovery of a voice that is not only her own, but is a Jewish voice, and that finds its characteristic 
expression in shorter forms, is far from incidental, but rather an originary formal decision with 
profound importance for the writer’s professional life.  Read against this textual practice, Paley’s 
comment that “we hoped that Americans, the regular kind, were listening too,” becomes at once a 
straightforward expression of a writer’s desire for an unfamiliar audience and an implicit indictment 
of the sensibility that aims for normative approval, and that is thus more willing to capitulate on 
critical artistic choices; such as, for example, the form—novel or short story—that a writer’s prose 
fiction will take. 
This dissertation considers the place of the short story in the post-war efflorescence of 
American Jewish writing.  It focuses particularly on the strategies that Jewish writers deployed, 
through their uses and meta-fictional portrayals of the short story form, to negotiate between Jewish 
and professional personae.  For many of the writers that I discuss, the term “professional Jewish 
writer” contained an implicit paradox: that the writer’s Jewishness or invocation of Jewish themes 
was of an entirely different nature than their professional identity, and yet that for many it provided 
a literary context crucial to understanding their careers.  In works that foreground the short story’s 
ambiguity as a marker of professional attainment—at once a vehicle of entry into single-author 
publication and a generally insufficient guarantor of further publication, a forum for 
experimentation and an emblem of high-art mastery—these writers of Jewish fiction interrogated 
their professional, Jewish, and Jewish-professional identities in the postwar American literary scene.  
Often, in the works that I discuss, the short story is anything but a neutral medium for considering 
the tension between Jewish writing and Jewish writers.  Instead, even for such established writers as 
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was Philip Roth in 1979, the short story virtually squirms with contending connotations of virtuosity 
and striving, potential and limitation.  Indeed, all of the narratives that anchor this dissertation’s 
single author chapters are linked in the ambiguous relationship they share with the form of the short 
story itself: from Tillie Olsen’s “Tell Me a Riddle,” which fills about half of the four-story collection 
that bears its name, to Cynthia Ozick’s “Envy; or, Yiddish in America,” billed as a novella in the 
number of Commentary in which it appeared, to the fictional story “Higher Education,” written by 
Nathan Zuckerman in Roth’s own novella The Ghost Writer, these stories are long.  The stories, 
joined also by the thematic attention that they pay to the development and frustration of potential—
political, cultural, and literary—themselves play at the boundaries of the development (artistic and 
professional) that is considered possible in magazine fiction.  In these works, I argue, the short story, 
precisely for the complexity of its relationship with single-author publication, becomes a key site for 
examining the conflict between authors’ Jewish and professional identifications. 
My study begins with the 1950 publication of the first anthology dedicated to contemporary 
American Jewish writing, Harold U. Ribalow’s This Land, These People, and concludes with the 1979 
publication of Philip Roth’s The Ghost Writer, a novella published first in two parts in the New Yorker, 
which looks back at the development of a Rothian Jewish writer in the immediate post-war period 
and which focuses on a controversial but professionally significant short story.  As is evident in 
Grace Paley’s account, the short story, viewed through the lens of career advancement, has had a 
vexed relationship to the professional development of authors in postwar America.  The form’s 
tricky position relative to specifically single-author publication is particularly significant to this 
study’s consideration of the often complicated intersection of the Jewish and professional identities 
of authors.  With very few exceptions, short stories (contra novels) always appear materially 
contextualized by other texts, whether additional stories in an anthology, articles in a magazine, a 
blogroll on an online literary journal, or other stories by the same author in a collection.  As such, 
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stories are uniquely positioned, relative to the novel, to introduce an author’s work to an audience 
who might have no additional knowledge of that author’s writing, to develop a reader’s sense of an 
author’s characteristic style as it develops over several works, and to provide a thumbnail 
characterization of that author (as, say, a New Yorker writer, a science-fiction writer, a Chicana writer 
to watch, etc.).  Though novels, of course, also offer readers material clues in the form of 
typesetting, jacket design, blurbs, etc., to the kind of book they are and the kind of author who 
wrote them, these effects, I would argue, are heightened in the short story (particularly in short 
stories by un-established writers) by the robustness of the contexts in which they appear.  Especially 
for authors at the beginning of their careers, the short story offers not only different narrative 
constraints than the novel, but a fundamentally different set of professional possibilities, and thus, as 
we’ll see in several of the following chapters, a pointed forum for considering the development of 
professional personae. 
The connection between biography and subject matter can be particularly complicated in the 
case of postwar Jewish writers, many of whom have professed ambivalence or even hostility to 
being labeled “Jewish writers.”  Biographical definitions of Jewish writing can cast or can appear to 
cast such writing as a personal expression of the writer’s essential self, downplaying the significance 
of craft in the interpretation of a writer’s work.  Rachel Kadish, writing in the note to her story, 
“The Argument,” in the collection Lost Tribe (2003), expresses a common authorial dissatisfaction 
with this categorization: “In subject and in voice, ‘The Argument’ is identifiably Jewish (though as I 
type these words I practically hear [my protagonist] Kreutzer’s protest: ‘As if a story was a thing you 
circumcised . . . ?’).  And I understand that labels such as ‘Jewish writer” or ‘woman writer’ can be in 
some way helpful to readers.  I choose, however, to consider myself simply a writer” (370–1).  
Though the work may be Jewish (and even that is a matter of dispute), the writer rejects the label.  
This is not to say that Kadish or any of the numerous other writers who have offered similar 
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disclaimers, in doing so renounce any personal connection to Judaism.  Rather, between their own 
Jewishness and their work, they maintain a barrier of professionalism.  Their work, whatever else it 
is, stands in relation to them as work, they argue, and not as scarcely mediated expression of their 
selves or their cultural origins.  Indeed, while definitions of Jewish fiction can plausibly (and 
pragmatically) be offered on the basis of subject matter, voice, cultural context, readership, etc., 
definitions of Jewish writers tend to make ontological claims.  These claims are made more 
complicated, still, by the variety of common vectors of Jewish identification, particularly ethnicity, 
which frames Jewishness as cultural inheritance, and religion, which links Jewishness more 
concretely to some observance (or even the pointed non-observance) of a set of practices.  If the 
writer’s craft functions rhetorically to guarantee the distance between the writer’s Jewishness and the 
text’s Jewishness, then the career of the author, drawing their work together by intimating their 
biographical wholeness, troubles this distinction. 
This dissertation begins with a consideration of a key venue for the presentation of stories in 
a Jewish context, Jewish story anthologies, and then proceeds to three case studies of Jewish writers 
addressing the relationship between Jewishness and literary professionalism in the short story form.  
Chapter one pairs two post-war anthologies of Jewish fiction: Harold U. Ribalow’s This Land, These 
People (1950), the first anthology to focus exclusively on contemporary Anglophone American Jewish 
Writing, and Saul Bellow’s Great Jewish Stories (1963), which differs from Ribalow’s in reaching back 
to biblical literature and drawing from a number of linguistic traditions, but which nonetheless 
responds directly to Ribalow’s anthology.  Ribalow, editor of several collections of Jewish stories 
along with other volumes on Jewish culture, approached the category of Jewish literature as a 
partisan of the cause and published his anthologies through comparatively small presses, only in 
hardcover format; Bellow, whose own fame stemmed from his novels’ critical acclaim, edited Great 
Jewish Stories as part of a line of quality mass market paperbacks produced by the Dell publishing 
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house.  Despite the differences in these texts’ historical scope and material form, they share a direct 
connection through Bellow’s review of This Land, These People, fragments of which review Bellow 
later adapted for his own anthology’s introduction.  These two collections, I argue, represent two 
distinct and characteristic approaches to the problem of defining Jewish fiction, each placing 
different weight on the Jewish identity of the author in the definitions they offer for literary quality, 
that is: good Jewish writing.  Ribalow’s approach places a premium on the author’s insider knowledge 
of the Jewish community and the texts’ fidelity to Jewish communal life, while Bellow’s, though still 
reliant on the author’s biographical Jewishness as a criterion for the categorization of Jewish fiction, 
aims to conceptualize Jewish writing in terms of literary form.  These two approaches to Jewish 
textual categorization reflect competing conceptions of the professional field of Jewish literature: 
one (Ribalow’s) understands Jewish writing in terms of a network of Jewish writers continuous with 
the broader Jewish community, and the other (Bellow’s) understands Jewish writing as a category 
meaningful primarily as a subset of professional literary activity more generally. 
Chapter two analyzes Tillie Olsen’s Tell Me a Riddle, a 1961 story collection that constituted 
the writer’s only internally complete published volume (her novel, Yonnondio, discussed in a footnote 
above, was published as an uncompleted work).  Tell Me a Riddle approaches Jewishness obliquely, 
primarily through its portrayal of an extended family of Jewish heritage.  Despite the relative absence 
of direct consideration of Jewish subjects or practices, however, the collection draws on the idea of 
Jewish continuity—a heavily weighted concept in post-war American Jewish discourse—as an 
element of its larger concern with Left political fragmentation and discontinuity during a period of 
Cold War deradicalization.  As author of the pioneering 1978 feminist text Silences, Olsen devoted 
significant consideration to the conditions that hinder authors from doing or completing significant 
work.  Tell Me a Riddle, likewise, is a book about what can be made out of discontinuity.  The 
collection is dually motivated by concerns for the social blocks that hinder the development of 
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individual potential and the socio-political blocks that frustrate attempts to extend a revolutionary 
politics across several generations.  The collection’s title story, multiply anthologized in anthologies 
of Jewish writing, frames Jewish continuity, traditionally considered (and continuity in general) as at 
best an unattainable goal, and at worst an agent of oppression.  The collection instead imagines 
fulfillment in discontinuity through a recurring secondary character.   
Chapter three considers Cynthia Ozick’s “Envy; or, Yiddish in America,” a 1969 short story 
which focuses its attention on a specific narrative of Yiddish writers in post-war America.  Ozick, in 
interviews and essays, has argued that the story is an act of mourning for a literature and a culture 
too soon truncated.  Ozick’s story, however, is no simple elegy for the loss of vernacular Yiddish 
culture as such.  Rather, “Envy” situates its treatment of Yiddish culture in the professional context 
of the literary publishing industry, which, as the readership for Yiddish literature increasingly reads 
that literature in translation, functions as a gatekeeper (of a now narrower gate) between writers and 
their readers.  “Envy” presents not simply the plight of the Yiddish writer whose audience is on the 
wane, nor the tragedy of that shrinking audience, but rather each of these concerns manifested in the 
new need for Yiddish literature to be published in translation, a situation in which Yiddish writers 
enter the market for publication at a disadvantage compared particularly to Anglophone Jewish 
writers, and with a waning native audience to support them.  The story’s winking reference to living 
Yiddish writers appears to offer a direct connection between historical and fictional subjects.  The 
identity of the writers who inspired the story, however, is more fungible than it first seems: Ozick 
has claimed in interviews that the writers in the story were inspired by the experiences of American 
Hebrew poets.  Moreover, the story’s depiction of the isolated and unread writer closely reflects 
Ozick’s own professional experience in crafting her first novel.  In this way, Ozick’s story 
generalizes from the specific case of post-war Yiddish writers, to American Jewish writers more 
broadly, to, finally, the common professional hurdles faced by writers seeking to publish. 
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The fourth chapter examines Philip Roth’s treatment of the conflict between the ideology of 
professionalism and the position of the Jewish writer in his 1979 novella The Ghost Writer.  Roth’s 
protagonist, Zuckerman, spends the book in hot water with his family over a story that he has 
written which shows them, his father feels, in an unfavorable light.  The paradox at the heart of The 
Ghost Writer is that the very professional norms that would appear to guarantee Zuckerman’s success 
and his family’s approval necessitate his production of a story that secures his alienation from them.  
Roth’s novella pivots on writerly ambition—on the making of the writer’s name.  The Ghost Writer 
simultaneously plumbs the limits of the popular metanarrative of Jewish American success—a story 
rooted in the understanding that the rise of American Jews to the middle class is predicated on 
professional performances that are at once a credit to the community and that depend on the 
erasure of their practitioner’s racial, ethnic, and religious distinction.  In this context, I argue, The 
Ghost Writer locates a key tension between the two sides of the term “Jewish writer”: that between 
the anonymizing preference of professional ideology, the often explicitly biographical referent of the 
adjective “Jewish,” and the product of a writer’s work: at once personal and crafted. 
Together, these chapters argue for a view of Jewish American writing that pays greater 
attention to the intersection of specifically professional performances, formal artistic choices, and 
the history of American Jewish life.  Professional pressures, I argue, are centrally important both to 
the literary choices that writers make—down to the level of formal and aesthetic choice—and to the 
ways in which we read them as representative figures of American Jewry.  By examining these stories 
against the narratives of their production, we discover the ways in which the profession of 
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CHAPTER ONE: Jewish Writing vs. Jewish Writers: 
Genre and Authorship in Post-War American Anthologies of Jewish Fiction 
 
The evaluative gesture—the establishment of the quality of a literary work, bread and butter 
of the book review—is largely alien to contemporary literary criticism. Notwithstanding the recovery 
projects and canon contestations central to the culture wars of the eighties and nineties, the task of 
classifying a work as good or bad has long been understood to be outside the purview of literary 
academia, at least in formal professional publications.  Even when academic literary critics venture 
into reviewing per se, we clearly perform a different kind of critical function than that dictated by the 
analytical epistemology that governs the field and that we encourage our students to develop.  The 
authority to claim a work as good or bad, however implicit it may be in the syllabi we create and the 
comments we make offhandedly in class, is not the same as the authority claimed in a journal article 
or scholarly book.  Moreover, the broadly conservative cast that such evaluation was understood to 
possess in the culture wars of the eighties and nineties—the understanding that absolute claims of 
literary quality reinforce rather than scrutinize existing distributions of cultural power—fortified the 
barrier between academic and popular critical postures, particularly in the case of literature 
introduced under a multiculturalist rubric.2  And yet, just such evaluative claims have been central to 
                                                 
2 John Guillory concludes his preface to Cultural Capital with the recognition that “The strangest 
consequence of the canon debate has surely been the discrediting of judgment, as though human 
beings could ever refrain from judging the things they make” (xiv).  He further explains: “It is 
scarcely surprising that a critique of canon formation which reduces that process to conspiratorial 
acts of evaluation is compelled to regard the discourse of the aesthetic as merely fraudulent, as a 
screen for the covert affirmation of hegemonic values which can be shown to be the real 
qualification for canonicity in the first place.  For the same reason that such a critique sees the 
discourse of the aesthetic only as a mystification of the bias of judgment, it can ignore the mediating 
functions of the school, reducing that institution to a support for the equally fraudulent claims to 
objectivity or expertise on the part of the judges, the gatekeepers of the canon” (270).  Guillory 
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the popular advancement, marketing, and discussion of what we can broadly call ethnic literature 
during the periods when such works were coming to cultural prominence.  Leslie Fiedler, appraising 
the state of American Jewish fiction in the Jewish publication Midstream in 1958, is representative in 
his emphasis on the importance of literary quality in crafting a literary history of twentieth century 
American Jewish writing and in connecting that literary history to the social history of American 
Jewish life: “[The fifties] demanded a Jewish hero, perhaps, but hesitated indifferently between 
Augie March [hero of Saul Bellow’s The Adventures of Augie March] and Marjorie Morningstar 
[Herman Wouk’s eponymous heroine].  What was demanded was the talent and devotion and 
conviction which belong particularly to Bellow, and to the rich, complicated milieu out of which he 
emerged” (35).  While the 1950s provided a fertile soil for the emergence and flourishing of Jewish 
themes and characters, it is through the talent, devotion, and conviction which attest to the literary 
quality of Bellow’s work—and that separates Bellovian achievement from the Woukian 
middlebrow—that the potential of American Jewish writing is realized.  Jewish American literature 
entered a position of prominence on the American literary scene not simply on the grounds that it 
was important, but rather on the grounds that it was good.  But what, in this context, does such a 
claim mean?  On what rationales and to what effects did proponents of American Jewish literary 
culture claim the literary quality of the works they advanced?  What, to popular advocates of Jewish 
writing during the postwar period, was the value of Jewish literature, and the value of Jewishness to 
that literature? 
A key place to look for answers to these questions are the popular (i.e., commercially 
produced) anthologies of Jewish writing that appeared with increasing frequency in the postwar 
                                                                                                                                                             
ultimately argues that the aims of canon reformers to redress social inequities through reform of the 
curriculum would be better served by fixing inequities in access to the classroom.  He thus 
concludes with a defense of aesthetic judgment that rests on just such academic standards as I 
mention above—one which substitutes standards of intellectual importance for standards of 
representation as the grounds for curricular revision, though in principle it would allow the inclusion 
of many of the same texts that were the object of feminist and multiculturalist recovery efforts. 
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period.  Such collections, whether focused entirely on contemporary American Jewish writing or 
spanning multiple historical periods, languages, and geographic boundaries, not only presented 
implicit and explicit arguments about how Jewish literature was constituted, but also offered 
examples of that fiction as evidence of its quality.  To a large extent, as various scholars have 
argued,3 these anthologies function as sites for Jewish literary canon formation, or at least for the 
articulation of the meaning of Jewish literature as a literary historical category.  But, as this chapter 
will argue, canon formation and literary historical interventions are only a small part of the work of 
these publications, which targeted themselves not mainly to scholars, but to casual but interested 
readers.  Readings of these anthologies which use them as evidence for the state of the art of Jewish 
writing at different periods of history, supported by the anthologies’ often polemical introductions, 
privilege the interventions that they make in literary historiography and the evidence that their 
content and composition provide for analyses of American Jewish identity formation.4  These 
approaches to the anthology are certainly valuable—they tell us much about the nature of postwar 
American Jewish life as imagined in literature, and about the cultural work that such anthologies 
perform in the project of developing and articulating Jewish culture outside of (and alongside) 
Jewish religious institutions (from synagogues to rituals to religious texts).  But whatever claims 
                                                 
3 See, in particular, Jeremy Shere, “Jewish American Canons,” and David Stern, “The Anthological 
Imagination In Jewish Literature.”  Stern writes that “Surely the most (and almost the only) 
discussed aspect of the anthology has been its canonizing role, its service in authorizing, sacralizing, 
and legitimating certain works and of marginalizing, delegitimating, and anathemizing others” (5). 
4 Julian Levinson, for example, argues that postwar anthologies of Jewish literature are “premised on 
the idea that a definable Jewish culture, not reducible to religion, exists” (144), and that imaginative 
literature occupies a privileged place in their definitions of this secular Jewish “culture” or 
“ethnicity.”  “If the central metaphors for Jewishness are the debate, the struggle, and the bridge, 
and if the authority of the normative religious tradition has been unseated,” he writes, “the only 
remaining mediating force becomes human consciousness, which itself becomes the final arbiter of 
meaning.  And imaginative literature, we might say, specializes in the representation of individual 
consciousness and subjective response” (145).  If anthologies instantiate secular Jewish culture, their 
literary content points to the personalization of Jewishness, and the connection of secular Jewish 
identification to literary modes of thought.  For Levinson, “secularism need not be looked for in the 
literature itself,” but rather “can be seen instead as a project that might use literature in defining 
Jewish identity” (134). 
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these volumes make to the work of cultural summation they make as commercial objects, premised, 
among other things, on the attractions that they hold for a definite class of readers. 
If the introductions and design of these collections present them as records of Jewish 
American literary writing, then their stories also function for readers as objects of emotional 
engagement and literary enjoyment.  Indeed, a key function of these commercial anthologies, 
published during a period in which Jewish writers and intellectuals were coming into positions of 
increasing cultural cachet, was to lay claim to a readership on the basis of the categorical appeal of 
Jewish stories—that is, to suggest, and to bank on the suggestion, that Jewish writing had a 
specifically generic value: that it could command the enthusiasm of a significant group of readers on 
the basis of their interest in something called “Jewish writing.”  Situating postwar American ethnic 
modernism within the structures of literary production defined by the rise of creative writing 
programs, Mark McGurl argues that postwar ethnic writing might best be understood as “high-
cultural pluralism,” a literary mode which “enacts a layering of positively marked differences: in the 
modernist tradition, it understands its self-consciously crafted and/or intellectually substantial 
products as importantly distinct from mass culture or genre fiction, although in practice [. . .] this 
distinction is often blurred or intentionally put at risk.  The high-cultural pluralist writer is 
additionally called upon to speak from the point of view of one or another hyphenated population, 
synthesizing the particularity of the ethnic—or analogously marked—voice with the elevated idiom 
of literary modernism” (56–7).5  The prestige of high-cultural pluralism—its “high culture” 
                                                 
5 The emphasis of McGurl’s argument is on explaining the peculiar rise of “systematic creativity” 
with the increasing dominance of the creative writing program as an American literary institution 
after the second world war.  To this end, his idea of high-cultural pluralism offers a powerful 
explanation of the work that ethnic literary fiction does to marry group identification with a form 
(late modernism) that emphasizes the irreducible intellectual and aesthetic achievements of the 
individual writer—that is, to enlist ethnic writing as a vehicle for high cultural prestige. In this 
explanation of the post-war American literary system, genre fiction, which is “systematic” in a 
fundamentally different way from the output of creative writing programs, stands against the literary 
modes at the center of his study. McGurl’s analysis of ethnic modernism is animated by a tension 
16 
 
pedigree—depends upon the theoretical dominance of its affinities with modernist craftsmanship 
over those it shares with genre fiction.  The anthologies under discussion in this chapter at once lay 
claim to the contemporary, literary prestige of Jewish writing and construe such writing as a genre 
with popular appeal.  The attractiveness of Jewish writing may be linked to secular or religious 
feelings, and it certainly holds different meanings for different readers, but regardless of the specific 
form such attraction takes in any individual reader and of the personal motivations that compel it, 
the generic appeal of Jewish fiction combines a reader’s presumably extra-literary interest in Jewish 
culture with their enjoyment of literary reading.  The question of literary quality is thus crucial to the 
anthologies that I discuss below, for more than simply their marketing.  Anthologies such as Harold 
U. Ribalow’s This Land, These People (1950) and Saul Bellow’s Great Jewish Stories (1963), this chapter’s 
main objects of inquiry, see literary quality as crucial to the connections that each collection makes 
with its readers, and to the ways in which such collections seek simultaneously to court and to evade 
their genericity.  Though “literary quality” holds different meanings for each editor, in each case it 
mediates between the enticement that the category of Jewish fiction holds for the reader and the 
threat of sentimentalism, parochialism, and formulaicism that such categorization presents. 
The issue of literary quality is particularly acute in the genre of the commercial anthology.  
As aggregations mainly of previously published works, commercial anthologies imply that their 
contents represent a selection of excellent or at least reasonably good representations of their 
subject.  At the same time, such collections tend not to have much highbrow cachet.  Consider, for 
example, Random House publisher Bennett Cerf’s introduction to his 1945 collection, Modern 
American Short Stories: 
This is the golden age of the anthology.  Give any amiable hack a pair of scissors and 
a paste pot, and he’ll bring you back the day after tomorrow a fully annotated 
collection of “The World’s Great Fish Stories,” “Great Tales of Error and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
between structured, institutional pedagogy of the creative writing program and the individual 
creative expression that the program tries to foster. 
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Supercilious,” “My Favorite Seventy-three Nymphomaniacs,” or “The Nursery Book 
of Famous Hatchet Murders.”  There are only two valid excuses for adding another 
anthology to the ever-expanding array.  One is the hope that it can introduce at least 
a handful of insufficiently exploited talents to the general reading public.  The other, 
in the words of Frank Morgan, is to make a little money. (10) 
 
Such collections, in Cerf’s sardonic view, are not standard bearers of artistic merit, but rather a 
convenient and relatively easy way to capitalize on niche readerships within the larger market for 
fiction.  If the literary prestige of story anthologies is tainted by the form’s association with 
commercial exigencies and cynical pandering to an audience’s unliterary desires, the short story itself 
is also a bearer of compromised cultural capital.  Though the short story has been associated with 
craftsmanship and formal unity by commentators from Edgar Allan Poe to the New Critics, it has 
by the same token been disparaged as a genre of formulaic aesthetic conservatism—the fit form of 
writing handbooks and conventional hackery.  As Andrew Levy has argued, “to the extent that the 
short story is a celebration of the marginal voices of our culture, that celebration is mitigated by the 
marginalization of the short story itself” (47). 
Collecting stories that treat several subjects in diverse styles, anthologies of Jewish fiction 
offer the reader a variety of potential points of attachment to Jewish culture, from literary historical 
engagement to emotional and aesthetic experience.  The anthology of Jewish fiction thus speaks in 
two voices: the scholarly-but-accessible tones of popular literary historiography and the often ad-
inflected enthusiasm of projected emotional engagement.  Consider, for example, two ways in which 
Irving Howe’s 1977 New American Library anthology, Jewish-American Stories, frames itself: its 
introduction, written by Howe, and the copy on its back cover.  Howe’s introduction assumes a 
voice of critical authority, situating its subject, Jewish American literature, within a discourse of 
large-scale literary movements with deep historical resonance.  “Over the decades, by now stretching 
into centuries,” Howe begins, “American literature has steadily drawn fresh energies from regions, 
subcultures and ethnic and racial groups which, if taken together, form a pleasing heterogeneity” (1).  
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Jewish American literature, an entity greater than the sum of the stories collected in Howe’s volume, 
is thus introduced as a vital contributor to American letters—at once an expression of “a kind of 
regional culture [. . . . Probably] one of the last this country is going to have” (2), and the product of 
“a profound, even a mysterious sense of distinctiveness” (4).  Howe’s introduction aims to establish 
the significance of Jewish American literature to American writing more broadly, and to enumerate, 
“a bit quixotically, [. . .] some of the main characteristics of American Jewish writing” (4): its style, its 
subject matter, its authors’ sensibilities, its construction of Jewishness, etc.  Howe’s introduction, 
that is to say, focuses on Jewish American writing as such, training its analysis on the writers and 
works that, in Howe’s argument, make up the Jewish American literary tradition.  Though Howe’s 
introduction projects a Jewish or Judeophile reader for whom the texts of Jewish American literature 
would be meaningful (“almost all [of the stories in this collection] would be incomprehensible to a 
reader who lacked some memory or impression—firsthand or through reading—of the immigrant 
Jewish milieu” [5]), he constructs that reader with reference to a standard of comprehensibility, 
rather than to one of emotional engagement.  While Howe’s introduction is, in fact, attuned to 
emotions associated with Jewish American experiences, he associates these emotions 
overwhelmingly with Jewish American writers rather than with readers of their stories. 
The book’s back cover strikes a markedly different note.  Red capital letters above a 
selection of stories from the anthology announce the legibility of these particularistic texts to the 
most general of readers: “FROM THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE—FICTION OF UNIVERSAL 
APPEAL.”  The remainder of the cover’s text goes on to characterize the drama of that experience 
and the texture of that appeal: 
These are among the 26 outstanding short stories selected for this landmark 
collection by Irving Howe, author of World of Our Fathers, and one of our leading 
literary critics and social chroniclers.  In them are reflected one of the greatest and 
most dramatic of American experiences—the soul-shaking changes that occurred 
when age-old Jewish traditions came into contact, in ways that resulted in either 
conflict or fusion, with the ideas of the New World.  Here are stories filled with 
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laughter, tears, compassion, wisdom.  Here are humanity and artistry that touch and 
move us all. 
 
Though the jacket copy, like Howe’s introduction, suggests a metanarrative which draws these 
stories together, the emphasis of that narrative is on its personal effects—both the “soul-shaking 
changes” of American Jewish immigration and its aftermath, and the emotionally resonant “laughter, 
tears, compassion, wisdom” that emanate from the stories’ writers (and, implicitly, from both their 
“age-old Jewish traditions” and their dynamic modern milieux), in order to touch and move the 
reader.  While they address different concerns and speak in different tones, the introduction and 
jacket copy of Howe’s anthology aren’t in conflict.  The emotional experience of text and context 
suggested by the jacket-copy is compatible with the intellectual interest implied by the tone and 
content of the introduction.  Indeed, the jacket copy touts Howe’s scholarly bona fides, while the 
introduction tends to present its claims in an objective but not entirely disinterested tone that invites 
the reader’s emotional investment in the story of Jewish American literary history—a tendency 
evident in the pathos of Howe’s much quoted claim that mid-century Jewish American culture 
“finds its voice and its passion at exactly the moment it approaches disintegration” (3).  Nonetheless, 
Howe’s introduction, characterizing the works in the collection and the literary tradition of which 
they are a part, emphasizes a critical and intellectual interest in the materials of the anthology, and 
the paragraph on the back cover suggests a frame for a reader’s engagement rooted in an emotional 
experience of the stories and of the larger historical narrative that they reflect.  If the focus of 
Howe’s introduction is weighted toward the collection’s authors, the book’s packaging is weighted 
toward a reader’s projected experience. 
The interplay between the dual editorial voices of Howe’s anthology, from the comparatively 
dispassionate mood of literary history to the exhortatory tones of commerce, don’t simply 
characterize this anthology alone, but also reflect the broader project of the publication series of 
which it is a part, the Mentor imprint of the New American Library (NAL).  The NAL was (and is) a 
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mass market press specializing in the publication of works of traditional literary or cultural value in 
inexpensive, mass market editions.  As the NAL’s slogan, “good reading for the millions” suggests, 
the press was founded both on the democratic ideal of publicly accessible culture and on the 
profitability of making such culture available.  According to book historian Thomas Bonn, “The 
New American Library’s major contribution to American culture and to book publishing was its 
Mentor imprint, which proved that serious works of nonfiction can be sold cheaply and profitably 
through a variety of mass distribution channels” (183).  While Howe’s introduction situates Jewish 
American literature as part of a broader intellectual history of American letters and literary 
regionalism, the book’s publication by “the most literary of the mass market publishers” (Bonn 183) 
aligns it with the mass market dissemination of American literary culture.  The value of Jewish 
American stories for the NAL is necessarily both cultural and commercial—indeed, in the context of 
NAL publication, the stories’ literary value furnishes their value within a mass market context. 
As the example of Howe’s 1977 collection suggests, one of the main activities of anthologies 
of Jewish fiction is to frame the Jewishness of their stories not only as a subject of analytical interest, 
but as a marketable attraction to their readers.  Viewed through the lens provided by the popular 
Jewish anthology, Jewishness is not simply an analytical category, but also an appealing category: a 
label, like Chicano fiction or African-American fiction, but also like science fiction, medical thriller, 
or detective novel, that for a variety of idiosyncratic reasons might draw a reader to pick up a book.  
In the eyes of the popular anthologies of Jewish fiction that I discuss in this chapter, then, 
Jewishness is at once a subject of quality literary treatment and a signifier of generic interest, by 
which I mean a category that provides the initial connection between the stories of the collection 
and their readers.  In addition to the literary historical functions that they possess, postwar American 
popular anthologies of Jewish fiction place their stories before their readers as objects of enjoyment, 
and appeal to those readers as potential fans of Jewish writing.  These anthologies thus propose that 
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Jewish stories have both commercial and literary value.  Regardless of the evenness of quality that a 
reader might perceive across the stories in an anthology, the anthologies that I discuss in this chapter 
make constitutive claims for the literary value of their contents qua Jewish stories, and for the 
marketability of Jewish stories as objects of literary quality.  Such professions of quality, variable in 
their particulars, cast Jewish stories as unique points of readerly attachment to Jewish culture.  
Indeed, the commercial appeal of these volumes was often predicated, as in Howe’s collection, on 
the idea that the reader would be moved both by the stories themselves and by the stories as 
metonyms for a larger Jewish experience. Anthologies of Jewish fiction address two subjects at once: 
the Jewish writers whose concerns and approaches they present, and the readers of Jewish texts, 
often presumed to be Jewish readers, for whom they provide material.6  They thus reveal a 
productive uncertainty about just what value such collections provide, and for whom. 
 
Great Stories and Composite Portraits: Saul Bellow and Bernard Ribalow on Jewish Writers 
and Jewish Form 
This section considers two post-war anthologies of Jewish fiction as a case study in different 
modes of conceiving the appeal of Jewish fiction per se: Harold U. Ribalow’s This Land, These People 
(1950) and Saul Bellow’s Great Jewish Stories (1963).  Though these anthologies reflect different 
editorial frameworks, This Land drawing only on then-contemporary Anglophone American Jewish 
                                                 
6 For Harold U. Ribalow, writing in the weekly organ of the American Jewish Congress, the 
connection between Jewish books and Jewish readers was straightforward.  In a 1951 article titled 
“Do Jews Read?” Ribalow laments that while the publication of titles of Jewish interest increased 
since his previous consideration of the subject in 1949, sales figures for most titles remained low: 
“That serious volumes by men like Lewisohn, Gaster and Heschel sell in driblets is not to the credit 
of the community.  That works of fiction cannot as easily be analyzed is not surprising, for no 
publisher can guess what kind of novels people will buy.  But that the finest Jewish fiction, as some 
of the books listed here undoubtedly are—sell poorly is another mark against the community” (12).  
If Jewish books, including volumes about Israel, the Holocaust, Jewish theology, and American 
Jewish life, sell poorly, Ribalow suggests, it is because their implicit audience of Jewish readers has 
failed to meet their cultural obligation to buy them. 
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literature and Great Jewish Stories compiling work from different languages, historical periods, and 
geographical regions, the two volumes taken together reflect a developing discourse on what Jewish 
fiction is and could be for post-war American readers.  The volumes are connected by more than 
just their shared form.  In 1951, Saul Bellow authored a critical review of the This Land in Commentary 
magazine.  Over a decade later, in composing the introduction to his own anthology (an 
introduction that is now itself frequently anthologized in collections of essays about Jewish writing), 
Bellow adapted a substantial section of material from his earlier review to furnish the concluding 
note of his remarks on Jewish fiction.  Read in light of the material connection between the two 
anthologies, Bellow’s later essay emerges as a continued engagement with an ongoing process of 
collecting Jewish writing, and an extended response to the faults that he finds in Ribalow’s 
collection.  Moreover, Ribalow’s and Bellow’s anthologies embody two materially and commercially 
distinct approaches to the collection of stories under the rubric of Jewish fiction: that of smaller 
Jewish publishing houses (such as Thomas Yoseloff, whose press oversaw the reprinting of 
Ribalow’s first two anthologies in a single volume and the initial publication of his subsequent 
collections), and that of the mass market press, for whom Jewish fiction was one category among 
many.  While Ribalow’s hardback collection brought Jewish writing before the public eye in a 
comparatively limited quantity and through traditional book distribution channels, Bellow’s Great 
Jewish Stories was published in several editions as a part of major mass market publisher Dell’s Laurel 
imprint, a line of classic reprints and newly compiled anthologies designed to appeal to high-school 
and college students.7  Bellow’s anthology thus placed Jewish stories between covers aesthetically 
                                                 
7 Dell’s Laurel Books were part of a diversification strategy that moved the publisher outside of their 
traditional association with paperback pulps, reprints of contemporary hardcover novels, and 
assorted other print ventures (their best-selling title for many years, for example, was the Dell 
Crossword Dictionary).  Per a report in Book Production Magazine, “The books [in Dell’s catalogue] reach 
every age level and appeal to the many tastes within those levels.  Members of the ‘crayon set’ are 
often introduced to Dell through the Color and Learn language books, grow into the Harlin Quist 
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indistinguishable from, for example, those of American Short Story Masterpieces, another Laurel 
anthology partaking in the same marbled cover design, enlisting Jewish fiction as a genre category 
appealing to a discrete audience.  These two forms of Jewish textual dissemination were in 
commercial competition with one another.  According to a 1979 Publishers Weekly survey of the state 
of Jewish publishing, “‘There is a belief in the industry,’ Schocken reports, ‘that Jews buy a 
disproportionately large number of books and therefore are receptive to books of Jewish interest’ [. . 
. .] But as David Olivestone, Hebrew Publishing Company’s Editor-in-Chief, points out, this new 
consciousness of ‘the fact that Jews constitute a large percentage of book buyers’ contains a threat to 
the very life of the specialized Jewish publisher. ‘More general publishers are putting out books of 
Jewish interest,’ Olivestone notes, a fact clearly borne out by PW responses from two trade 
publishers who voice what is being felt and acted upon by many other general publishers: namely, 
that titles of Jewish interest may well be good book business.” (64)  Ribalow’s and Bellow’s 
anthologies thus represent not simply two different individual takes on what constitutes good Jewish 
writing, but different commercial approaches to the issue of publishing Jewish texts and attracting 
and engaging with a Jewish audience. 
This Land, These People, was produced in 1950 as the first anthology entirely devoted to 
contemporary fiction about American Jewish life written by American Jewish writers.  The book, 
published by the comparatively small Beechhurst Press, contained a selection of short stories by 
Jewish authors on Jewish themes published largely in the two decades before the volume’s 
compilation.  As such, it extended Ribalow’s larger career as a guide to and partisan of Jewish literary 
culture.  Ribalow (son of Menachem Ribalow—a noted Hebraist and the editor of the American 
Hebrew language publication, Hadoar) worked largely within secular Jewish cultural contexts as an 
editor for Congress Weekly (magazine of the American Jewish Congress), American Zionist, and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
line to meet ‘little Boy Blue’ and his friends, advance through school with the Laurel Leaf Library, 
and supplement their college educations with Laurel and Delta paperbacks” (qtd. in Laughlin 94). 
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Jewish Telegraphic Agency, an occasional contributor to Jewish cultural journals, and author or editor of 
over a dozen books of general Jewish interest (e.g., in addition to several anthologies of Jewish 
fiction, The Jew in American Sports, Fighting Heroes of Israel, and Autobiographies of American Jews), and a 
regular reviewer (often of books of Jewish interest) for general interest publications.  Ribalow 
additionally can be credited with having returned the now classic Call It Sleep to the public eye, 
having initiated a correspondence with its author, Henry Roth, on the Maine duck farm where he 
was working in 1959, and having arranged for the novel’s 1960 republication.8  In articles in such 
publications as the Nation and the American Mercury, Ribalow recommended Jewish literature as a 
uniquely intimate guide to Jewish culture for a (largely gentile) population in the dark about Jewish 
life and customs, not to mention Jewish writing.  Ribalow’s articles sketch a historical moment 
crying out for an editorial hand—one in which a profusion of work on Jewish subjects offered 
unprecedented opportunities for popular insight into Jewish culture and concomitantly many 
opportunities for misinformation about Jewish life:  
Many areas of Jewish concern were treated—and still are being described—in 
current works of fiction, yet the general reader, picking up these books 
promiscuously, guided to them either because of the fame of the author’s by-line or 
                                                 
8 In the introduction to The Tie That Binds, a collection of his interviews with Jewish writers, Ribalow 
calls the continued success of Call It Sleep “one of the most gratifying experiences of my own literary 
life” (11).  The Tie That Binds is itself a fascinating document of Ribalow’s construction of Jewish 
literary culture: organized both around its subject and the person of its editor, it places Jewish 
writing in a decidedly personal frame, allowing the reader a rich sense of Ribalow’s opinions and 
editorial philosophy as developed in continuing conversation with a wide cohort of Jewish writers, 
most still well known.  Animating Ribalow’s interviews, for which he read the entire published 
corpus of each author, is a passion both for his subject and for the people who write Jewish fiction, 
a personal connection to the material augmented by author snapshots, occasionally blurry or lit with 
a bright full flash, taken by Ribalow at the time of each session.  About Charles Angoff, a particular 
friend, for example, Ribalow writes, “I remain puzzled and angry that none of Angoff’s novels are in 
paperback, that his name is mentioned only in passing when contemporary critics write 
comprehensive essays on American Jewish writing.  His work is substantive, suffused with love for 
his people, and written out of a deep knowledge of the American Jew” (17).  The “love for his 
people” and “deep knowledge of the American Jew” that Ribalow finds in Angoff’s work are, I 
would argue, central to Ribalow’s aesthetic of Jewish fiction—one which presupposes an 




because of the enthusiasm of a particular critic or reviewer, who often has no 
background to judge the book accurately, has only a dim notion of Jewish life in this 
country. 
Yet there have appeared, among the hundreds of novels devoted to Jewish 
themes, a handful which, if read by non-Jews in a number of concentrated sittings, 
will offer a better than fair idea of the American Jew; the background which formed 
his personality; the reasons for his neuroses, if any; the differences between himself 
and his fellow Americans. (“Jewish Life” 110) 
 
In these essays, Ribalow presents Jewish fiction as a uniquely potent guide to the communal life and 
concerns of American Jews, yet one not without risk.  To realize their potential as instruments of 
general education about Jewish life, such works of fiction require more than the “promiscuous” 
browsing of the casual reader—they demand, rather, reliable recommendations and careful attention.  
Such an understanding envisions the writer as an ethnographic informant, chronicling the ways that 
Jews respond to certain situations, the problems they tend to face, their manner of speaking and 
habits of thought, and the reviewer as a necessary arbiter of a source’s reliability.  Thus, the 
watchword of the recommender (cousin of the anthologist) is “accuracy,” a term defined by their 
insider knowledge into American Jewish life and by an implicit separation of authentic from 
synthetic or stereotypical accounts. 
The introduction to This Land, These People opens with the bold proclamation that “Every 
one of the short stories in this book is a story that only a Jew could have written” (1).  For Ribalow, 
the Jewishness of the collection’s authors is of paramount importance in attesting to the worth of 
the collection as a record of American Jewish life.  The promise that “only a Jew could have written” 
the stories in his collection9 not only vouches for their authenticity as representations of American 
Jewish life, but it also frames Jewish identity as literary capital.  Ribalow immediately qualifies his 
                                                 
9 This partial definition of Jewish fiction resonates with Michael Kramer’s controversial 2001 
argument that “[the] foundational definition of Jewish literature is the sweeping, seemingly 
tautological definition that, ironically, many find the least appropriate of all—that Jewish literature is 
simply literature written by Jews” (289).  Kramer’s own argument relies heavily on the work of 
Jewish literary anthologists to provide evidence of the often unspoken Jewish biographical 
determinant underlying Jewish literary canon formation. 
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initial claim of the stories’ Jewish provenance: “[this] is only to say that there is some aspect—
reflected in either the characters, situations or mood employed—in each story that is inextricably 
bound to Jewish life in America” (1).  But his original, controlling idea, that the contents of his 
anthology not only reflect American Jewish life, but that they do so in a way that is theoretically (and 
not just practically) unique to Jewish writers, firmly associates contemporary Jewish fiction with 
community participation and communal self-representation.  Jewish fiction, as defined by Ribalow’s 
anthology, is not simply fiction produced by Jews, it is fiction that only Jews could produce: fiction 
authorized as accurately Jewish by the essential authenticity of its Jewish writers. 
 This Land, These People is an anthology conceived in this explanatory mode: one in which 
“[S]lowly and individually, these Americans [its writers] have been contributing and continue to 
contribute to a wider understanding of Jewish life in this country in the best way they know how—
through the medium of literature” (10).  Even as it casts Jewish writing as part of a larger project of 
advancing the general understanding of Jewish life, however, This Land presents its writers not only 
as guides to Jewish life, but also as examples of Jewish integration with American culture.  Ribalow’s 
anthology thus has at least two main aims: to provide its reader with insight into American Jewish 
life and to argue for the achievements of American Jewish writers as contributors to a larger 
American literary culture.  In this second sense, the collection casts its writers at once as artists 
(“among the most widely read in the United States,” of whom “a handful [. . .] have been considered 
by acute literary critics as truly significant American writers” [1]) and exemplars of American Jewish 
cultural achievement.  At the same time, Ribalow clearly understood his anthology’s audience not 
only to consist of gentiles roaming bookstores for literary enlightenment about the state of 
American Jewry, but also (and more frequently) American Jews themselves.  A 1951 article titled 
“Do Jews Read?” which Ribalow penned for Congress Weekly laments, among other evidence of 
paltry support for quality Jewish literature among Jewish readers, the disappointing sales (“not quite 
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4,000” [12]) of his own collection.  In its editorial design, This Land embodies a tension between 
didacticism and literary enjoyment that comes into sharp focus in the ways that it imagines its 
readers: as Jewish insiders for whom the stories will have the appeal of truthful hominess and whose 
purchase of the volume might be understood as a matter of intra-ethnic solidarity, and as non-Jewish 
outsiders for whom the book provides a window into a previously opaque American subculture.  If 
the recommendations that Ribalow provided in review essays in non-Jewish periodicals aimed to put 
accurate representations of Jewish life before the eyes of gentile readers, those works remained (like 
many of the stories in his anthology before their collation) in contexts that were not particularly 
Jewish.  Indeed, the virtue of these stories and novels, implicit in Ribalow’s remarks, is that through 
them the gentile reader can encounter Jewish life without needing to enter a specifically Jewish space 
(either textual, social, or physical).  Collected in This Land, These People, however, the stories enter a 
decidedly Jewish milieu, a development which threatens the didactic function they have for the non-
Jewish magazine subscriber or bookstore browser even as it resolves the dangers of unselective 
reading.  This tension is apparent in the prominent disclaimer that opens the second paragraph of 
the collection’s jacket copy: “No chauvinistic catalogue of stories, this anthology was compiled as a 
book to be read and enjoyed as literature.”  Implicit in the reassurance that the reader might find 
more than just the pleasures of ethnic familiarity to enjoy in the volume is the concern that the 
anthology’s Jewish focus projects a lack of aesthetic ambition.  Indeed, the introduction’s several 
citations of the provenance of its stories in “class magazines,” little magazines, and only a select few 
quality Jewish publications and its repeated reference to the popularity and acclaim of its authors 
serve to reassure its readers that the Jewish content of the stories in the collection doesn’t pre-empt 
their aesthetic value; that reading the stories can be fun, and not (or not only) work. 
The jacket’s disclaimer did not satisfy Saul Bellow’s misgivings about the collection, and his 
review found plenty to fault.  While the book presents a variety of slices of Jewish life from around 
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the nation, Bellow argues, “[t]he subjects are here, but they are not, except by [Delmore] Schwartz, 
Michael Seide, and two or three others, entered, opened, and brought to life” (203).  In Bellow’s 
estimation, the collection is, at best, uneven.  The shortcomings that Bellow finds in the stories of 
the collection bring his attention to their authors. “Still, I was intrigued by this collection, not 
because it added much to my knowledge of Jewish life on the frontier or in Cleveland or the Bronx, 
but because of the writers.  Their own difficulties, and the degree of resourcefulness they brought to 
their solution, were often far more interesting than those of the characters in their stories” (203).  
The predicaments faced by the authors as they composed their stories here fill in for the absence of 
interest generated by the stories themselves.  The style of the stories in This Land, These People is, in 
Bellow’s reading, obtrusively bad, bringing to mind other instances of similar stylistic missteps.  
Thus, the straining metaphor of musical composition and overabundance of adjectives in Louis 
Zara’s “Resurgam” carries Bellow “back in thought to the kitchen, where the gifted and inspired 
adolescent theme-writer sat beside the stove,” and the stiff propriety of Ludwig Lewisohn’s “Writ of 
Divorcement” suggests “that great plush horse of a style, sixteen hands high and panting like 
Macaulay” (203–4).  In a surprising way, then, the stories’ correspondence to pre-established 
forms—their genericity—calls attention to their authors at the moment of composition, while, in the 
system of aesthetic value upon which Bellow’s review relies, the mark of stylistic mastery is to defer 
a reader’s awareness of the author through their absorption in the story. 
Bellow begins his review, titled “In No Man’s Land,” with an evaluative critique of the 
writing in the collection, much of which, to his ear, is overblown.  This, he argues, is a trait common 
to both the anthology’s excerpted writers and to its compiler.  “In his rather inflated introduction, 
Mr. Ribalow is, I think, trying to speak for the record and to perform a public-relations function.  
And the contributors do something similar” (204).  The problem at the heart of the anthology’s 
failure, in Bellow’s reading, is the tendency that he sees for these writers to produce idealized types 
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of American Jewish life rather than authentically felt and deeply imagined characters—a tendency by 
no means limited to Jewish writers but, in his view, particularly fatal to their ambitions to produce 
emotionally authentic fiction of Jewish life: “The American character is in a fluid state, not yet 
defined, and teachers, leaders, scholars, publicists, and writers are engaged in defining it.  Or, rather, 
not so much in defining as in asserting what it is. [. . . . The figures that come from this activity] exist 
by fiat.  They are constructions and, at this level, construction faces construction and type faces type.  
The Jewish figures in this volume come into being by a comparable process” (204–5).  But, though 
Bellow sees the construction of ideal types as a common and symptomatic project of his 
contemporary American culture, Jewish writers are in his view uniquely susceptible to this mode of 
idealization.  “It is more difficult for [these Jewish writers] than for other children of Europeans to 
divorce themselves from a long history, and they therefore feel obliged to explain themselves and 
create an acceptable picture of the American Jew” (204).  Where other European ethnic writers, 
Bellow claims, can easily sever their ethnic ties and blend into the American mainstream, or 
approach their ethnic subjects from a posture of objectivity, Jewish American writers continue to 
identify as Jews even while assuming American identity, and therefore feel the need to justify to the 
American mainstream the Jewishness which remains a part of their self-conception. 
Bellow’s critique of the anthology hinges on the limitations of its authors’ engagement with 
psychologically realistic representation.  As his review’s ascerbic title suggests, Bellow’s critique 
occupies the same ground as Ribalow’s praise: that of literary realism.  Ultimately, however, Bellow’s 
conception of realism differs substantially from Ribalow’s.  Whereas for Ribalow the hallmark of 
good Jewish fiction is the recognizability of the social world that it presents to a Jew engaged with 
Jewish communal life, for Bellow the chief priority of realistic literature is the description of 
individual character in ways that necessarily resist what he sees as sentimental boosterism.  “[These 
authors’] effort is to present themselves, to explain differences and strangeness, and back of it, 
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behind the painting of the radiance of Jewish virtue in the face of a mother, the solemnity of a 
kaddish, the naming of Jewish dishes, behind the comedy of Jewish American speech, behind even 
the ‘social criticism,’ there is something uneasy and not quite true” (204).  The lamentable 
characteristics of the anthology come down to a sentimentalism and superficiality that, in Bellow’s 
reading, are symptomatic of an American Jewish unease with the completeness of their assimilation.  
Bellow’s review reads bad writing (surely not a unique property of Jewish fiction) as a token of the 
disordered contemporary Jewish condition. 
It is clearly a problem for Bellow that the writers of Ribalow’s anthology capture his 
attention more pointedly than do their stories.  This objection, though Bellow doesn’t argue so 
explicitly, extends to the design of the anthology as a whole, insofar as it aims to enlist Jewish writers 
as representative examples of American Jewish success.  The review casts Ribalow’s collection as a 
paradigmatically sociological document, and goes on to diagnose this problem as a reflection of the 
authors’ desire to ameliorate the discomfort they feel as Jews in America.  The straining, false note 
that Bellow detects in their language is symptomatic of a straining for social acceptance.  The value 
of the writing, then, is in what it reveals about the writers, rather than in what it reveals, as a story, to 
the reader.  And yet the review’s concluding thought turns, too, to an invocation of Jewish pride: 
“The less we find of actuality in reading stories such as these, the more a mass of unreclaimed 
material weighs with a great weight upon us.  And as long as American Jewish writers continue to 
write in this way we will have to go elsewhere for superior being and beauty, and will thus continue 
to be foreigners, seeking these things in other centuries and in other countries” (205). 
The “we” of Bellow’s conclusion is the sophisticated Jewish reader, whose reading is a 
search for “superior being and beauty.”  A page earlier, Bellow argues that “this accident—the 
strangeness of discontinuity and of a constant, immense change—happens to all and is the general 
condition.  The narrowly confined and perfect unit of a man, if we could find him now, would prove 
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to be outside all that is significant in our modern lives, lives characterized by the new, provisional, 
changing, dangerous, universal” (204).  The mournfulness with which he characterizes the doom of 
the Jewish intellectual to the condition of a literary foreigner in his or her own land—the evident 
longing for an end to that condition—is a surprising departure from the cosmopolitan appreciation 
of the literatures of other centuries and other countries that underlies the review’s sensibility.  To 
some extent they can’t be reconciled.  But if we move past the incongruous implication that Bellow 
would prefer to have all of his literary needs met by Jewish writing, what we find is a desire for 
serious Jewish writing for serious Jewish readers—a conception at once cosmopolitan and Jewishly 
particular that his own selections in Great Jewish Stories will attempt to realize. 
The reading of a particular story in Ribalow’s anthology, Meyer Levin’s “Maurie Finds His 
Medium,” serves as a bridge between thoughts first articulated in Bellow’s review and their revision 
and inclusion in Bellow’s own later anthology.  Maurie, Levin’s title character, is a luftmensh—a man 
with artistic and business aspirations but with a flightiness that brings all of his projects to 
dissolution.  The story finds him taking up and dropping a variety of endeavors before eventually 
settling in Palestine to become a visual artist, painting works that are “all of one sort: hackneyed, 
common repetitions of landscape and Arab head, banal, except for an occasional splash of 
outrageously brilliant and meaningless color” (189).  The “medium” of the title, then, is kitsch.  An 
outgrowth of the credo that Bellow scorns, “art to be universal must be narrowly confined.  An 
artist must be a perfect unit of time and place, at home with himself, unextraneous” (184), Maurie’s 
work reveals the theoretical desire for a pure and distinct Jewish subjectivity as something that must 
fail to generate work of artistic merit.  Bellow not only reads Levin’s story as kitschy, he imagines 
that Levin shares his impression of the work.  
Levin’s story is particularly significant to Bellow’s review because it thematizes the problem 
that Bellow puts at the center of his critique: that Ribalow’s anthology is stocked with poorly written 
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texts.  “For the majority of these writers the problem of language is not an easy one” (204), Bellow 
writes, but rather an “uneasiness over language” that is rooted in a propagandizing urge—a desire to 
justify their Jewishness which leads to poor writing: “they are not describing actualities and they 
therefore doubt their words” (205).  Levin’s honesty, in this reading of “Maurie Finds His Medium,” 
is in his frank acknowledgment of his shortcomings as a Jewish writer, and his value, for Bellow, is 
that he “comes out with it” (204).  Bellow’s misreading of Levin’s story is predicated on his 
assumption that Levin lacks literary sophistication, and that this unsophistication manifests in a too-
close relationship between the author’s views and those of his character.  In other words, Bellow’s 
problem with Levin’s story stems from the same identification of Jewish writers with their work that 
justifies This Land as a chronicle of Jewish achievement.  Levin’s story, in this reading, fails to 
convert the author’s interests into characters with lives and stories of their own.  In the context of 
Levin’s story, this misreading suggests a telling anxiety about the category of Jewish fiction.  Bellow’s 
misreading cuts precisely against the story’s orientation toward Maurie’s work and ideological 
position, interpreting it to validate the idea that an artist—a Jewish artist in particular—must be both 
existentially whole and wholly at home with his or her cultural medium to produce work of value.  
The supposition against which Bellow reacts so strongly—that the Jewish artist’s work is the 
outgrowth of a unitary Jewish position—is in effect remarkably close to the assumptions that he 
makes about Levin’s position (i.e. that it is the same as Maurie’s), and that he generalizes to the 
collection as a whole.  From the beginning of his review, Bellow reads through the stories to their 
authors.  Bellow’s misreading of “Maurie” tellingly brings together two objects of Bellow’s critical 
derision: the neat identification of an author with his or her work (which undermines the 
professional artistry of fictional characterization) and the idea that a character can be adequately 
defined by a complete embrace of a particular subject position.  Insofar as Jewish stories point back 
to their authors rather than out to a broader significance, and insofar as they hew to ideologically 
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determined constructions of character, Bellow argues, then Jewish writing as such is of limited 
literary value.  The solution proposed in his own anthology is to recast Jewishness not as a 
tautological property of particular persons, but as a sensibility: a quality with literary form outside of 
the individuals who embody it. 
Saul Bellow’s introduction to his Great Jewish Short Stories (1963) construes the Jewishness of a 
text as an open secret to be sussed out by the observant, keyed-in reader: “Most of the stories in this 
collection are modern; a few are ancient.  They were written in Hebrew, German, Yiddish, Russian 
and English, yet all are, to a discerning eye, very clearly Jewish” (9).  The Jewishness of the stories 
that Bellow assembles, while not necessarily apparent in their linguistic form, is taken to be 
accessible to a sufficiently astute observer.  In this introduction, Bellow understands the Jewishness 
of texts to consist in their “oddly tilted perspective” (9), in their endowment of the universe with “a 
human meaning” (10), and in an attitude in which “laughter and trembling are so curiously mingled 
that it is not easy to determine the relations of the two” (12).  Thus, Bellow frames his conception of 
Jewish texts in terms of a particular sensibility—an affective posture that, in his description, 
approaches a Jewish form, rather than a Jewish subject—though, in the event, all of the stories in the 
volume center around Jewish characters and were written by Jewish authors (with the arguable 
exception of Heinrich Heine, whose contribution, “The Rabbi of Bacherach,” was written after his 
conversion to Christianity).  Bellow’s selections, moreover, are motivated not solely out of a concern 
for representative balance, but also out of standards of literary taste and readerly engagement, which 
Bellow sets explicitly against an unliterary reverence for the Jewish past.  Thus, discussing his 
editorial decisions with regard to Yiddish fiction, Bellow writes: 
The effort to describe [the uniqueness of some of our Yiddish classics] may lead us 
into exaggeration and inflation, from inflation to mere piety.  And from piety to 
boredom the path is very short.  I do not see the point of boring anybody for the 
sake of the record.  Opening a book in order to pay our respects to a vanished 
culture, a world destroyed to the eternal reproach of all mankind, we may be tempted 
to set literary standards aside.  Still, a story should be interesting, highly interesting, 
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as interesting as possible—inexplicably absorbing.  There can be no other 
justification for any piece of fiction. (13) 
 
There is an element of posturing in this avowal of editorial freedom from the inclusion of stories for 
the sake of the historical record; though Bellow confesses that he “[does] not wholly admire the 
stories of I. L. Peretz” and avers that Sholem Aleichem “gives the Yiddish reader indescribable 
pleasure, but his stories themselves are by a more general standard often weak,” he nevertheless 
includes four stories by Peretz and two by Sholem Aleichem (12–13).  But even if his editorial 
practice fails to conform to his defense of it, Bellow’s identification of interest as the central 
justification for all fiction rhetorically connects his argument for a Jewish literary sensibility to the 
standards of aesthetic judgment that justify his work as editor of a mass market collection. 
To conclude his justification for the particular form that his anthology takes, Bellow returns 
to the same quotation from Levin’s story that he addressed in his 1951 review: 
“I was a foreigner, writing in a foreign language . . . What am I?  Native, certainly.  
My parents came to this country . . . they were the true immigrants, the actual 
foreigners. . . . But I, American-born, raised on hot dogs, I am out of place in 
America.  Remember this: art to be universal must be narrowly confined.  An artist 
must be a perfect unit of time and place, at home with himself, unextraneous. . . . 
Who am I?  Where do I come from?  I am an accident.  What right do I have to 
scribble in this American language that comes no more naturally to me than it does 
to the laundry Chinaman?” 
 Theories like those expressed by Mr. Levin’s character, as Mr. Levin is at 
pains to show, about the “perfect unit of time and place” seldom bring any art into 
the world.  Art appears, and then theory contemplates it; that is the usual order in 
relations between art and theory.  It cannot be argued that the stories of Isaac Babel 
are not characteristically Jewish.  And they were written in Russian by a man who 
knew Yiddish well enough to have written them in that language. [. . .] Why should 
he have chosen therefore to write his own stories in Russian, the language of the 
oppressors, of Pobedonostev and the Black Hundreds?  If, before writing, he had 
taken his bearings he could not have found himself to be “a perfect unit of time and 
place.” He wrote in Russian from motives we can never expect to understand fully.  
These stories have about them something that justifies them to the most grudging 
inquiry—they have spirit, originality, beauty.  Who was Babel?  Where did he come 
from?  He was an accident.  We are all such accidents.  We do not make up history 
and culture.  We simply appear, not by our own choice.  We make what we can of 
our condition with the means available.  We must accept the mixture as we find it—




Bellow’s treatment of Isaac Babel foregrounds a critical tension in his understanding of the 
mechanisms by which Jewish literature is created and codified as such.  In Bellow’s account, Babel’s 
case demonstrates the artistically fruitful convergence of unmotivated fate and artistic agency, 
understanding a writer as an intentional actor, whose creations are at once motivated by their creator 
and a product of the inscrutable conditions of that person’s development.  In Bellow’s review, 
Maurie’s lamenting (and lamentable) search for a place outside of contingent history in which he can 
plant his essentially Jewish flag is a screen for an ethno-religious separatism keyed to a broader 
discomfort with “American” expression: “Why is there this anxiety about using a language our 
parents did not speak?  Music is also a second language, yet the composer, unlike Maurie, does not 
think to examine his right to it.  For Americans, what there is to be said, passionately said, can come 
out only in American, the language we have in common with the Chinese laundryman’s son” (204).  
Maurie’s problems with the contingency of his existence are resolved by invoking America as a 
signifier of a unified form of expression that retains room for heterogeneous experiences.  Maurie’s 
discomfort with “American” is a misunderstanding of America, which isn’t, for Maurie, one option 
among many, but his “only” choice.  As his reading of the story is adapted for the introduction to 
Great Jewish Stories, however, Bellow rejects the emphasis on the rightness of American expression 
for American writers in favor of an analysis that foregrounds a writer’s prerogative to choose his or 
her linguistic medium.  
Levin’s Maurie, “American-born, raised on hot dogs,” is a far cry from Bellow’s famously 
game “American, Chicago born,” Augie March—a difference in sensibility connected to Bellow’s 
disdain for the character’s artistic ideology.10 The focus of Bellow’s critique is Maurie’s naïve 
                                                 
10 An aversion which extended, in an earlier version of the introduction, to a hostility towards Levin 
himself—as Andrew Furman reports, Bellow’s introduction to the first edition of the anthology 
accuses Levin of “a curious surrender to xenophobia [. . .] in this theorizing about art,” a position 
amended only after Levin’s complaints, his editors’ urging, and his own move toward ideological 
alignment with Levin’s Zionism (24-6). 
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understanding of the artist’s perfection as prerequisite for the art’s success, a theory which, as Bellow 
notes, privileges context over text and places theory before art.11  Bellow objects to a fussy 
essentialism in Maurie’s theory; an understanding that the perfect conditions for artistic production 
(in particular, for Jewish artistic production) are attainable and therefore necessary. Bellow’s point, 
centrally, is that Jewish language, no less than Jewish content, is not a sufficient condition for Jewish 
art.  The question of linguistic medium is for Bellow (like everything else) subordinate to the 
question of literary quality.  
The key change between Bellow’s treatment of the story in his review and his discussion of it 
in the introduction to his anthology is his recognition that Maurie, the character, is distinct from 
Levin, the writer.  This corrects the perception that Maurie’s predicament is the same as Levin’s, and 
avoids the implication that Levin understands his own position as a Jewish writer in America to limit 
his artistic achievements, and by extension that his own story labors under similar limitations as 
Maurie’s kitsch.  As Levin’s criticism of Maurie is incorporated into Bellow’s introduction to his own 
anthology, it transforms from a neat encapsulation of all that Bellow finds wrong with Ribalow’s 
collection into a corroborating voice for the contention that ends Bellow’s essay: that art must be 
generated prior to the theory that accounts for it, and that the best Jewish stories are those which 
embrace the accidental and unresolved in Jewish life instead of grasping for an essentialized 
wholeness guaranteed by the embrace of one’s Jewish identity.  The shift from Bellow’s criticism of 
Levin to a criticism of the story’s character is significant to the way that Bellow, in each of these 
                                                 
11 Bellow’s comments here, and his invocation of high-art standards throughout his introductory 
essay, seem to me to be aligned with George Steiner’s notion of a Jewish homeland in the text, 
insofar as both see textuality as a bearer of value that is not only not dependent on its contexts, but 
that in fact might be devalued by too close an association with a particular place and time—a 
specifically literary disagreement with Zionist ideology.  “Locked materially in a material homeland,” 
Steiner writes, “the text may, in fact, lose its life-force, and its truth-values may be betrayed” (120).  
So too do Bellow’s arguments aim to provide the texts of his choosing with an essentially textual 




documents, construes the connection between literary quality and the Jewish writer.  Dissociating 
Levin from his creation (though notably not re-anthologizing him), Bellow shifts from a paradigm in 
which Maurie represents Levin, who in turn represents the state of Jewish culture, to one which 
recuperates Levin as a writer with a meaningfully self-aware critical perspective on Jewish life.  The 
anthology’s introduction presents Levin as a figure with critical agency, rather than one whose 
writing, down to its style, is predetermined by a doomed attempt to relieve a Jewish anxiety of 
alienation in America. 
Bellow’s review discounts the stories of This Land as such, in favor of the stories they tell 
about their writers.  Thus Bellow reads Ribalow’s collection as an ersatz sociology of American 
Jewish writing, a reading which parodies the ambitions that Ribalow has for the collection itself—for 
it to stand as a particularly resonant document of American Jewish life, at once balancing 
sociological accuracy with literary merit.  For Ribalow, the medium of fiction allows the reader to 
access something closer to the inner life of American Jews than what is available from traditional 
historiography.  Though Ribalow understands the fiction in his collection to offer a reasonably 
transparent window onto American Jewish life, he imagines that such access will come through the 
writer’s stories, rather than their biographies, the product of professional effort rather than 
unintentional revelation.  All the same, Ribalow’s anthology, interested at once in representing 
Jewish life and cataloging Jewish artistic success, places a particular stress on the biographical 
Jewishness of its writers: however much insight the content of their stories might offer into the 
social world of American Jews, it is the authors’ Jewishness that underwrites their authority and that 
attests to the vibrancy and cultural success of American Jewish letters.  If the stories’ content 
constitutes “a definitive composite portrait of American Jewish life” (10), then the authors’ Jewish 
identification, combined with their artistic ability, justifies the accuracy of their portraiture. 
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In Bellow’s view, however, the artistic deficiencies of the anthology focus the reader’s 
attention instead on the writers themselves.  The main difference between the two anthologies, as 
described by their editors, is that Ribalow’s understands Jewishness in historical terms, as the culture 
produced by Jews, while Bellow’s understands it in theoretical terms, as a transhistorical sensibility.  
Though for Ribalow Jewish culture has Jewish content beyond the simple fact of its being produced 
by Jews, this content is defined practically (in terms of the Jewish subjects that Jewish writers have 
chosen to tackle) rather than theoretically.  Bellow, by contrast, presents Jewish writing not simply as 
the cultural production of Jews that relates in some way to Jewish life, but rather as an “attitude in 
which laughter and trembling are so curiously mingled that it is not easy to determine the relations 
of the two” (12).  Significantly, it is not only the closeness of laughter and trembling that 
characterizes Jewish storytelling, but that the relationship between the two is difficult to explain.  If a 
close relationship between laughter and trembling forms the basis for Bellow’s characterization of 
the attitude of Jewish stories—and thus the content of literary Jewishness—the complexity of that 
relationship, and the sophistication that such complexity implies, marks these stories as serious 
literature.  Indeed, Bellow’s characterization of the value of these stories prizes the very virtues 
embraced by the New Critics: complexity, ambiguity, and nuance.  Bellow thus frames the element 
of Jewishness in his collection’s stories as something that is itself well suited to gratifying a cultivated 
reader’s curiosity.  The value of Jewishness is itself literary, and is understood to act upon a reader’s 
aesthetic consciousness. 
In his own introduction, Bellow argues, moreover, that not only can Jewish writing be 
defined in terms more precisely “literary” than those of their content, but that there is a special 
relationship between Jewish culture and storytelling.  “For the last generation of European Jews, 
daily life without stories would have been inconceivable.  My father would say, whenever I asked 
him to explain any matter, ‘The thing is like this.  There was once a man who lived . . .’ ‘There was 
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once a scholar . . .’ ‘There was a widow with one son . . .’ ‘A teamster was driving on a lonely road . . 
.” (11).  Jewish storytelling, then, is at once a matter of sensibility and cultural practice: a literary 
outlook that creates the written world from a perspective in which “the world, and even the 
universe, have a human meaning” (10) that is not only a matter of literary style but also part of the 
texture of very recent lived Jewish experience.  If Ribalow argues that “the Jewish contribution to 
American fiction, far from small, is quite impressive” (1), Bellow responds with an explication of 
Jewish writing that casts storytelling as a characteristically Jewish gesture.  Ribalow, cataloging the 
ways in which Jewish writers “have been contributing and continue to contribute to a wider 
understanding of Jewish life in this country in the best way they know how—through the medium of 
literature” (10), makes no claims about a particularly Jewish literary sensibility.  Rather, Ribalow 
implies that authors he collects, “these Americans” (10), write in an American idiom—that what 
draws their stories together is not a Jewish set of formal characteristics or authorial attitudes, but 
rather the fact of their treatment of Jewish subjects and the Jewish identification of their authors.  
Bellow, in adducing a Jewish mode of writing, produces a mythography of Jewish literary 
production, a definition of Jewish writing that is at once composed of the work of Jewish writers 




Selling the Collection: Jack B. Creamer’s “The Klippah”: 
If the anthologies of Ribalow and Bellow offer distinct answers to the question of how to 
value Jewish fiction, triangulating between the commercial marketplace, aesthetic value (however 
conceived), and concerns related to Jewish representation, such concerns are also present in “The 
Klippah,” Jack Creamer’s contribution to Harold Ribalow’s 1959 anthology of Jewish fiction, The 
Chosen (the title of which, in addition to being a stunning moment of editorial hubris—aligning the 
anthologist, selecting texts, with God, choosing the Jewish people to receive the commandments—
marvelously conflates Jewish authorial identity, fictional subject, and anthological practice).  
Creamer’s piece, first published in 1954, shortly after the appearance of his own anthology, Twenty-
Two Stories about Horses and Men, in Charm: The Magazine for Women Who Work (a title later 
incorporated into Glamour), expresses a pointed ambivalence about the commercial value of Jewish 
texts.  “The Klippah,” is a story about a seller of Jewish books with an exceptionally knowledgeable 
customer whose jealous wife, the “klippah”12 of the title, threatens the customer’s devoted 
compilation of his library of Jewish volumes.  Creamer’s story, depicting the assembly, maintenance, 
and financial appraisal of a curated collection of Jewish books, thematizes the problem of 
negotiating between the commercial value of Jewish texts, their use value as conveyors of cultural 
knowledge, and the sentimental value they contain.  In Creamer’s story, which was accompanied in 
its original publication by an illustration by Ben Shahn,13 a man named Grossman makes a 
substantial purchase of good books from the narrator Levinson’s bookshop.  Shortly after he leaves, 
his wife arrives holding a small child, to claim that Grossman has used all of their grocery money to 
buy the books.  Grossman later returns, explains that his wife, jealous of his collection, was lying 
                                                 
12 “Klippah,” literally “shell” or “husk,” is translated in the story as “shrew” (“The Klippah” 50), and 
signifies in kabbalah the outer, material covering that hides the divine light: a husk that Kabbalists 
endeavor to remove through their fervent worship. 
13 Many thanks to Ben Pollak for bringing this image to my attention. 
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about the money and that their pantry is in fact well stocked, and soon becomes a regular customer 
at the bookshop.  Some time passes, and Grossman stops visiting the store, until eventually 
Levinson receives a call from Grossman’s wife, asking him to appraise his customer’s library of three 
to four thousand volumes for sale to raise money for an unspecified operation necessary for her 
health.  Grossman, it turns out, has gone nearly blind, and while he can make his living as a Hebrew 
teacher by teaching from memory he can no longer read new books.  Levinson appraises the books, 
valuing them at eight-thousand dollars, and Grossman’s wife, whom Grossman has given a very low 
estimate of their initial cost—three or four times lower than he paid—relents, now believing the 
books to be a sound financial investment.  The story’s close finds Grossman’s wife now enabling her 
husband’s habit, bringing Grossman by the store to purchase new books to add to what she believes 
is a fantastically lucrative investment, and what Grossman sees as his son’s legacy. 
At the heart of the story is a conflict over how to value Jewish texts.  For the customer, 
Grossman, the primary value of Jewish books is their content—Jewish knowledge that transcends 
market value (this knowledge need not be solely religious—the customer first distinguishes himself 
by asking for works by the maskil [proponent of the 19th century Jewish enlightenment] Jacob 
Reifman—but Grossman’s attitude towards Jewish books bears the imprint of the rabbinic ideal of 
torah lishma, the study of torah for its own sake).  For his wife, however, who disdains his collection 
and who enters the story with claims about the books’ ruinous cost, their financial value is 
paramount.  The bookseller, Levinson, who narrates the story, mediates between the two positions.  
While he expresses his intellectual appreciation for good Jewish books, financial concerns dominate 
his role in the plot—not only does Grossman’s first purchase convert Levinson’s stagnant stock of 
Jewish texts to, “a good dinner, a really good dinner,” his first in quite a while (“The Klippah” 48), 
but his own potential purchase of his customer’s library, a collection sure to launch its possessor to 
the top of the New York Jewish book market, is the key to his fortune or failure.  Thus, while the 
42 
 
story’s conclusion, which sees the wife’s jealous disdain for Grossman’s books subverted and the 
books still in Grossman’s hands, would seem to validate Grossman’s implicit position that the book 
trade, while necessary for the dissemination of texts, can offer little measure of their true value, the 
focalizing consciousness of Levinson the bookseller casts the reader back to the commodified 
materiality of the texts. 
Importantly, it is not only the physical texts that have financial value in the story, but, in a 
clear analogy with the editorial content of an anthology, the labor of the compiler as well.  Sold as a 
lot to a single deep-pocketed buyer with an interest in Jewish texts, the organizational apparatus that 
accompanies the collection itself takes on value—an extra $1,500, in Levinson’s estimation (58).  
Grossman’s catalogue, an index embellished with news clippings and biographical information about 
the authors, cross-references to other books in the collection, and the original purchase price of each 
book, is of only marginal value separated from the library in which it originated.  However, as a 
paratextual device analogous to the introduction and notes of an anthology, it has substantial 
financial worth.  If we read Grossman’s library as the product of activity analogous to that of 
assembling an anthology, the card catalogue, a tangible artifact of the labor of the collector, stands in 
for the explanatory supplements of the anthology’s editor.  Not only are they valuable in their own 
right as contextualizing or interpretive devices, but also as traces of the value that the act of 
compilation adds to the source texts. 
The final paragraphs of the story seem, with a conspiratorial wink, to align Grossman and 
Levinson against the materialistic Mrs. Grossman, threat to the romantic integrity of the 
metaphysical value of a good library: 
“You see, Mr. Levinson,” [Grossman’s wife] would sometimes say, with her kind of 
attempt at being pleasant, “maybe you didn’t get our books away from us, but at least 
you didn’t lose a good customer.  We’re still adding to our investment in the future.” 
 Of course it’s hard to tell exactly what goes on behind a very thick pair of 
glasses, but it was at times like this that I’m almost sure my friend Grossman the 
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Hebrew teacher would wink at me as he stroked the little boy’s head and said: “Yes, 
it’s very important . . . our investment in the future.” (“The Klippah” 60) 
 
The apparently unavoidable language of finance and the focalizing frame of the book business, 
however, temper the explicitly anti-financial and misogynistic transvaluation of Jewish texts into 
objects above the feminized financial fray.  Grossman can recast the terms of his son’s “inheritance” 
through a (nearly literally) veiled expression of solidarity with a masculine notion of immaterial 
textual value, but it is precisely the material collection of volumes that he hopes to leave to his son, 
with no guarantees that this son won’t simply sell off the lot. 
In pitting the jealous, materialistic wife against her bookish husband, the story casts 
intellectual and pecuniary value in diametric opposition.  On one side, Mr. Grossman: “What the 
books are worth to me, no one can know.”  On the other, Mrs. Grossman: “Ha! I can know!” (57).  
In the scene of the story and in the profession of the narrator, however, intellectual value translates 
directly to monetary worth.  A good book—here, a good library—is also a good sale (surely a 
somewhat utopian textual economics).  The material circumstances of the story—Grossman’s vision 
problems, Levinson’s job, the capacity of Levinson’s collection to intervene in the New York Jewish 
book market, dramatically altering the narrator’s life—all suggest that the exchange value of Jewish 
texts is not so easily escaped.  Further, what ultimately enables Grossman to retain his library is not 
his wife’s acceptance of the inherent value of the knowledge that the books contain and her desire 
that this knowledge, metonym for Jewish intellectual culture, be passed on to her son, but her 
ignorance of their initial cost—a willful misvaluation on the part of Grossman, uncorrected by 
Levinson, that provides her with an inflated understanding of the speed with which the books will 
rise in value.  The story concludes less with the triumph of textual immateriality than with the 
successful manipulation of a market.  Grossman’s library is maintained on a bubble. 
It is not Jewishness, precisely, that is commodified in the story, but the monetary value of 
the collection, as a collection, is nonetheless tightly bound to the books’ Jewish content.  Though the 
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individual works would presumably be of some value to a generalist bookstore, the quality and 
coverage of the collection as a whole make them particularly valuable to a Jewish bookseller, for 
whom, as the story makes clear, they would constitute a career-making acquisition.  In this regard, 
however, the Jewishness of the collection is instrumentally rather than inherently valuable.  Indeed 
the story (contra its illustration, which identifies the stores wares as Jewish through its incorporation 
of Hebrew letters reading makhzorim [high-holy day prayerbooks] and sforim [books of religious 
significance]) explicitly notes that Levinson’s store is formally indistinguishable from generalist 
bookshops, its specialization evident only to those able to read its context—“The wooden sign 
hanging outside my shop reads: I. LEVINSON BOOKS.  But it tells more than that.  From the 
neighborhood, you would know right away that the ‘books’ are Judaic and Hebrew books” (47).  
Thus, in the story, the neighborhood as an ethnically homogeneous space and the bookstore is a 
commercial venue that is not specifically ethnically marked. In Creamer’s story, contrary to the 
narrator’s assertion that the sign “tells more than that,” it is precisely the information that the sign 
doesn’t present that is important: the sign specifically does not reveal anything more than the 
proprietor’s name and merchandise—the storefront, requiring the narrator’s clarifying exposition, 
takes its Jewishness to be understood from its context.  In this regard, the store functions less as a 
figure for the anthology than as a figure for the anthologized story, defined by the neighborhood of 
other stories in which the anthology situates it—a definition in line with Ribalow’s conception of 
American Jewish fiction as distinct from other American writing in its content, but similar in its 
form. 
The store in “The Klippah” is simultaneously a bookstore like any other: the uninflected I. 
Levinson Books, and a Jewish bookstore: I. Levinson “Books.”  Though the narrator claims that the 
specific genre of bookstore that he owns is legible from its environs, the codedness of the store’s 
Jewish content, which we can see in the quotation marks with which Levinson surrounds the word 
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“books” in his exposition, signals an uneasiness with the construction of Jewish books as a genre 
like all other genres, even as the story presents a sympathetic picture of the business of selling Jewish 
texts.  In labeling the bookstore as just a bookstore, but claiming that it is nonetheless clearly legible 
as a Jewish bookstore by virtue of its Jewishly inflected surroundings, Creamer’s narrator suggestively 
positions Jewish texts between generic particularity and universal form. 
This story—Jewishly anthologized fiction, multi-faceted allegory of the anthological 
apparatus, product of an anthologizer of genre fiction—presents an image of the uneasy positioning 
of Jewishness as a marker both of culture and of commerce: content whose value is at once 
immaterial and monetizable.  Indeed, even Grossman, for whom Jewish culture provides a refuge 
from an unhappy marriage and a subject pursued for its own interest makes his living in the story 
teaching Hebrew lessons all week, “even a few hours on Saturdays to pupils whose families don’t 
believe in keeping the Sabbath” (50).  Creamer’s story thus also introduces a concern that shadows 
both Ribalow’s and Bellow’s volumes: the Jewish continuity that Jewish books might (or might fail 
to) guarantee, and the corollary affective attachment that readers might feel for Jewish writing by 
virtue of its Jewishness.  Creamer’s story ends on a note of the conspiratorial masculine safeguarding 
of cultural continuity against the irrevocable, feminized transformation of Jewish cultural capital into 
secular economic capital.  As Grossman can no longer read the books that he and his wife continue 
to purchase, and as his wife has no interest in them, their only value is as a projected inheritance for 
Grossman’s young son.  Keeping Grossman’s library intact preserves both the collector’s labor and 
the idea of Jewish culture as an object of lineal dissemination, passed from one generation to the 
next in an unbroken patriarchal line.  But if we imagine a different ending for the story, one in which 
the books are sold to Levinson, catapulting him to the heights of the New York Jewish book trade, 
what we find is simply another model of Jewish cultural transmission: one closer to that offered by 
the anthology of Jewish fiction.  In Levinson’s shop, the books that Grossman has spent a lifetime 
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compiling remain in circulation.  Not bound to the young his son’s interest or disinterest they are 
instead accessible to other readers from other families—readers whose encounter with the books is 
motivated not directly by family connections, but by enthusiasm for the material.  It is to these 
readers in their encounter with the anthology that we turn in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Conclusion: Hasidic tales, Jewish detectives, and the affective work of genre 
The secondhand copy of Martin Buber’s Tales of the Hasidim that I purchased online 
sometime in 2010 is inscribed with a personal note, dated 2008, that implies a poignant narrative of 
frustrated Jewish continuity: 
Dear N—— 
This is the book that let me know I could love Judaism— 




This note from Aunt A—— supplements the text’s fairly substantial editorial apparatus, which is 
dedicated to explaining the history and cultural context of the tales and their redaction by Buber,15 
with a more personal and contemporary account of their use.  Buber’s prefatory notes cast his 
collection in two molds.  In one reading it is a historical record—a book which “purports to express 
and document the association between zaddikim [charismatic leaders of Hasidic sects] and hasidim 
[followers of zaddikim],”16 (I.2).  In another it is a tool of renewal: part of a continuous living 
culture, in which “story is more than a mere reflection.  The holy essence it testifies to lives on in it.  
The miracle that is told, acquires new force; power that once was active, is propagated in the living 
                                                 
14 The original inscription includes the full first names of the gift giver and the recipient, as well as a 
specific date.  I have omitted these details in deference to their privacy. 
15 The book includes a foreword by Chaim Potok, a preface and two introductions from Martin 
Buber, two glossaries, two sets of notes, two indices (one of each for each of the collection’s original 
volumes), a genealogy of the Hasidic masters, and an alphabetical index to that genealogy. 
16 Zaddik (pronounced TSA-dik [s.] and tsa-DIK-im [pl.]) literally translates to “righteous one.”  
Hasidim (s. KHA-sid; pl. kha-SID-im) translates to “the pious.” 
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word and continues to be active—even after generations” (xvii).  This dual resonance of the tales—
as a document of both historical significance and personal religious meaning—is amplified in Chaim 
Potok’s 1991 foreword, which argues that the collection embodies both “a unique world of the spirit 
that existed until its destruction by the Germans in World War II,” and the voice of Buber, who 
“speaks to us through these eternal tales” (xv).  The tales, as described in their introductions, at one 
and the same time represent a mode of spiritual connection (between zaddikim and their adherents 
and between Buber and the Hasidic mode of life[as he constructs it]) and act as a vehicle for 
connecting the reader to the spiritual world of the Hasidim and to Buber himself. 
A——’s note extends and modifies this logic.  For her, the value of the collection lies in the 
mode of Jewish culture that it projects—one that she finds it possible to love.  A——’s inscription 
implies a narrative of alienation and return.  A—— discovers in Buber’s collection something 
lovable in Judaism, something that negates her implicit estrangement from Judaism as an object of 
affection.  As she presents it to her niece, the love that A—— experiences begins but doesn’t end 
with Buber’s collection.  Instead, as anthologies aspire to do, Tales of the Hasidim provides her with a 
window onto a larger world: a category—Judaism—for which she can now feel affection.  The 
inscription frames the collection as part of a meaningful narrative of the gift-giver’s life, and as an 
agent of personal and communal connection.  Giving the collection as a gift, A—— proposes to 
extend the chain of affective attachment that binds the zaddikim, hasidim, and the divine; Buber and 
his image of the hasidim; and A——, the tales, and Judaism, by presenting her niece with the 
possibility of a similar experience: an attachment to Judaism that strengthens her attachment to her 
aunt. 
Though I have no further information about the circumstances of this inscription, its details 
(the fact that the aunt gives her age, the content of her comment) suggest that perhaps N——’s 
position in life is analogous to her Aunt’s at the time that she read the collection.  The gift might be 
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a fifteenth birthday present.  Whatever N——’s attachment to Judaism, Aunt A——might imagine, 
it is not defined by love.  The book, a formative component of A——’s Jewish life, might furnish 
the same spark of affection for her niece.  In any case, somewhere between the gift’s presentation 
and my purchase of the volume, the book appears not to have had its intended effect.  I can think of 
several possible reasons for the book’s reentering circulation, but for the sake of argument, let’s 
assume that N—— simply met the book with indifference, and got rid of it.  For her aunt, fifteen, 
receptive for unexpressed reasons to the book’s portrait of Jewish culture, Buber’s collection proved 
personally resonant.  For N——, it just wasn’t her thing.  Such is the peril of giving books as gifts.  
An inscription projects a hope that the reader will be moved, entertained, delighted—but only if 
they read the book.  A gift-book comes with a request: be absorbed in this book and absorb its 
contents; don’t just put it on your shelf, take it into your experience.  But our friends and family 
sometimes have strange and disagreeable taste and we can’t or don’t want their books.  To be 
honest, we’re a little embarrassed to have them on our shelves, at least the ones in the front room. 
A particular gift presentation of Tales of the Hasidim is a unique case, and the text itself differs 
in important ways from the collections of largely non-religious Jewish fiction that this chapter 
analyzes.  But the divide between A——’s embrace of the book as a formative connection to 
Judaism and the possibility of its rejection that N—— represents forms a key context in which 
American postwar anthologies of Jewish fiction operate.  While such anthologies have often, and 
productively, been adduced as evidence in arguments about the emergence of Jewish American 
literature, such citations rarely treat the affective dimension of these anthologies’ appeals to their 
readers.  All texts, of course, are susceptible to wide and unpredictable variations in the readerly 
responses that they engender, from attachment, to repulsion, to indifference.  But such responses 
are particularly central to the ways in which postwar American anthologies of Jewish fiction function 
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not only to define the contours of Jewish literature, but to provide their (not necessarily Jewish) 
readers with focal points for an emotional attachment to Jews, Judaism, and Jewish culture. 
For many readers, as, for A——, in her relationship with Buber’s Tales of the Hasidim, 
anthologies of Jewish fiction are not just about Jewish literature, they are modes of being Jewish or 
of relating to Jewish life.  Candles in the Night, a 1940 anthology subtitled “Jewish Tales by Gentile 
Authors,” and compiled by Rabbi Joseph L. Baron, a reform congregational rabbi working in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, frames its mission in clear terms: “The lights of civilization have indeed been 
extinguished temporarily, and the Jew has been overwhelmed by the floods of hatred.  At this time 
the eloquent and sympathetic portrayal of the Jew by some of the most distinguished artists and 
thinkers of the world needs repeated emphasis. [. . . .] If this volume will succeed in awakening here 
and there the dormant sympathy of a non-Jewish reader, and in strengthening the morale of a Jewish 
youth, the editor and all those who have aided in the production of the book will feel gratified and 
rewarded for their effort” (xv–xix).  Though few anthologies of Jewish literature share the 
circumstances that account for Baron’s straightforwardly utilitarian statement of the collection’s 
goals, the attention that he pays to the affective relationship the reader forms with Jews and Jewish 
culture through his or her reading of the text is a salient component of the work that Jewish 
anthologies perform.  Baron’s collection aims to leverage the cultural capital of respected non-Jewish 
writers and the affective force of their writing to bolster support for Jews in times of uniquely 
terrible trial.  The quality of the writing that his anthology contains is a key element of its rhetorical 
appeal.  Not only do the stories he collects remind the reader of gentile philosemitic feeling during a 
period of murderous Nazi antisemitism but they also assert the fineness of such feeling in aesthetic 
as well as moral terms. 
While the claims of aesthetic distinction made by postwar Jewish fiction anthologies, and the 
prestige, both social and personal, associated with the appreciation of their stories as high cultural 
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artifacts are important elements of these anthologies’ presentations of Jewish culture, such appeals 
are only half the story.  Such anthologies simultaneously mobilize the particular, and quite different, 
appeal of genre in drawing their readers to Jewish fiction.  Toward the end of his essay “Imaginary 
Homelands,” Michael Chabon confesses to a dual defection from identities that he once called his 
own—his Jewish identity, and his identity as a writer of genre fiction—defections that mark a low 
ebb in what is for him a narrative of return.  Having been accepted into an MFA program at the 
University of California, Irvine and eager to begin his career as a writer, he sets aside plans for a 
whimsical science fiction epic, producing instead “a straightforward realistic narrative, equally 
influenced by Proust, Fitzgerald, and Philip Roth, about summertime and sexual identity in the city 
of Pittsburgh.”  At the same time as he jettisons his ambitions as a genre writer, he says, he puts 
aside his Jewish identity.  “I also turned my back on Judaism.  I was learning to question everything; 
I guess I was trying to fit in” (177).  In Chabon’s provocative pairing, Jewish practice and genre 
fiction are two sides of the same coin: superficially different but fundamentally similar modes of 
creating a feeling of rootedness and belonging while preserving a particularistic otherness from 
mainstream culture.  In the genre of literary realism, Chabon finds the same pressures to conformity 
that he holds responsible for his abandonment of Jewish ritual; and in his return to genre fiction and 
turn to domestic Jewish rituals, Chabon sees a path to what he understands as an authentic 
expression of his self. 
“For a long time I’ve been busy, in my life and in my work, with a pair of ongoing 
overarching investigations: into my heritage—rights and privileges, duties and 
burdens—as a Jew and as a teller of Jewish stories; and into my heritage as a lover of 
genre fiction.  In all those years of lighting candles on Friday night and baking 
triangular cookies for Purim with my children and muddling through another 
doomed autumn trying to atone, years spent writing novels and stories about golems 
and the Jewish roots of American superhero comic books, Sherlock Holmes and the 
Holocaust, medieval Jewish freebooters, Passover seders attended by protégés of 
forgotten Lovecraftian horror writers, years of writing essays, memoirs, and nervous 
manifestoes about genre fiction or Jewishness—I failed to notice what now seems 
clear, namely that there was really only one investigation all along.  One search, with 




Chabon’s collation of Jewishness and genre fiction flirts with glibness, but his point is sincerely 
made: each furnish him with frameworks for constructing his belonging in the world.  But though 
both Jewishness and genre fiction scaffold one unitary search for Chabon’s metaphorical “home,” 
they rest on different foundations.  As Chabon frames them in this essay, his relationship to Judaism 
is a matter of performance (he tells Jewish stories) and ontology (he is a Jew), while his relationship 
to genre fiction is a matter of performance (he writes genre fiction) and affection (he loves genre 
fiction). 
Though both make the claims of a heritage and thus balance what is gained (“rights and 
privileges”) with what is owed (“duties and burdens”), the basis for Chabon’s serious attachment to 
genre fiction, conceived in unambiguously communal terms, is the enthusiasm he shares with other 
lovers of genre works.  Indeed, Chabon describes his return to Judaism as part of a broader attempt 
to retreat from the self that he had constructed in pursuit of normative literary success (i.e., the 
successful composition of artful realist novels) into one defined by more personally meaningful 
trappings of his past: 
“I wanted to know where I came from, to retrace my steps and see if I dropped 
anything along the way that might serve me, now, better than I had imagined at the 
time of letting it go. 
 I started to light candles; I met and married my present wife, the grandchild 
of European Jewish immigrants; I abandoned the [realist] novel and began 
wandering back to a place where I could feel at home. (178) 
 
What links Judaism and genre fiction in Chabon’s experience is the fact of his having let them go. 
But the affective grounds of Chabon’s abandonment of Jewishness and genre fiction are markedly 
different from one another.  Chabon’s disavowal of his Jewishness appears to him as an organic 
outgrowth of his encompassing engagement with the non-Jewish world: “Nothing about my being 
Jewish—about my ancestors, about their languages and histories, about the stale holiday invocations 
of freedom, continuity, and survival—seemed to have use or relation to the ongoing business of my 
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life at the time” (178).  The author’s turn from genre fiction, however, appears much more as an 
unwilling capitulation to the anti-genre norms of the literary academy than as the slow passage into 
irrelevance that characterizes his slide from Jewish identification—dropping genre fiction constitutes 
a renunciation of passions that he continues to hold rather than a loss of already attenuated beliefs.  
“As a young man, an English major, and a regular participant in undergraduate fiction-writing 
workshops, I was taught—or perhaps in fairness it would be more accurate to say I learned—that 
science fiction was not serious fiction, that a writer of mystery novels might be loved but not 
revered, that if I meant to get serious about the art of fiction I might set a novel in Pittsburgh but 
never on Pluto” (176). 
Though Chabon’s essay begins by placing the author’s commitments to Judaism and genre 
fiction on an equal footing, as it develops, “Imaginary Homelands” frames the author’s return to 
Judaism as in a sense secondary to his return to genre fiction.  Despite the invocation of Jewish 
observance with which the essay opens, its concluding gesture, a defense of Chabon’s The Yiddish 
Policemen’s Union, suggests that the author’s return to literary Jewishness comes through his embrace of 
genre fiction and casts The Yiddish Policemen’s Union as a work that transposes Chabon’s sometimes 
wavering affinity for Judaism into a medium for which he feels a more straightforward and 
unwavering enthusiasm: detective fiction.  This is not to question the sincerity of the author’s 
personal commitment to Jewish religious life, but rather to foreground the extent to which genre 
fandom and genre production furnish him with a model of passionate enthusiasm that translates to 
an engagement with Jewish identification and a degree of religious observance.  To an extent, 
Chabon’s association of his love of popular genres with his return to religious engagement is 
strategic: it mobilizes the respectability and earnestness associated with religious commitment in the 
service of legitimating his serious relationship with the “unserious” genres of detective and sci-fi 
writing.  But if we credit Chabon’s account of his mutually entwined pursuits of authentic selfhood 
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as something more sincere than a bid to give Sherlock Holmes a lift on the coattails of the Sabbath 
blessings (and we don’t need to accept uncritically Chabon’s valuation of authenticity to do so), we 
find a position that draws together Ribalow’s and Bellow’s anthologies by substituting the reader’s 
prerogative for the editor’s pronouncements: one in which Jewishness doesn’t simply mark 
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CHAPTER TWO: Maturity, Form, and Tillie Olsen’s Tell Me a Riddle: 
From “Early Genius” to “Fragments and Scraps” 
 
“It is a painful thing to be asked to live again through events ten years gone, to admit 
one’s identity with the person who bore one’s name in a by now incredible past.  It is 
hardest of all to confess that one is responsible for the acts of that past, especially 
when such acts are now placed in a new and unforeseen context that changes their 
meaning entirely. ‘Not guilty!’ one wants to cry; ‘that is not what I meant at all!’” 
—Leslie Fiedler, “Hiss, Chambers, and the Age of 
Innocence,” December 1950 
 
The arc of Tillie Olsen’s career is famously fragmented.  Olsen entered the literary scene in 
1934 to significant acclaim, when the second issue of Partisan Review published half of the first 
chapter of her still only partly-written proletarian novel.  Almost immediately, however, Olsen faded 
from literary view, producing no published work until her 1956 publication of the short story “I 
Stand Here Ironing,” and the subsequent 1961 collection Tell Me a Riddle, containing it.  In 1974, 
Olsen published Yonnondio, a version of her 1930s novel culled from fragmentary drafts and given 
the subtitle “From the Thirties,” marking it as an artifact of that earlier period.  The question of 
early genius and the limits on its realization is both a key component of Olsen’s biography, but also a 
central thematic concern of her work.  Much as Olsen’s career up to the composition of Tell Me a 
Riddle presents a narrative of early potential, fostered in the active Left political milieu of the Great 
Depression but ultimately unrealized, the stories of Tell Me a Riddle focus on characters painfully 
reconciling themselves to the limitations that life and their social environment impose on personal 
and political fulfillment.  Thus, a mother in the collection’s first story sums up her musings on her 
daughter as follows: “There is much to her, and probably little will come of it.  She is a child of her 
age: of depression, of war, of fear. / So all that is in her will not bloom—but in how many does it?  
There is still enough left to live by” (20–1). And the collection’s title story defines Eva, its dying, 
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elderly protagonist, adherent of the failed 1905 Russian revolution, in terms singularly linked to the 
failure of the revolutionary engagement of her youth: “Being at last able to live within, and not to move to 
the rhythms of others, as life had helped her to: denying; removing; isolating; taking the children one by 
one; then deafening, half-blinding—and at last, presenting her solitude. / And in it she had won to a 
reconciled peace” (77, italics in the original).  Olsen’s are the poetics of failed revolution and stunted 
development.  But, significantly, they mobilize tropes of Jewish continuity in order to imagine a 
persistence of radical political commitment into the future: an intergenerational continuity that 
would mitigate the disappointments of the political deradicalization of the early Cold War moment 
in which “Tell Me a Riddle” was written.  Tell Me a Riddle articulates a ruptured narrative which 
places the structural continuity offered by family against a discontinuity that characterizes both the 
ideological changes of the post-war left and the shape of her characters’ lives.  The anthologies of 
the previous chapter presented conflicting interpretations of the literary salience of Jewishness: 
Ribalow’s, understanding Jewishness in terms of a communal politics, as the fiction produced by and 
for the Jewish community, and Bellow’s, resisting the incursion of that politics into what it 
understood to be an aesthetic sphere, casting Jewishness instead as a literary sensibility.  Tell Me a 
Riddle mobilizes Jewishness in the service of a different politics entirely: a Jewish Socialism whose 
Jewish cultural overtones are progressively more salient in a post-radical era that increasingly 
privileged ethnic fiction as a vehicle for aspirations to social justice.  Olsen’s collection, taken as a 
whole, presents a vision of political possibility rooted in discontinuous development.  As Olsen goes 
on to shape the narrative of her career, situating her work within the various contexts of feminism, 
popular-front-era radicalism, and Jewish history, the liminality of Tell Me a Riddle in terms of its 
author’s professional development becomes key to interpreting the work’s political effects. 
Olsen’s Tell Me a Riddle is a collection of four stories, three of which are linked by their 
mutual depiction of several generations of a single extended family, while one stands apart from the 
58 
 
fictional universe of the others, sharing no characters and no fictional landscape with its 
companions.  Though only three of the stories are linked into an unambiguous cycle unified through 
the family network that they depict, all four place families at their center.  Indeed, though the 
collection is bound by a thematic focus on narratives of political disappointment—the failure of the 
revolutionary fervor of the thirties to have taken hold in the United States, and the concomitant 
early Cold War retrenchment of the American Left—all of its stories mediate their political concerns 
through depictions of family dynamics.  In Tell Me a Riddle the family sits in a tense structural 
position.  As a symbol of the early Cold War turn from political action to domestic insularity and a 
site for imagining not class solidarity but social mobility, the collection sees family as a diversion 
from effective political action for change—a place of retreat from radical agitation to liberal reform, 
and, for radical women in particular, a deflection of the energy needed for public political action into 
domestic drudgery.  But family, in the collection, also provides a structure for lamenting the loss of 
the radical idealism of an earlier historical moment—a model for imagining the continuity of radical 
political ideals in de-radicalized times.  By the same token, the family is the conduit for the title 
story’s consideration of Jewishness, both as negatively valued ritual observance and as postitively 
valued (largely socialist) secular culture, arranged under the rubric of yiddishkeyt.  All the same, for the 
central character of “Tell Me a Riddle,” a radical whose politics were shaped in the failed 1905 
Russian revolution but whose praxis has been thwarted by American domestic life, Judaism 
represents a false legacy: her conscription in a past she has rejected for the sake of a future she 
doesn’t want.  Where the story invokes Jewishness directly, it is for the main character to deny its 
salience to her life. 
Nonetheless, “Tell Me a Riddle” has regularly been considered a Jewish story, finding its 
way, for example, into two influential anthologies of Jewish literature: Irving Howe’s 1977 Jewish-
American Stories and the 2001 Norton Anthology of Jewish American Literature.  Tell Me a Riddle situates its 
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brief consideration of Jewish tradition in a broader treatment of the intersection historical and 
individual development in Cold War America.  The title story, the only story to include any reference 
to Jewish practice, is unquestionably the most “Jewish” of the four stories in the collection.  By 
resituating it among the three other stories produced during Olsen’s late-fifties productive period 
and constituting her entire corpus of completed mature fictional works, I would like to focus our 
attention on the connections between those aspects of the story that render it excerptable as a 
“Jewish story” and Olsen’s larger project of documenting the fragility of intergenerational 
ideological transmission. 
The main differentiating factors between short story cycles and novels are in their potential 
narrative foci and the opposed possibilities for narrative fragmentation offered by each.  Where 
novels tend to focus on the narrative of a single protagonist (or an ensemble of protagonists) 
presented through a main plot interwoven with subplots, short story cycles often concern 
themselves with an aggregate “protagonist” (a family, a location, etc.), and are defined by the 
containment of their constituent stories, which each offer a sense of narrative closure, and are 
legible as complete stories even outside of the context of the cycle (themselves often finding 
publication in magazines, journals, and anthologies, both before and after their inclusions in cycles) 
(Nagel 13-17).  J. Gerald Kennedy locates the short story cycle as a site of tension between the 
community suggested by the apparent unity of the short story sequence and the fragmentation 
suggested by the narrative breaks which differentiate the sequence from the novel (195).  Kennedy’s 
description of “[t]he obscure or victimized figures populating the story sequence [who] comprise an 
imaginary confederacy, a cast of loners and losers gathered to create the semblance of community in 
the face of the storyteller’s irrevocable separation from a living audience,” and his understanding 
that “the genre embodies an insistently paradoxical semblance of community in its structural 
dynamic of connection and disconnection” (ibid.), accounts for the genre’s implicit proposition of 
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unity through fragmentation with a metaphor that socializes the form, reading structures of 
communal affiliation (and disaffiliation) in narrative interconnections. 
In my readings of the stories that comprise Olsen’s collection, I focus on the texts’ 
consideration of the family as a locus of historical action and as a barometer of national politics.  
The story’s portrayal of the family, I suggest, is central to its relevance to a Jewish American literary 
tradition.  Continuity, a central concern of twentieth-century Jewish communal discourse, appears 
not only as a key theme in Olsen’s collection, but also as a structural problematic.  The final three 
stories in the collection are continuous insofar as they treat a single family in a chronological 
sequence.  The first story portrays a separate family, but is thematically aligned with the narrative of 
a young woman’s development that is strung through the stories which constitute the family cycle.  
Tell Me a Riddle thus offers two contiguous models for conceiving of continuity: the genealogical and 
the ideological.17  In both “I Stand Here Ironing” and the three linked stories which succeed it, 
gender is also a crucial element of the collection’s social critique. “I Stand Here Ironing” explicitly 
filters its thematic treatment of individual potential and development through the a critique of the 
dynamics of motherhood.  The story’s narrator remains unnamed and is defined through her literal 
position performing domestic work—standing over the ironing board—and in relation to her 
developing daughter.  The three linked stories similarly focus on the ways in which normative 
gendered behavior conditions class prejudices, and on the connections between inequitable divisions 
of domestic labor and the silencing of women’s voices in radical political critique during the early 
                                                 
17 I intend for these terms to recall the key concepts of Dan Miron’s argument against models of 
Jewish literary study that privilege unitary conceptions of a continuous Jewish literary tradition, and 
for a pluralstic (even Bakhtinian) recognition of the linguistic, thematic, and ideological multiplicity 
historically unavoidable in Jewish literary production.  “What we should part with—indeed, what we 
must exorcise from our cognitive system,” he writes, “is the obsessive theoretical craving for all-
encompassing unities and continuities. [. . . .] Modern Jewish history, with its wildly colliding 
crosscurrents, did not allow for the emergence of one unified modern Jewish culture or for an 
integral, albeit multilingual, modern Jewish literature. It rather forces upon the scholarly observer the 
realization that Jewish culture and literature were fragmented beyond repair” (33-34).  These ideas 
are further elaborated in Miron’s monograph, From Continuity to Contiguity (2010). 
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Cold War period.  The collection critiques the sublimation of radical political energies—particularly 
women’s radical action—into the domestic sphere.  At the same time, Tell Me a Riddle draws on the 
emotional resonance of family to lament the decline of the political left in the early post-war period, 
drawing together biological and ideological reproduction. 
The collection’s title story is primarily connected to post-war Jewish American cultural 
concerns via its treatment of the Jewish family.  Though Eva, the story’s protagonist, strongly 
distances herself from Judaism, claiming a socialist politics as her authentic legacy, Judaism 
nonetheless remains an important piece of her extended family’s self-definition.  Olsen’s collection, I 
argue, uses the form of the short-story cycle, a form dependent on the tension between the apparent 
self-sufficiency of its units and the larger narrative continuities visible in their aggregation, to 
complicate questions of cultural and ideological continuity.  Jewishness, evoked most often in its 
negation, forms the context for the collection’s ambivalent treatment of ideological transmission 
along family lines: a model for the maintenance of political commitment in ideologically hostile 
times. 
In Tell Me a Riddle, Olsen’s sense of the legacy of the radical past, as past, takes its place as a 
central narrative concern.  The structures of family that Olsen invokes to frame a project of 
historical retrospection situate her politics in a context of legacy and a tradition, rather than solely as 
a response to the material pressures of the historical moment.  Tell Me a Riddle thus responds to the 
legacy of a progressive politics in retreat through an uneasy invocation of the domestic as a model 
for historical continuity and rupture.  In their retrospective orientations, the stories in Olsen’s 
collection frame their consideration of contemporary political realities and future social possibilities 
through narratives of loss.  The volume’s critique of domesticity as an institution that co-opts 
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economic relations as impetus for social reform,18 is tempered by its suggestion that the language of 
family tradition embedded within the domestic provides a sturdy platform for a critique of the 
resoundingly de-radicalized situation of the American left in the early Cold War.  This aspect of 
Olsen’s invocation of family, underplayed in critical considerations of her work’s engagements with 
the domestic,19 casts questions of political and social justice in terms of historical continuity.  In so 
doing—in mobilizing the memory of the past as a motor for action in the present—Olsen structures 
Tell Me a Riddle as a text simultaneously pre-occupied with the obstacles limiting the fulfillment of an 
individual’s potential and concerned with a time scale larger than that of the individual person, on 
which the political disappointments of the left during the early Cold War might not yet be counted 
as failures.  The text’s episodic structure, then, offers a series of narratives that enlist the family as a 
provisionally unifying structure, useful not for the mode of social connectedness that it presents, but 
for the ready-made structure that it provides for diachronic investigation.  
 The danger, for Olsen’s project, of relying on a generational model of historical continuity is 
in part that it places a subject in relative, rather than historical time, potentially sublimating the 
material conditions to which her critique responds to the logic of lineal reproduction.  In this regard, 
the episodic form of Tell Me a Riddle, Olsen’s work most thoroughly interested in the ways in which 
intergenerational family structures contribute to the formation of historical subjectivity, constructs 
the family as both a continuous and fluid whole and as a series of discreet states.  The collection as 
such incorporates a short story cycle united around several generations of a family, but composed of 
three discontinuous narratives.  Not united in a single novelistic structure, but possessing instead a 
                                                 
18 See Edmunds, “Introduction” for an extended discussion of this tendency in American social 
policy, and the modernist literary response that it engendered. 
19 See, for example, Rosenfelt, “Rereading Tell Me a Riddle in the Age of Deconstruction;” 




sort of fragmentary unity, the form of the story collection foregrounds historical ruptures 
imperfectly contained within a generational paradigm. 
 Tell Me a Riddle finds its coherence in the interplay between the connective tissues that 
suggest a conceptual unity in the text, and the structural fissures that disrupt that unity.  The stories 
in the collection can be connected on the level of theme, through their mutual concerns with the 
social and political growth of individual characters, their mutual portrayals of the drama of unmet 
expectations, personal, parental, and political, and their treatments of working class lives; or through 
a combined consideration of theme and character, linking the anxieties of generational succession at 
the center of “I Stand Here Ironing” to the family narratives of “Hey Sailor What Ship?,” “O Yes,” 
and  “Tell Me a Riddle.”  As Deborah Rosenfelt notes, the collection’s critique of domesticity is 
undercut by its (perhaps unavoidable and almost certainly unwilling) capitulation to the norms of its 
era, as its stories, “incorporate a ‘structure of feeling’ [. . .] characteristic of fifties literature, in which 
resistance is depoliticized, and unwittingly reinscribe, even in protesting against it, the ideology of 
female containment and domestication [. . .] central to the period” (“Rereading Tell Me a Riddle in 
the Age of Deconstruction” 52).  But Olsen’s treatment of the family is neither simply an 
epiphenomenon of the ideology of her times, nor solely the subject of her pointed critique.  In all of 
the stories in Tell Me a Riddle, the desire for a better world filters through a family frame.  Family 
serves a narrative function as well, encoding and organizing Olsen’s consideration of social shifts 
over historical time.  Thus, while Rosenfelt correctly notes the extent to which the stories of Tell Me 
a Riddle repeatedly figure the family as a mode of social organization that encourages an escape from 
or diminishment of the class solidarities and reform movements advocating for progressive social 
change, familial relationships nonetheless provide Olsen with a potent lens through which to 
inventory the disappointments and possibilities of the twentieth century political left. 
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Indeed, while Olsen doesn’t see the family as a vehicle for social reform, the conceptual 
focus on lineage, inheritance, and futurity offered by the family frame presents Olsen with a means 
to consider and forecast historical change.  If, as Susan Edmunds argues, “we need to recognize the 
American family as a recent, costly, and deeply unreliable vehicle of personal and social amelioration, 
the alienated product of an uneasy partnership between the global market and a welfare state no 
longer prepared to fund its own initiatives” (37), then Olsen’s collection, maintaining an 
understanding of the domestic sphere as a diversion from real reform, nonetheless encodes the 
family as its primary vehicle for interrogating the history and fate of radical political engagement, and 
for uniting the insights of Marxist and feminist critiques of social organization.  The disjunctures and 
disunities of Olsen’s episodic narratives, then, can be read as a strategy for puncturing the lineal 
order of the family, while maintaining some of its utility as a structure for tracing the drama of 
potential and disappointment in politics and in life more broadly. 
 Already in 1934, Olsen’s work was fundamentally concerned with the precariousness of 
artistic potential and the tension between growth and the dislocations of circumstance.  By the time 
Olsen’s proletarian novel Yonnondio was published in 1974 as a piece of recovered literature20, 
Olsen’s own career had become emblematic of this same dynamic of potential and dislocation.  
Olsen’s short story collection, Tell Me a Riddle, published between the composition and the 
publication of Yonnondio, filters the question of maturity and potential through its episodic form.  Tell 
Me a Riddle embraces an episodic plot structure to refract questions of its characters’ potential and 
growth.  The collection employs episodic narrative as a way of reconciling social change on a 
historical time scale with the growth and maturity of individual characters.  Rendered not as a central 
                                                 
20 In this regard, Yonnondio engages with a tradition of feminist literary recovery work that Olsen was 
herself instrumental in encouraging, distributing reading lists of under-read and out of print books 
by women, and convincing Florence Howe to reprint Rebecca Harding Davis’s Life in the Iron Mills 
through the Feminist Press in 1972, which inaugurated the press’s re-orientation towards the 
recovery of out of print works by women. 
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protagonist of a bildungsroman—subject of a continuous narrative of development—Jeannie, the only 
character to appear in all three connected stories in the collection, and a character notably tangential 
to the lives of the central characters of each story, is, in fact, the only subject observed by the reader 
in the process of maturing.  Her maturity, though, is rendered in fits and starts, each story marking a 
moment of apparently stable personality and forceful conviction, only to be overturned in the next, 
until the final story, in which Jeannie’s transformation from callousness to compassion is signaled by 
her disillusionment with the bureaucratizing effects of her job as a social worker and her embrace of 
an affective, humanistic response to tragedy. 
Tell Me a Riddle encodes disjunction as a way to perceive maturity as contingent, and legible 
most readily across gaps of historical time.  Where the disjointed lives of the peripatetic protagonists 
of Yonnondio, repeatedly uprooted by economic exploitation, figure cultural and economic struggle, 
the authorized, formal disjunctures of Tell Me a Riddle signal a reconciliation, in Olsen’s writing, of a 
certain type of rupture and the possibility of achieved maturity. 
 
Tell Me a Riddle: Family Ties and Fragmented Form 
In the advertising material in the back of the 1983 Laurel paperback edition of Tell Me a 
Riddle, a notice for Jayne Anne Phillips’s short story collection Black Tickets carries a blurb from Tillie 
Olsen, praising the collection as, “[t]he unmistakable work of early genius.”  This phrase, on its face, 
reads as an advertising blurb should: an unreserved recommendation of the work and of its author’s 
potential.  But the particular phrasing of her praise might strike a reader familiar with Olsen’s own 
early career as surprising.  In a frequently cited 1934 New Republic review of fiction appearing in the 
“little magazines” prevalent in the period, Robert Cantwell singles out Olsen’s work in remarkably 
similar terms to those with which she praises Phillips fifty years later: “out of the two hundred 
stories published in the magazines covered in this survey there is one fragment (by Tilly Lerner) [sic] 
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so fresh and imaginative that even a cautious critic can call it a work of early genius” (295).  In light 
of Olsen’s relatively sparse literary production in the wake of Cantwell’s praise, her invocation of 
“early genius” to describe Phillips’s book could as easily read as a curse as it could a portent of 
future success (though Phillips herself continues to have a successful literary career). 
So what are we to make of this striking echo?  On one level, not too much.  “Work of early 
genius,” is an appropriately effusive appraisal for ad copy promoting a first publication, and one 
can’t say conclusively that Cantwell’s citation, which jumpstarted Olsen’s career, garnering her offers 
of publishing contracts from several reputable houses, was on Olsen’s mind as she composed her 
response to Phillips’s work.  But the phrase itself—the concept of early genius and its implication 
that the work in question is valuable not only for its content (though that, too, is presumed to be 
uniquely strong) but in relation to other, better work, not yet realized—not only echoes Olsen’s own 
past, but also resonates with a central concern of the collection in which it is situated: the dynamic 
between potential (both the potential of individuals and of progressive movements) and the social 
conditions that limit its realization. 
In Cantwell’s review, Olsen’s early genius is set against another bit of evaluative augury: “A 
good part of [the magazines’] fiction is of the sort that is usually called promising” (295).  This is to 
say, not good—at least, not yet.  But “early genius” suggests that there is something there already: in 
contradistinction to the work of promise, the work of early genius is itself exceptional, even if those 
exceptional elements it contains are not completely shaped by a mature creative hand into a polished 
whole.  Yonnondio, particularly that section of Yonnondio excerpted as “The Iron Throat,” a story of a 
young girl of unusually gifted aesthetic perception and the work to which Cantwell refers, is 
concerned with early genius.  Tell Me a Riddle, though, is concerned with promise.  The stories in the 
collection track the realization or stagnation of its characters’ potential—a potential understood to 
be important not because it marks these characters as exceptional, but rather because it is marks 
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them as broadly representative.  Indeed, one of the key arguments of the collection is that the 
circumstantial brakes on this ordinary potential can, too, be tragic.  The shift from the concern for the 
fate of early genius manifest in Yonnondio to a concern for more quotidian promise in Tell Me a Riddle 
is emblematic of a larger shift in Olsen’s historical concerns.  Where Yonnondio crafts its narrative in 
relation to a revolution that might just be imminent, Tell Me a Riddle attempts to deal with 
diminished revolutionary expectations, to create a fiction that treats the failure of a revolutionary 
moment to come to its maturity, and to imagine that moment’s fractured and diminished legacy. 
Not only in their themes, but also in their form, the stories of Tell Me a Riddle address the 
question of how developmental narratives are produced, and to what extent they might be resisted. 
“I Stand Here Ironing,” the first story in the collection, introduces the theme of frustrated promise 
through a narrative of a teenage girl’s unsettled development, told by her mother as she moves back 
and forth over an ironing board.  The three remaining stories constitute a short story cycle treating a 
single extended family.  Beginning with the tensions between Whitey, the sailor protagonist of “Hey 
Sailor, What Ship?” and Lennie and Helen, his friends from the 1934 San Francisco general strike, 
newly-middle class at the time of the story; running through the growing divide between Carol, 
Lennie and Helen’s daughter, and her working class African-American friend Parialee in “O Yes;” 
and culminating in the strife between Lennie’s parents, Eva and David, and between Eva and her 
children in “Tell Me a Riddle,” the final three stories in the collection generate their conflict through 
the drama of eroding relationships.  Determined by divergent class positions, shifting ideological 
alignments, and the fruition of long germinating arguments, the fallings-out at the center of these 
stories draw their affective force from a sense of what Olsen describes in her afterward to Yonnondio 
as “what might have been, and never will be now” (Yonnondio 133).  Where the dislocations in 
Yonnondio, more narrative than formal, serve as an index of socio-economic deprivations, the formal 
disjunctures of Tell Me a Riddle address what is essentially a discursive problem: the narration of 
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shifts in political and social attitudes across historical time and over several generations.  Like 
Yonnondio, Tell Me a Riddle filters its historical concerns through family narratives.  However, unlike 
the narrative of Yonnondio, which uses the Holbrook family as a frame through which to provide a 
capsule history of proletarian tragedies leading to a radical consciousness that was very much of the 
compositional moment, the stories of Tell Me a Riddle possess a historical consciousness that is as 
much retrospective as it is progressive, and a concomitant attention to the dynamics of limited 
promise and unrealized potential.  The form of the collection, the juxtaposition of a single story 
thematically concerned with a mother’s pained, guilty, occasionally defiant consideration of her 
daughter’s development, with a short story cycle consisting of three stories connected through their 
concern with a single extended family, traces broken narratives of uncertain development and 
apparently inevitable disillusionment.  Tell Me a Riddle keys the gaps and fragmentation that formally 
constitute the short story cycle to a thematic interest in the disjointed legacy of the American left at 
the beginning of the Cold War.  In (and in between) the stories of the collection, “development” is 
interrogated in its political and individual dimensions. 
Three linked stories appear in the collection in chronological order, but with varied temporal 
foci.  The first, “Hey Sailor, What Ship?” introduces “Lennie and Helen and the kids [Jeannie, Carol, 
and Annie]” through the central consciousness of Whitey, a sailor briefly ashore in San Francisco, 
who had saved Lennie’s life during the 1934 San Francisco general strike (Tell Me a Riddle 22).  The 
second, “O Yes” records the growing distance of Carol, the middle daughter, from her working-
class African-American friend Parialee (Parry) Phillips as they move into junior high school, and in 
the wake of Carol’s unsettling experience of Parry’s baptism.  The final and longest story, “Tell Me a 
Riddle,” from which the collection’s title is taken, focuses on the lives of Eva and David, the elderly 
parents of Lennie and six other children, who have grown apart in their marriage, and who, after 
Eva is diagnosed with terminal cancer, travel around the country visiting their children and 
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grandchildren.  Each story treats a unique episode in which the gradual processes of historical 
change become visible in the discreet incidents of their characters’ lives.  These stories all tend 
toward tragedy and build toward a localization of historical meaning in the family. 
 “I Stand Here Ironing,” the opening piece of Tell Me a Riddle, however, begins the collection 
on a note of deep skepticism not only of the value of lineal inheritance, but of the value of 
explanatory narrative itself in the face of a more powerful social imperative to simply make things 
better.  The linked stories of Tell Me a Riddle emphasizes the family drama of ideological changes that 
occur across generations—the tragic combination of social success with the weakening of social 
conscience.  “I Stand Here Ironing” focuses on the failure of an individual to succeed, and on the 
representational problems generated by trying to explain that failure. We can understand the rest of 
the collection, in its piecemeal exposition of another young girl’s development into social 
consciousness, as an attempt to answer Emily’s nihilistic exit from the story.  The three stories 
which follow “I Stand Here Ironing” constitute a short story cycle, connected through their 
treatment of three generations of the same family, with multiple generations appearing in each story.  
The connected stories of the collection present a vision of a community fragmenting and being 
reconstituted.  But taken together, the stories combine to portray the fragmentation and 
reconsititution of character within individuals across historical time. 
In a note included with the publication of “Help Her to Believe,” the story which would 
become “I Stand Here Ironing,” in the 1956 Stanford Short Stories collection, Olsen relates the 
compositional difficulties that she faced in writing the story (her first published work of fiction since 
the 1934 Partisan Review printing of half of the first chapter of Yonnondio). The story takes the form of 
a mother’s unspoken apologia for her daughter’s upbringing, prompted by a school counselor’s 
inquiry about her daughter’s life, and thought out while the mother irons clothes.  For Olsen, who 
began the story’s composition with the intention of presenting a full exposition of the daughter’s life 
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to illuminate the circumstances limiting her potential, the scope of the story’s explanatory ambitions 
quickly began to seem impractical.  “I would start a scene and realize it required too much 
development,” she writes.  “There was too much material.  What could I select to best show her [the 
daughter in the story, Emily]? to best show ‘what had made him [the story’s inspiration, Olsen’s 
friend’s son] how he is.’  It needed to be a novel” (“On the Writing of a Story” 134).  Olsen’s desire 
to explain her characters’ lives threatens the narrative cohesion of her project, not to mention the 
possibility of ever completing it.  While the ethical motivation that Olsen offers for her story 
demands comprehensiveness, the narrative that would fulfill that requirement strains against the 
boundaries of her form.  The immediate significance of “development” in Olsen’s remarks is 
narratological, but her comments apply to her ambivalent treatment of biographical development as 
well.  Indeed, Olsen’s framing links the question of narrative development (how do I mold this story 
into a complete and finished narrative?) to the question of an individual’s development in their social 
context (how did this person get to be how she or he is?).  The tension here is between story and 
plot—in particular between Olsen’s expressed desire to present the story in its explanatory fullness 
(which she casts as a novelistic enterprise) and the requirements of narrative compression imposed 
by the short story form.  Olsen’s resolution situates the explanatory story of the child’s life within a 
narrative of the mother’s concern for her daughter, structuring its discussion of the daughter’s life in 
relation to the mother’s expectations and immediate emotional state; that is, maintaining a perpetual 
link between the incidents of the daughter’s story and the larger generational frame into which her 
life can be fit. 
The rest of Olsen’s author’s note explains the process of distillation that leads from an 
unmanageable proliferation of causes to a coherent and cohesive portrait of an emotional effect.  
Indeed, if the complex of social and personal circumstances that would account for the totality of 
the daughter’s life seem, to Olsen, to exceed the bounds of what is possible in the short story form, 
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then the emotional experience of failing to produce a sufficient explanatory narrative of a life (an 
experience felt by Olsen as author and mirrored by her narrator) prove to be a subject that the short 
story can grasp.  The flight from novelistic expansiveness into a short narrative marked by lyrical 
compression frees Olsen from the unfulfillable demands of narrative development made by her 
initial conception of the story.  Only once Olsen is able to shed the burdens of robust novelistic 
explanation can she produce a story that she can call “her own”: 
The emotional tone of the story came as the story became my own, not in the 
incidents in which the story was clothed, but in the emotions of a parent whose tasks 
are finished with a particular child and who can only at this time of life, when it is 
too late and the mistakes and successes are irrevocable, begin to see what was and 
what was not determining, can feel how much “could not be helped,” and know that 
the kind of world it is, is what will determine what ultimately happens with the child. 
(136). 
 
Olsen’s note frames the story’s production in explicit reaction to the novel, a genre that she 
conceives as fundamentally a vehicle for the placement of individual characters in relation to a 
system of historical and local incidents (thus, the trimmings from the story, which “filled a paper 
bag,” include “a hospital scene, the Spanish Civil War, a school scene, a long diatribe about school 
homework” [135]).  Deciding to abandon the novelistic aspirations to an explanatory scope 
encompassing both the world historical and the local, Olsen subsumes the etiological questions that 
would be addressed by a narrative of Emily’s development to an exploration of the dread that strikes 
the narrator when she attempts to narrate her daughter’s life.  Though Emily’s narrative is essentially 
linear—a progression from birth to an early adulthood of dimmed prospects—the overt action of 
the story is essentially static, encapsulated in the mother’s back and forth vacillation over the ironing 
board—agitated movement without direction.  The ironing itself has a clear teleological focus: the 
flattening of clothes, the smoothing of their wrinkles and regularization of their form, the fulfillment 
of a domestic chore.  The motion behind the ironing, extending a classical Marxist understanding of 
alienated labor to the domestic sphere, mechanizes the mother, imagining her in relation to the 
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potentially permanent stream of clothes to be ironed, and reiterating the oscillation of the mother’s 
emotions (“Aren’t you ever going to finish the ironing, Mother?” Emily asks. “Whistler painted his 
mother in a rocker.  I’d have to paint mine standing over an ironing board” [19]). 
“I Stand Here Ironing” begins with contesting notes of defiance and regret.  The action of 
the story consists of the narrator ironing and mulling over her daughter Emily’s development.  The 
mother’s recollections are sparked by a school counselor’s request that she come in to talk about 
Emily, “a youngster who needs help and whom I’m deeply interested in helping” (Tell Me a Riddle 9). 
The mother does not come in, but in response mentally narrates a procession of incidents that may 
offer some purchase on her daughter’s life: her nursing schedule, oppressive desire for her daughter 
to be good, and unstable employment in “the pre-relief, pre-WPA world of the depression” (10); the 
daughter’s indifferent childcare at the hands of her absent father’s family, experience of a bad 
teacher, residence at a nightmarish camp for the treatment of eating disorders, apparently innate wit, 
brown hair and dark, “foreign looking” features (20); and the broader social factors of Cold War 
nuclear panic and economic depression. 
From the beginning of the story, the mother’s understanding of her own limited agency 
ability to affect her daughter’s life colors her responses to the counselor’s prompt.  “Even if I came, 
what good would it do?  You think because I am her mother I have a key, or that in some way you 
could use me as a key?  She has lived for nineteen years.  There is all that life that has happened 
outside me, beyond me” (10).  In responding to the question, which “moves [her] tormented back 
and forth with the iron,” the mother immediately distances herself from any potential utility that she 
might have in the counselor’s efforts to help her daughter.  This distancing extends both to her role 
as a source of narrative information about her daughter that might be instrumentalized in the 
counselor’s intervention, and to her own possible transformation into an instrument of reform.  The 
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mother thus tries to divorce her retrospective consideration of her daughter’s life from any potential 
utility it might have.  The mother presents her narrative for herself and to herself. 
In this regard, the story presents an ambivalent transfer of agency from the mother to the 
counselor (from the family to social institutions), and a shift from a narrative of action to a narrative 
of memory.  The mother’s narrative doesn’t offer a solution to the problems that it presents (the 
mother from beginning to end disavows any actual communication with the counselor, despite 
ending her monologue with a clear, if unvoiced, request to the counselor), but only a meditation on 
the problem of the daughter’s life.  As it is framed by the story, Emily’s problems are of the past, 
and insofar as they continue into the present, they are a problem for someone other than the mother 
to solve.  The act of narration, though entirely internal, creates an event with an endpoint—a 
moment of at least provisional maturity, in which the daughter’s fate seems to be sealed, and the 
mother’s responsibility opens up onto a responsibility to address the conditions in which her now 
nearly adult daughter moves—in which, by virtue of its closure, the mother’s own actions might be 
judged. 
In contrast to the counselor’s optimism about Emily’s prospects, the mother’s reaction to 
Emily’s entrance at the end of the story suggests that the mother constitutes her own identity in 
relation to her daughter by imagining her, at least in part, as an already determined subject.  When 
Emily enters the story, near its conclusion, she does so with a mixture of whimsy and fatalism that 
signal her apparent unconcern with futurity: 
She starts upstairs to bed.  “Don’t get me up with the rest in the morning.”  
“But I thought you were having midterms.”  “Oh those,” she comes back in, kisses 
me, and says quite lightly, “in a couple of years when we’ll all be atom-dead they 
won’t matter a bit.” 
She has said it before.  She believes it.  But because I have been dredging the 
past, and all that compounds a human being is so heavy and meaningful in me, I 




The mother’s pose of retrospection which heightens her sensitivity to her daughter’s apocalyptic 
nihilism, in part because her remembering, itself, invokes the language and structures of progressive 
development.  Her concern with “all that compounds a human being,” is a concern with events 
considered in light of their ends: by the extent to which they determine the trajectory of an 
individual’s life.  In this sense, the mother’s assertion, immediately following the lines quoted above, 
that she will “never total it all” (20) resists the impulse to biographical summation that would 
subsume her into the narrative of her daughter’s life, as a cause of which Emily is an effect. 
The episodic descriptive structure that the mother refuses to bring into a totalized narrative 
line mirrors the organizational logic of the collection as a whole, placing incidents alongside one 
another, hinting at throughlines of narrative development (and routing many of them through 
intergenerational family structures), but resisting a unified resolution.  Composed of an aggregation 
of various events,  Emily is an effect that defies easy causal explanation.  But though the narrator 
refuses to impose a structure of explanatory coherence on her daughter’s life, neither does she 
accept the counselor’s understanding of her daughter’s youthful malleability, or her sense that 
because Emily’s might be helped, the counselor must intervene in ways grounded in an understanding 
of her personal past.  Emily’s youth and maturity are, for the mother, relational and contingent—not 
essential to her age but a function of her roles and circumstances.  Emily early in life assumes 
gendered adult roles: “She had to help be a mother, and housekeeper, and shopper.  She had to set 
her seal” (18).  The ambiguity of the mother’s assertion that “she had to set her seal” (a phrase that 
evokes the need to make one’s mark, in the sense of pressing a signet into wax, the progression from 
lability to rigidity in the material transformation of the sealant, and the sense in which a seal serves 
both to close off and separate thing from thing, and also to attach two objects) reflects an 
ambivalence about maturity, conceived as the final issue of a coherent project.  This phrase, 
moreover, has particular resonance with the mother’s narrative project of retelling, even if ultimately 
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only to herself, the story of Emily’s life.  In telling the story—in engaging in the act of 
comprehensive recollection, if not final summation, the mother sets a seal of her own.  Resisting the 
counselor’s desire for a narrative of recovery, the story concludes with an appeal to the counselor, 
and to the reader, to alter the circumstances in which the daughter moves: “Only help her to 
know—help make it that there is cause for her to know—that she is more than this dress on the 
ironing board, helpless before the iron” (21).  The mother’s parry, ending the imagined conversation 
with the counselor, ultimately reframes the terms of the conversation away from the daughter 
herself and towards the circumstances in which the daughter lives.  As such, the story’s conclusion is 
oriented away from an individual, biographical logic, and towards a social logic.  Rather than trying 
to make a better Emily, she suggests, the counselor should make a better world. 
But if the story’s focus on Emily moves from the personal to the political—away from 
Emily’s development and towards its milieu—its treatment of the mother retains a pronounced 
developmental focus.   In opening up onto a broad call for changed circumstances, the narrator 
converts the setting of the story into a metaphor that gestures again towards her own implication in 
her daughter’s life story.  After dictating the circumstances that render her, too, a victim, keeping her 
from being the mother she would have liked, she appears to conclude on a note of resignation: 
“She has much to her and probably little will come of it.  She is a child of her age, of 
depression, of war, of fear.” 
 Let her be.  So all that is in her will not bloom—but in how many does it?  
There is still enough left to live by. (20-1) 
 
The turn to the metaphor of the dress and the ironing board, however, suggests a complicated and 
still-unresolved responsibility that the mother feels for her daughter’s alienation and limitation.  
Indeed, even as she appears to accept that her daughter’s primary developmental moment has 
passed, she herself is now behind the iron metaphorically bearing down on Emily.21 
                                                 
21 Patricia Meyer Spacks notes of mid-twentieth century fiction of adolescence, that, “the 
psychological satisfaction it provides for adults partakes in the pleasure of self-castigation.  
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On the level of metaphor, abstracted from the narrative situation of the mother ironing, the 
mother’s plea that the daughter understand herself to be capable of resisting apparently determining 
social forces despite her likely failure to realize her potential depends on Emily’s ability to define 
herself in a position other than that of the dress, steamed, pressed, and flattened.  But the metaphor 
allows for only a few positions that Emily might occupy: the controlled, objectified dress, the ironing 
enforcer of domestic order, and a figure outside of the overt metaphorical structure: the wearer of 
the dress, or the person unconcerned with the event of ironing entirely.  I don’t want to suggest that 
the metaphor entirely forecloses on the daughter’s possibilities outside of its immediate structure—
she could potentially occupy the positions of the dress-wearer or of a woman outside of the house 
altogether—but rather to point out the unattractive possibility, held out by the mother’s metaphor, 
that her daughter might merely assume her own position as motor behind the iron’s flattening force.  
Insofar as the metaphor positions the mother as an agent of oppression (literally pressing, if not 
oppressing), then a portion of the mother’s worry is that the daughter is not only subject to 
oppression at her hands, but that upon maturing she will simply take her place. 
 This, I would like to suggest, is central to Olsen’s problematic of maturity, evident in the 
tension between the ideals of the epigraph to “Tell Me a Riddle”—“These things shall be,” a line 
from John Addington Symonds’s labour song, “A Vista,” (1880)—and the possibility of static or 
worsening social relations implied in the anxiety that Emily might only either be oppressed or take 
her mother’s unenviable place.  The danger looming over “I Stand Here Ironing” is the danger of 
tradition-as-stasis: a danger that individual development will not be accompanied by social 
                                                                                                                                                             
Increasingly in the twentieth century, the novel of adolescence provides not a device for criticizing 
the existing state of society (a function it has served from the beginning) but a record of adult guilt” 
(288).  This tendency towards reading fictions of adolescent development as indictments of the 
vacuity of adult poses of maturity is evident in “I Stand Here Ironing.”  The mother’s anxiety in the 
story, however, bears a complex relation to the daughter’s putative accession to adulthood.  The 
hope that Emily will know, or will have cause to know, “that she is more than this dress on the 
ironing board, helpless before the iron” (21), turns the mother’s immediate situation into a figure for 
broader oppressive social forces. 
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development, but instead will simply re-inscribe unjust patterns of social organization.  Symonds’s 
song, as voiced by David, a central character in “Tell Me a Riddle”, proclaims that, “These things 
shall be!  A loftier race / Than e’er the world hath known shall rise / With flame of freedom in their 
souls / And light of knowledge in their eyes.”  The song’s utopian vision depends, crucially, on a 
narrative of generational progress.  The final verse, not referenced in “Tell Me a Riddle,” begins, 
“These things—they are no dream—shall be / For happier men when we are gone,” emphasizing an 
earthly messianism of social development.  The ideals of the present will not be realized in the 
present generation, but by future inheritors of contemporary idealistic legacies.  This is the mood of 
“secular Jewish utopianism” referenced in the Norton Anthology of Jewish Literature’s introduction to 
the story (689).  But “I Stand Here Ironing”  offers a clue to the ambivalent relationship to Jewish 
tradition evident in “Tell Me a Riddle.”  Emily’s development, the focus of the well-intentioned 
counselor’s concerns, would be negated by the injustice of the world into which she matures.  
Moreover, Emily’s understanding of the imminence of atomic annihilation, which underwrites a 
nihilistic counter to the school’s expectations that she will take a path toward “being helped,” 
undermines the utopian hope of an earlier generation.  The threat of atomic destruction undermines 
both the narrative concern for Emily’s potential and the Emily’s rationale for pursuing a better life 
or a better world.  The shift from the political moment of the 1930s, imbued with a revolutionary 
immediacy that authorizes the apparent teleology of Olsen’s proletarian novel Yonnondio, to the Cold 
War period of de-radicalization and feared atomic destruction and in which the stories of Tell Me a 
Riddle were composed, signals, for Olsen, a change in formal possibilities.  From the revolutionary 
telos of the proletarian novel, in which the Holbrook family’s dissolution—the end of a lineal family 
narrative—is aligned with the definite end of demonstrating the need for a new social order, Tell Me 
a Riddle adopts and anti-teleological, retrospectively oriented narrative strategy that marries a lament 
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for a defunct popular radicalism with a concern for the development of individual characters in 
post-radical conditions.22 
While “I Stand Here Ironing” is centrally focused on an individual character’s Bildungs 
narrative, the three stories which follow—a linked but discontinuous whole—trace a dialectical 
movement between the development of Jeannie, a secondary character in each story in which she 
appears, and the shifting class position of that character’s family.  In the stories’ negotiation between 
Jeannie’s developing social consciousness and the larger narrative of the embourgeoisement of three 
generations of her family, the family itself emerges as a site in which ideological shifts are rendered 
legible, and an individual’s political position can be understood in relation to a longer tradition. 
While the individual stories tend towards a tragic aesthetic of dissolution, disappointment, 
and the destruction of ideals at the hands of circumstance, the cycle as a whole holds out the hope 
of progress in the figure of Jeannie.  Peripheral in each of the earlier stories, Jeannie is essential to 
the final story’s conclusion, linking a new socially-engaged generation to the immigrant grandparents 
who serve as the matriarch and patriarch for the cycle’s central family.  Jeannie’s growth as such is 
not directly narrated in these stories, but rather is implied in the changes in her attitude evident in 
her successive appearances in the final three stories.  Indeed, the book’s structure, in which the 
incidents in each of the connected stories are separated by impermeable narrative barriers—despite 
the continuity of characters, no one story references any other—tempers the narrative prominence 
of incident with a larger, un-narrated plot of individual development in historical time.  Nowhere is 
this tendency more evident than in the transformation of Jeannie’s character from the teenager who 
                                                 
22 The turn to the psychological implied by this shift resonates with the account of post-War Jewish 
American letters offered in Mark Shechner’s After the Revolution (1987), which, as the title of two of 
its chapters (“From Socialism to Therapy” [parts I and II]) suggests, reads Marxism and psychology 
as the beginning and ending points of the trajectory of Jewish American literature in the twentieth 
century.  The nearness of this narrative—not premised on particularly Jewish concepts (the 
biographies of Freud and Marx notwithstanding)—to the central concerns of Olsen’s collection 
offers some background for the legibility of Tell Me a Riddle as a text with something to say about 
American Jewish life.  
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snobbishly derides Whitey for his language and his drinking into the young woman whom Eva, the 
matriarch protagonist of “Tell Me a Riddle,” recognizes as a kindred spirit of Lisa, the woman who 
taught her to read in pre-revolutionary Russia (112). 
 Olsen’s biographer, Panthea Reid, notes that the author appears to have worked through a 
process of distillation, moving from the expansiveness of the novel to the compression of the short 
story.  In response to Malcom Cowley’s estimation of her as, “essentially a novelist rather than a 
short story writer,” Olsen “said she had written several thousand pages but reduced whole scenes to 
a paragraph, or a sentence, or nothing at all.  Thus she was ‘a short story writer, I leave things out.’  
She did not want to remake her novella into a novel by ‘padding, fattening, putting back what was 
cut away’” (Reid 212).  Though the extent of Olsen’s drafting may be an exaggeration,23 the practice 
and aesthetic of distillation that she claims as her own positions the story’s completeness as a 
function of the spare intensity of its prose.  The paratactic structure of the stories that comprise Tell 
Me a Riddle’s short story cycle offer an escape from the burden of the full exposition of a character’s 
development. Jeannie develops for the reader precisely because she is ancillary to the main action of 
every story in which she figures.  The gemlike lyricism of Olsen’s prose, concentrated on the precise, 
intense exposition of the diegetic moment, allows little space for the narrated growth of its 
characters.  The third-person narratorial voice that replaces the first-person narration of Emily’s 
mother in “I Stand Here Ironing” is decidedly terse, often providing the physical outlines of a 
scene’s setting, and letting the dialogue do the work of emplotment.  Consider, for example, the 
opening sentence of “Hey Sailor, What Ship?,” the first of the three connected stories: “The grimy 
                                                 
23 A strength of Reid’s biography is the extent to which it explores the falsehoods and self-
inventions underlying much of Olsen’s comments about her own writing, both in public and to 
publishers.  Olsen, who throughout her career requested and accepted numerous foundation grants 
and publishers’ advances, often with false avowals that she was working on material that she had 
apparently abandoned, appeared almost pathologically unable to fulfill a contract.  For a piercing 
criticism of the mythologies of Olsen’s silences, read in light of her persistent institutional support, 




light; the congealing smell of cigarettes that had been smoked long ago and of liquor that had been 
drunk long ago; the boasting, cursing, wheedling, cringing voices, and the greasy feel of the bar as he 
gropes for his glass” (22).  All action is substantiated to description.  The voices in the bar are 
emptied of semantic value.  The central character’s movement conveys information about his 
character primarily through his location—his fingers allow us to feel the bar’s greasiness. All subject 
and no predicate, the sentence offers a particular moment, its concrete details foregrounded, that 
emphasizes the material presence of the figure who is to become the story’s protagonist—a lyrical 
appreciation of the scene as such, itself a figure for the action of the social forces with which it is 
instantiated. 
The burdens of social comprehensiveness that Olsen sees as a novelistic imperative fall away 
with the development of the lyrical center of the story.  Jeannie’s reappearance across the final three 
stories of the volume allows for an escape from the lyrical moment through an implied and 
fragmentary temporal movement.  The piecemeal presentation of Jeannie’s arrival at three separate 
developmental stages tempers the stasis of Olsen’s lyrical presentation of static moments through 
the narrative movement of Jeannie’s developing character.  By avoiding an expressed narrative of 
development in favor of one implied in the gaps between the collection’s stories, Olsen mitigates the 
pessimism of her political moment, providing a figure of continuity who disrupts the apparently final 
endings of her stories.  Jeannie’s implied development, I argue, is given fuller and more complicated 
historical weight by its ultimate realization in relation to the family of which she is a part.  It is in the 
connection of Jeannie’s personal narrative of development with that of her grandparents’ political 
frustration that her story comments on and ameliorates the frustrations of the contemporary cultural 
moment. 
Jeannie is as close to an antagonist as we find in the story, “Hey Sailor, What Ship?” her first 
appearance in the collection.  The narrative center of the story is Whitey, the sailor in whose 
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consciousness the story begins and ends, and the plot hinges on the realization of his growing 
distance from the people with whom he shares a long history, and who serve as his most significant 
grounding while ashore.  The story’s opening establishes a dramatic tension between the grimy, well 
worn dive bar where Whitey finds himself (but no company) on coming ashore at San Francisco, 
and the attraction of “Lennie and Helen and the kids,” a quasi-familial relationship that serves 
simultaneously as a social draw and as a source of shame.  Jeannie, to whom Whitey is uniquely 
attached, and who, during the span of the story, openly disdains Whitey’s working-class language 
and habits, is the main figure through which the reader encounters Whitey’s transformation from a 
central participant in the family’s emotional and economic life to “old friend”—a figure of nostalgic 
affective attachment now alienated from the family’s newfound self-sufficiency. 
Whitey’s feeling for Jeannie is in part dictated by her young, playful proclamation of 
marriage to him, which is revealed parenthetically in the story, and which serves to anchor Whitey in 
the life of the family—“(He had told the story so often, as often as anyone would listen, whenever 
he felt good, and always as he told it the same shy happiness would wing through him, how when 
she was four, she had crawled into bed beside him one morning, announcing triumphantly to her 
mother: I’m married to Whitey now, I don’t have to sleep by myself anymore.)” (39).  The mock 
marriage authorizes and formalizes Whitey’s connection to Helen and Lennie’s family beyond the 
moment of the 1934 general strike in which it was forged.  In “marrying in” to the family, Whitey 
lays claim to the domestic solidarity that replaces the labor solidarity that he and Lennie once 
shared—a transposition echoed in Lennie’s comment to Whitey that the family, whose relative 
stability Whitey notices in the new domestic order in which dishes are done immediately after 
dinner, has “gotten organized” (36).  At least part of the appeal of the marriage, for Whitey, is that it 
cements his connection with and responsibility to a younger generation—one that he defines as 
affective, rather than material.  Younger sister Allie’s later comment that he should “kiss the dolly 
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you gave me [. . .]. She’s your grandchild now,” presents a further figure of the limitations of this 
elective family affiliation to encompass the class-solidarities of the ’30s—the simulated grandchild, a 
mute and purchased legacy, foregrounds that while, for Helen and Lennie, Whitey is a figure of the 
past, for him they are a link to the present and the future. 
As the story continues it is precisely Jeannie’s insensibility to Whitey’s emotions that signals 
the depth of his remove from the family’s contemporaneous situation. Jeannie’s reactions to Whitey 
reveal a particularly classed conception of maturity.  Her objections begin with his cursing, a mode 
of speech offensive in part because out of place in the domestic norms to which she subscribes: 
I don’t go over to anybody’s house and hear words like that.  
Jeannie, [says her mother], who are you kidding?  You kids use them all. 
That’s different, that’s being grown up, like smoking. [. . . .] He’s just a 
Howard Street wino now—why don’t you and daddy kick him out of the house?  He 
doesn’t belong here. (42-3) 
 
In the context of Jeannie’s domestic objections to Whitey, Whitey’s tender feelings towards their 
mock marriage run all the more strongly against Jeannie’s developing bourgeois social 
consciousness.  The adolescent experience of taboo language as a hallmark of “being grown-up” is 
an iteration of the ideological inflection of maturity that Olsen elaborates (and of which Jeannie is 
acutely aware) in “O Yes.”  Here, however, the defamiliarization at the heart of the story’s account 
of Jeannie and Whitey’s relationship serves as an indictment of the exclusivity of the middle class 
family structures into which Helen and Lennie’s children acculturate. 
At the end of “Hey Sailor,” Whitey leaves Helen and Lennie’s house in San Francisco, 
unlikely to return:  
By Jeannie, silent and shrunken into her coat.  He passes no one in the 
streets.  They are inside, each in his slab of house, watching the flickering light of 
television.  The sullen fog is on his face, but by the time he has walked to the third 
hill, it has lifted so he can see the city below him, wave after wave, and there at the 
crest, the tiny house he has left, its eyes unshaded.  After a while they blur with the 
myriad others that stare at him so blindly. 
Then he goes down. 
Hey Sailor, what ship? 
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Hey Marinero, what ship? (47) 
The houses on the San Francisco hills ultimately figure atomization: the solitary figure in front of the 
flickering TV opposed to the communalism that Whitey instantiates in his unpredictable entrances 
and exits, and that, the story posits, existed in the now bygone solidarity of “seafaring gen’lmun” 
(35).  The synecdochal blurring of the “eyes” of the family’s house with those of the other “blindly 
staring” houses and the prominence of Jeannie upon Whitey’s departure signal the collection’s 
critique of the family as a unit of progressive change and ideological transmission.  As the final 
member of the family to be mentioned, wrapped in a coat that emphasizes her own insularity, 
Jeannie is foregrounded as a representative of the family’s trajectory.  Indeed, for Whitey, who 
variously confuses Jeannie for Helen and Carol for Jeannie, Jeannie connects the different 
generations of women in the family: a figure of Helen’s past, “so much like Helen of years ago,” and 
of Carol’s future (31). 
In filling this role, Jeannie acts for Whitey as an embodiment of youthful potential—a figure 
in which the young version of her mother imaginatively can be re-embodied, and also a symbol for 
youth as such: a model through which Whitey sees her younger sister Carol.24  That Whitey sees 
                                                 
24 A curious line in her afterward to the Feminist Press’s reissue of Rebecca Harding Davis’s Life in 
the Iron Mills bears on the significance of the family in Olsen’s historical imagination in ways relevant 
to our discussion of Jeannie’s interchangeability with her mother, in Whitey’s eyes.  “[Davis] was a 
dark, vigorous, sturdily built girl,” she writes, “with a full handsome face that decades later was to 
become the most admired, sketched, photographed face of its generation in the person of her 
famous son Richard” (Silences 55). Olsen’s primary aim here is to contrast Harding Davis’s relative 
hardships with the advantages enjoyed by her son by virtue of his sex (she continues: “in her own 
time [. . .] her appearance was probably considered unfortunate—for a girl” [ibid.]), but the transitive 
character of her claim is striking.  In Olsen’s telling, it is not only Davis’s influence that survives into 
the next generation (her son, too, has a successful career as a writer and beneficiary of his mother’s 
professional advice), but also elements of her material self.  The link between mother and son holds 
out the possibility of re-instantiating the mother as a man, and thereby redeeming her misprized 
virtues for public consumption.  According to the progress of generations implicit in this account, 
the later generation reframes the life of the earlier, casting into relief changes in social circumstances 
as well as inherent differences between the individuals in each generation (in the context of Olsen’s 
afterward, gender is clearly the most significant factor differentiating Davis from her son, but 
character, personality, ability, etc., also play a role in her use of generational comparisons to 
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Jeannie as a young Helen suggests his nostalgia for the situation of their youth.  That he confuses 
Carol for Jeannie suggests a more generalized longing for a younger Jeannie, not yet socialized into 
the class prejudice that defines her subjectivity in the story.  In both misidentifications, however, 
Whitey’s desire for continuity, as such, is evident.  Indeed, Whitey’s working class masculinity is at 
the root of Jeannie’s rejection of him.  His joking references to their marriage, his penchant for 
physical intimacy, and his comparisons of Jeannie to Helen all point to the instability of the family’s 
class position—an alternate past in which Helen’s husband in a sailor or longshoreman, or an 
alternate future in which Jeannie’s husband is working class.  Whitey’s presence threatens Jeannie 
with the possibility that sexual reproduction will fail to lead to the reproduction of the middle-class 
status that the family enjoys.  The arc of her character’s development ultimately depends upon her 
acceptance of such a situation as a non-tragic possibility, and on her decoupling of sexual 
reproduction from the reproduction of class altogether. 
Whitey is a nomadic outsider, and though the story begins and ends focalized through his 
perspective outside of the house, from the moment that Lennie picks Whitey up on the street early 
in the story until the moment he leaves the house at the story’s end, Whitey is only seen in the 
context of his interactions with the family.  The story documents the family’s insufficiency as a 
container for social relations defined by class and labor solidarity.  But it is not the family in isolation 
that proves incapable of incorporating Whitey into its purview.  Instead, in light of Helen and 
Lennie’s continued affection for Whitey, the family represents a potential site of resistance to the 
disdain for the working class demonstrated in Jeannie’s behavior.  Family in the story, then, is a 
contested concept.  A site in which Whitey imagines continuity and Jeannie imagines upward 
                                                                                                                                                             
foreground historical change and historical stagnation).  The literalized presence of Davis’s face in 
her son’s gives Olsen’s description its uncanny charge (it is her face, more than Richard’s, that 
becomes “the most admired, sketched, photographed face of its generation”).  Generational 
distinctions thereby collapse as the family becomes a vehicle for transhistorical transit. 
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mobility, the family provides a potential link to the more radical past, and a measure of its failure to 
persist. 
Within the structure of the family, moreover, larger scale social and political shifts are 
situated within contexts of individual development.  The reader’s awareness of Jeannie’s youthful 
enthusiasm for Whitey and her eventual rejection of him tempers the sweetness of Carol’s 
unmitigated affection.  Thus, when Carol figures her desire for a knee bounce as one potentially 
inappropriate for her age—“guess you think ’cause I’m ten I’m too big to bounce any more” (36)—
she rejects the projected reluctance of early adolescence, but also acknowledges an understanding 
that growing older entails the socially proscribed rejection of one’s former self.  It also foregrounds 
the class-determined sexual threat that Whitey appears to present to Jeannie—puberty, and with it 
the possibility of sexual reproduction across class lines, separates Jeannie from Carol.  This 
understanding has poignant resonances for Whitey’s relationship with the family, as he discovers 
himself to be more a figure from the past than an easy participant in the family’s present—a fact 
reinforced in Whitey’s recitation of Jose Rizal’s valedictory poem, El Ultimo Adios, a recitation which 
includes the lines “Little will matter, my country, / That thou shoulds’t forget me. / I shall be 
speech in thy ears, fragrance and color, / Light and shout and loved song. . . .” before drifting off 
into incomprehensibility, Lennie assuring the children that “he’ll tell it all some other time” (42).  
The children’s appreciation for Rizal’s poem isn’t concretely explained in the story, but seems based 
less on its content than on the ritual and form of its recitation: it is a begged-for act, a regular part of 
Whitey’s visit.  As such, the resonance of the poem with Whitey’s own departure is lost on its young 
auditors in the story, but available to the reader.  Rizal’s valedictory claims its speaker’s cultural 
significance beyond his personal persistence in memory.  In the context of Whitey’s departure, his 
previous recitations of the poem take on a proleptic significance, as he arrives at the moment of his 
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departure from the family’s life, and metonymically, of the radical worker from the national 
imaginary. 
But the poem, of course, has additional significance as an object of Whitey’s avuncular 
relationship with the children.  A key text in Filipino nationalism and international anti-colonial 
revolutionary literature, the poem entertains the children.  This framing subordinates the song’s 
revolutionary significance to its playful performance.  It is special—unique to Whitey’s visits, and a 
marker of his ties to a culture with which the children’s parents (Lennie, in particular) identify, but 
that evidently forms little of their domestic life.  As an object of the children’s youthful experience, 
the poem is liable, like the knee-bounces, to being outgrown.  Indeed, Carol’s demure request for a 
bounce is couched in her recognition that her enjoyment of the act is in danger of being out of step 
with the expectations associated with her age.  “Guess you think ’cause I’m ten I’m too big to 
bounce anymore.”  Whitey’s response, “Bounce everybody.  Jeannie.  Your mom.  Even Lennie,” 
jestingly asserts that, whatever the age of the bouncee, he’s game—unwilling to let decorum interfere 
with their play (36).  But coming on the heels of Jeannie’s expressed disdain for Whitey’s manners, 
his willingness to pretend that age doesn’t matter immediately calls the reader’s attention to the fact 
that if Whitey’s up for a bounce, Jeannie decidedly isn’t. Whitey’s claim that he’ll “bounce 
everybody” is voiced to make Carol feel better, and to feel that the patterns of interaction and 
affection that they’ve established remain valid.  Jeannie’s presence troubles the list.  The political 
import of this scene is in its inflection of Jeannie’s development.  Jeannie is unfit to be bounced not 
only because she’s too big, or because the sexual overtones of the bounce, echoing her discomfort 
with even the satirical implication that she could marry Whitey, would render the bouncing 
inappropriate for their relationship (though both of these contribute to her refusal), but because she 
constitutes her own developing maturity in class-bound terms that are opposed to Whitey’s affect 
and mode of carrying himself.  In linking Rizal’s valedictory with the playful episodes of Whitey’s 
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visits, the story foregrounds the fragility of ideological continuity in the face of the social forces 
acting to interpellate Jeannie as a member of a different class from that in which her parents grew 
up. 
At the same time, however, the content of Rizal’s poem and of the origin of Lennie’s 
relationship with Whitey does provide a potentially usable narrative through which the children 
might develop a social consciousness in line with the tradition of their parents.  Though this process 
evidently fails with Jeannie, at least within the bounds of the story, it is nonetheless a tradition on 
which the children can draw to interpret their parents’ social understandings, and to develop their 
own.  In this way, the poem’s premonition of Whitey’s departure also prefigures its own eventual 
interpretation, the meaning of the verse latent for the children to access, and modeling the reader’s 
potential mobilization of the story itself to understand its contemporary moment in relation to a 
marginalized history of radical engagement.  This potential, unrealized in the story, sits next to a 
potent metaphor of embourgeoisment as the process of outgrowing one class affiliation for another, 
putatively more mature.  The process of Bildung is thus negatively weighted for its implication of 
working class atavism.  By aligning upward class mobility with the developmental narrative of 
adolescence, the story mounts a critique of class-disaffiliation by associating individual class ascent 
with the uniquely immature gesture of claiming one’s maturity.  Jeannie’s snobbishness, then, is at 
once adolescent and middle-class: an assertion of developmental achievement realized 
simultaneously along biological and socio-economic lines. 
  “O Yes,” the story that immediately follows “Hey Sailor” in the collection, reinforces and 
expands the collection’s association of developmental milestones and the concretization of class 
identity.  “O Yes,” titled “Baptism” in its original 1957 publication in Prairie Schooner, centers on the 
relationship between Jeannie’s younger sister, Carol, and Parialee Phillips, her working-class African-
American friend.  Picking up a consideration of the previous story’s family, “O Yes” embraces the 
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family as a unit through which individual ideological development might be evaluated and 
contextualized.  The story recapitulates Jeannie’s self-distancing from Whitey, as Carol and Parry 
grow apart upon their entrance into middle-school, a context in which racialized and classed 
segregation progresses through the official discourse of school pride, mandated middle-class 
standards of dress, and racist presuppositions of teachers and other school officials.  Though Carol’s 
story is very much one of her own unique development into social consciousness, the story as it 
appears in the collection places this narrative in direct dialogue with Jeannie’s, and with the conflict 
between her mother’s idealism and the social forces at play in the school.  In this way, Carol’s 
narrative trajectory is not solely a matter of individual importance, but a reflecton on her family as 
well. 
 In “O Yes,” Jeannie serves as forerunner and interpreter of Carol’s experience.  Having 
passed through a similar experience of sorting at her middle school, she displays a cynical expertise 
that extends to the social tragedy of her sister’s situation, but that doesn’t encompass the possibility 
of a different system outside of the relatively freer racial mixing in the school in a nearby wealthy 
suburb.  Here, too, Jeannie serves as a foil for both her mother and her sister, filtering her sister’s 
experiences through her own, while occupying the position of silent critic that her mother will echo 
in her own unvoiced advice at the story’s end: 
You don’t realize a lot of things, Mother, Jeannie said, but not aloud. [. . . .] 
Enough to pull that kid apart two ways even more, Jeannie said, but still not 
aloud. [. . . .] 
“Grow up, Mother.” Jeannie’s voice was harsh. [. . . .] 
It’s like Ginger and me.  Remember Ginger, my best friend in Horace Mann.  
But you hardly noticed when it happened to us, did you . . . because she was white? 
(62-3) 
 
Jeannie’s characteristically adolescent demand that her mother grow up presses her to accede to 
Jeannie’s own weary sense of the leveling force of school norms, echoing the lament at the end of “I 
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Stand Here Ironing.”  Growing up, in this construction, entails the abandonment of an idealistic 
view of social possibilities for an acceptance of structural divisions along the lines of race and class. 
But Jeannie’s is far from the only definition of what it means to be “grown-up” offered in 
the story. The controlling metaphor of “O Yes” is that of baptism, used in the story to explore the 
various inflections of an individual’s accession into a community.  The literal baptism of Parialee 
Phillips with which the story opens accompanies her secular transition into middle-school, which, in 
turn, presents a codified structure for her separation from Carol.  The story is coy about the 
baptism’s significance for Parry: she isn’t scared, but she “ponders the platform,” the private 
meaning of the ritual opaque to the reader (51).  For Carol, however, Parry’s baptism is a profound 
experience of alterity that leads to her own fainting, and that embodies the difference that she can 
begin to comprehend only at the story’s end.  In this regard, the baptism is also a figure for Carol’s 
own transformation.  Carol is at first overwhelmed by the ecstatic scene of the baptism, fainting 
before Parry mounts the baptismal platform.  The baptism thus begins as a marker of unassimilable 
difference—a celebration of Parry’s accession to a particular religious and ethnic community, an 
event to which Carol can only respond by withdrawing. 
On Carol’s fan, a little Jesus walked on wondrously blue waters to where bearded 
disciples spread nets out of a fishing boat.  If she studied the fan—became it—it 
might make a wall around her.  If she could make what was happening (what was 
happening?) into a record small and round to listen to far and far as if into a 
seashell—the stamp and rills and spirals all tiny (but never any screaming). (56) 
 
Through Parry’s church, the story ties racial difference to distinct forms of emotional expression.  
Carol, for whom this difference resonates with the implicit disapproval of her continued friendship 
with Parry in the new social regime of middle school, understands herself only to be able to 
approach the milieu of Parry’s church through dissociation and reification—casting the baptism not 
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as a vital cultural moment in which she might participate but as an object that she can observe from 
a distance.25 
The logic by which the story figures Carol’s own experience, though, is one of inevitable 
immersion.  “It is a long baptism into the seas of humankind, my daughter,” her mother thinks.  “Better 
immersion than to live untouched. . . . . Yet how will you sustain?” (71).  Helen frames Carol’s “baptism” as a 
choice, an assent to immersion against a default position of “living untouched,” but Carol 
experiences empathetic identification with another persecuted African-American girl at her school as 
involuntary: “Mother I want to forget about it all and not care,—like Melanie.  Why can’t I forget?  
Oh why is it like it is and why do I have to care?” (71).  Carol, then, is pulled in two different 
directions in her growth: the direction of socialization into the discriminatory norms of her white, 
middle-class classmates, and the direction (here, naturalized) of a conscientious understanding that 
the sociability that she and Parry shared, predicated on an acknowledgement of their mutual, 
unqualified, and equal humanity, is a moral action that runs counter to those other norms. 
While school most concretely sets Parry and Carol on separate tracks, it also acts as agent 
and function of larger social structures that interpellate these girls differently, and against one 
another.  The school’s setting highlights their growth into separation, framed, socially, as growth, 
implicitly casting their continued friendship as atavistic.  The moral tension of the story is filtered 
through an appeal to what once was.  Indeed, not only the immediate past of Carol and Parry’s 
friendship, but the more distant past of Carol’s religious heritage provide models for imagining an 
anti-racist present.  Among the unvoiced explanations for the forms of worship that Carol 
                                                 
25 A model, perhaps of the reader’s own position vis-à-vis the action of the text, and one that repeats 
the indictment of the reader’s capacity to aestheticize the mine explosion in Yonnondio: “And could 
you not make a cameo of this and pin it onto your aesthetic hearts?  So sharp it is, so clear, so 
classic.  The shattered dusk, the mountain of culm, the tipple; clean lines, bare beauty—and carved 
against them, dwarfed by the vastness of night and the towering tipple, these black figures with 
bowed heads, waiting, waiting. [. . . .] You will have the cameo?  Call it Rascoe, Wyoming, any of a 
thousand mine towns in America, the night of a mine blowup.  And inside carve the statement the 
company is already issuing” (20). 
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encounters in the church is one which calls attention to the Judaism of Carol’s great grandparents, 
drawing a connection between the oppression of African Americans and the oppression to be found 
in Carol’s ancestral past: “Emotion, Helen thought of explaining, a characteristic of the religion of all 
oppressed peoples, yes your very own great grandparents—thought of saying.  And discarded” (70).  By 
situating Carol in relation to her Jewish ancestry, Helen seeks to enable a more equitable human 
understanding.  Jewishness thus becomes a transhistorical structure through which Carol might 
understand herself to be implicated in the social injustice that separates her from a racial and class 
other.  Crucially, this use of Jewishness depends on a continuity of Jewish identity that would allow 
Carol to imagine herself, via her great grandparents, as a potential victim of social oppression—an 
understanding central to Jewish tradition and embodied in the injunction in the Passover hagaddah to 
understand oneself to have been a slave in Egypt.  “Tell Me a Riddle,” immediately following “O 
Yes,” takes up this discarded thought, further expanding the ideological and emotional genealogy of 
the family.  But “Tell Me a Riddle” contests the very genealogical logic that links it most concretely 
to the other stories in the collection. 
“Tell Me a Riddle” relates the pained peregrinations of Eva and David, parents of the 
previous two stories’ Lennie and Helen, as David drags Eva around the country to visit their adult-
children and their grandchildren, attempting to keep Eva unaware of her terminal cancer.  Shifting 
its focus from the generation that came of age in the 1930s to one whose formative political 
experience was the failed 1905 Russian revolution (the story is dedicated to “two of that generation, 
Seevya and Genya,” and takes a line from a late nineteenth century British labor song as its epigraph 
and theme, linking it to the leftist politics of an earlier era), the story presents the apotheosis of the 
collection’s consideration of how the problems and politics of the past impress themselves upon the 
present.  Cognizant of the strife, political, social, and economic, that defines its protagonists’ lives, 
the story resists idealizing Eva and David as part of a storied past.  Instead, “Tell Me a Riddle” 
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understands its protagonists as robust characters whose developed relationship is defined by still-
contested desires. 
Indeed, while the genealogical logic that links the story most concretely to the other stories 
in the collection would tend to subsume David and Eva’s lived experiences into their roles as 
parents and grandparents, the story in fact emphasizes their autonomous lives.  This is not to say 
that the story does not serve any genealogical function.  Part of the effect of “Tell Me a Riddle”  in 
the larger family narrative presented in the collection is to situate Helen and Lennie’s anxieties about 
the world in which their children grow up and the ideologies that they adopt within a broader 
history of the American left, and the explication of Lennie’s lineage offered by “Tell Me a Riddle” 
surely deepens our understanding of his character.  The story’s understanding of David and Eva’s 
practical problems as a disruption of—or an escape from—their youthful social commitment, too, 
implicates their lives in a larger historical and ideological frame.  But the central conflict of the story 
is not inter- but intra-generational, and its causes and potency remain to a large extent inaccessible to 
the younger generation.  Moreover, the facts of the story’s conflict—whether Eva and David will 
remain in their house or sell it to move into an elder cooperative, the contrast between Eva’s 
decaying body and David’s resilient vitality—are primarily in, between, and about the protagonists’ 
bodies (as opposed to their reputations or their relationships with their children).  By sidelining 
intergenerational issues to focus instead on the immediate problems of two members of the older 
generation, “Tell Me a Riddle” approaches the legacy of the relatively recent past not primarily in 
terms of its intangible significance for coming generations, but in terms of its tangible, material 
implications for the lives of the generation that lived it.  Eva and David’s lives are story, not 
backstory. 
“Tell Me a Riddle,” like Olsen’s later publication of Yonnondio which presents the work as a 
surviving trace of a distanced past, suggests a reading of the past not only for its utility to the present 
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but also for its own sake.  The story’s trenchant focus on its protagonists’ lives beyond their 
significance relative to their children, even despite the structural logic that would link them, via their 
children, to the rest of the collection and the significant presence of the children in the story, 
expands the collection’s critique of the family as the site of one’s social legacy.  The story offers a 
partial pre-history of the conflicts of the two preceding stories—highlighting their connections to an 
earlier era’s politics and expanding the collection’s treatment of the family at its center—and 
elaborates the post-revolutionary context of the other stories.  David and Eva are important both as 
Lennie’s parents and in their own subjectivity.  Much of the story’s import, in fact, is in its 
recognition of the interplay between the two—of a robust physicality which links a mythologized 
past with a material present.  “Tell Me a Riddle” mediates a contest between historical subjectivity 
and historical objectivity; that is, between Eva and David’s objectivity as quasi-mythologized 
instruments in their children’s self-construction and their subjectivity as historical actors for whom 
the lived experience of ideological struggle (both on the world-historical and on the personal scale) 
has material significance. 
 The story’s opening frames the relationship between its two central characters as a 
continuing quarrel: an argument briefly interrupted and free to be resumed as the constraints of 
work and childcare have been lifted: 
For forty-seven years they had been married.  How deep the stubborn, gnarled roots 
of the quarrel reached, no one could say—but only now, when tending to the needs 
of others no longer shackled them together, the roots swelled up visible, split the 
earth between them, and the tearing shook even to the children, long since grown. 
(72) 
 
The story opens not with the reasons for the argument, but with the fact of the argument itself, and, 
equally importantly, with the fact of its repression.  The metaphor that describes Eva and David’s 
quarrel foregrounds the latency of their argument, framing their marriage as a period in which their 
argument ferments, rendering its depths obscure.  This metaphor figures a long-standing 
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disagreement, held back by the forms and obligations of domesticity, as a thing with a vegetal 
power—organic but not sentient, possessing a force commensurate with the duration of its growth.  
The metaphor’s force in part consists in the way in which it returns material significance to a figure 
of speech often emptied of its full metaphoric content.  “Roots,” in “the roots of the quarrel” would 
seem at first to refer to the causes of the quarrel—the term used here not in a robust metaphoric 
construction, but in its colloquial meaning as a synonym of “origins.”  But as the metaphor extends, 
it becomes clear that “roots” signifies the quarrel itself, not cause but effect, and not figure of 
speech but a figured object, the materiality of which is essential to its interpretation.  The shift here, 
literalizing and concretizing an idiomatic usage, has important implications for the story’s 
understanding of Eva and David as representatives of a particular generation, as characters 
understood in relation to other key figures in the story, and as historically embedded subjects of a 
certain and significant age.  In transforming “roots” from a figure for an origin to a figure with a 
disruptive material presence in the narrative present, the story provides a model for understanding 
the history of the twentieth century in terms of the ferment, latency, and recrudescence of political 
radicalism—that is, for understanding the politics and ideologies of the past not as products of their 
moment, tending towards obsolescence and with implications understandable primarily in terms of 
their “afterlives,” but as concepts with continuing, if latent, pressure in the present. 
 In this regard, the material conditions of David and Eva’s lives, too, significantly inflect their 
narrative importance.  Coming on the heels of the collection’s previous two stories, the focus of 
“Tell Me a Riddle” on Lennie’s parents offers a backstory for Helen and Lennie’s lives: a partial 
genealogy for Lennie and his children.  But as the story progresses, it becomes clear that Eva and 
David’s family not only explains the couple’s legacy but also their troubles.  In “Tell Me a Riddle,” 
the family is not a blank screen on which the scenes of history are projected, but a mode of social 
organization that complicates a socialist ideal.  Thus, the voices of Eva and David’s children, 
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introduced at the beginning of the story as a chorus of responses to their parents’ quarrel, asking 
“why now?,” sympathizing with their strife, and suggesting that what’s needed is for someone to 
“knock their heads together,” are immediately undermined by the voice of the narrator, offering a 
definitive answer to Lennie’s incredulous question: 
Lennie wrote to Clara: They’ve lived over so much together; what could possibly tear 
them apart? 
 
 Something tangible enough. (73) 
 
Indeed, it is precisely the tangibility of Eva and David’s problems that separates the narrative’s 
understanding of their lives from their children’s understandings of their lives. 
The “tangible” ground of David and Eva’s rift is the conflict over David’s desire to sell their 
house to move into “The Haven,” a cooperative for the aged sponsored by David’s fraternal lodge, 
and Eva’s categorical rejection of that idea.  As David and Eva argue, Eva’s health falters, and she 
spends an increasing amount of time in bed until being convinced to see a doctor.  The doctor 
offers “a real fatherly lecture.  Sixty-nine is young these days. Go out, enjoy life, find interests” (81), 
but as Eva’s condition fails to improve, her doctor son-in-law Phil examines her and finds a 
pervasive and untreatable cancer.  Phil removes much of the cancer immediately, leading to a brief 
resurgence in Eva’s strength, but ultimately he indicates to David and the children that she has only 
about a year left to live.  Several of the children decide, with David, that Eva should not be told her 
prognosis, and instead should travel to visit her children and grandchildren, a plan to which Eva 
objects, but with which she complies.  David and Eva spend some time with their daughter Vivi and 
her family, and then leave for Los Angeles, to recuperate before seeing Lennie and Helen in San 
Francisco.  They never leave Los Angeles, though, and the story ends with Eva’s death in that city, 
attended by Jeannie, Lennie and Helen’s daughter. 
Eva’s objection to David’s plan to sell the house and move to the Haven, transparent to the 
third-person narrator but obscure to her children, stems from her understanding that the solitude of 
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old age affords her a self-determination that she has long desired, and that would be threatened by a 
move to a communal environment: 
Being able at last to move within, and not move to the rhythms of others, as life had forced her 
to: denying; removing; isolating; taking the children one by one; then deafening, half-
blinding—and at last, presenting her solitude. 
And in it she had won to a reconciled peace. (77, italics in the original) 
 
As “a reconciled peace,” Eva’s solitude is far from ideal.  Indeed, her isolation, while a consoling 
alternative to, “the days when it was her family, the life in [the house], which had seemed the enemy: 
tracking, smudging, littering, dirtying, engaging her in endless defeating battle,” is a notable 
diminishment of the utopian social ideals with which she and David began (ibid.).  The house, the 
husk of a life dominated by pressing parental obligations compounded by poverty, now stands as a 
trophy simply of her survival.  The house is significant to Eva as a past opponent.  Remaining there 
is a way to reclaim it as her own home, rather than letting it stand as the site of her domestic labor. 
But the relative freedom from domestic labor that Eva now experiences in the house doesn’t 
fully explain her tenacious desire to stay.  The absence of her children enables Eva’s attachment to 
the house.  Indeed, Eva’s triumph consists in the success she finds in dissociating the house from 
her family and transforming it into a place in which she can go about the habits of old age.  In this 
transformation, Eva reclaims the house from its history, and from the traditional associations of the 
domestic.  Where the Haven offers convenience greater than that of the house, the convenience has 
not been won, but purchased, and therefore lacks the savor of the contrast between the work that 
the house once implied and the leisure that it now allows.  Part of the pleasure of the house, for Eva, 
is that it was once a location of pain.  What Eva stands to lose in a move to the Haven is the peace 
of which the metaphorical scars of the progressive loss of her children, her deafness, her blindness, 
and her isolation are the price. 
So, at least, goes Eva’s reasoning.  The story, however, does not entirely endorse the 
consolation that Eva finds in her late-life isolation.  While perhaps a triumph in opposition to the 
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drudgery that defines her married life, Eva’s withdrawal is also a pathological removal of herself 
from the social world: not a victory but a forfeit.  In Eva’s conflicted relationship with the past, 
conveyed through her stance towards the house, the story offers a microcosm of the dilemmas of 
historical perception. 
 Consider Eva’s mediation on her first airplane flight, to Vivi and her children: 
 In the airplane, cunningly designed to encase from motion (no wind, no feel 
of flight), she had sat severely and still, her face turned to the sky through which they 
cleaved and left no scar. 
 So this was how it looked, the determining, the crucial sky, and this was how 
man moved through it, remote above the dwindled earth, the concealed human life.  
Vulnerable life, that could scar. 
 There was a steerage ship of memory that shook across a great, circular sea: 
clustered, ill human beings; and through the thick stained air, tiny fretting waters in a 
window round like the airplane’s—sun round, moon round.  (The round thatched 
roofs of Olshana.)  Eye round—like the smaller window that framed distance the 
solitary year of exile when only her eyes could travel, and no voice spoke.  And the 
polar winds hurled themselves across snows trackless and endless and white—like 
the clouds which had closed together below and hidden the earth. (91-2) 
 
The airplane, for Eva, is modernity as isolation: motion without the feeling of motion, 
transportation that fails to leave its imprint on the earth over which it travels.  The specific critique 
embedded in this image depends upon a positive valuation of scarring, a notion, recalling the 
discussion of Fiedler with which this chapter began, of life as constituted by a vulnerability to 
permanent effacement—by the experience of a past that one cannot slough off.  But if the airplane 
figures the alienation of easeful movement, then the “steerage ship of memory” offers an alternative 
mode of travel, historically situated at a moment of early twentieth century emigration, marked by its 
materiality: a rocky ride in “thick stained air” among “ill human beings.”  At one level, the contrast 
here serves to reiterate a well worn notion of the privileged relationship between suffering and the 
Real, one which elevates a history of hardship over a present of relative ease (a key binary in Eva’s 
dissent from David’s desire for the Haven).  Thus the difference in conveyances extends the story’s 
critique of comfort for comfort’s sake. 
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But the ship of memory, for all its redolence of grungy authenticity, is no pleasure cruise 
either.  As the story’s portrayal of Eva and David’s physical voyage gives way to a progression of 
visual affiliations—the round windows of the airplane suggest the portholes of the steerage ship, 
which recall the round roofs of the shtetl from which Eva hails, which in turn evoke round windows 
of Eva’s exile, likely in a Russian prison—the particular contours of Eva’s historical experience 
reveal an unenviable series of injuries leading to her scars.  Eva, opposed to the isolations of 
modernity but isolating herself nonetheless in her past, embodies the dilemma of how to incorporate 
unfinished historical experience into the present.  The answer, for Eva, is certainly not Judaism.  
From the bitterness that has dominated the later years of her life, Eva assumes an attitude of 
“musing; gentleness—but for the incidents of the rabbi in the hospital and the candles of benediction” (89, 
emphasis in the original).  Her reaction to the Rabbi who, having seen her name on a list of the 
hospital’s Jewish patients, appears “like a devil in a dream” at her bedside is at once unambiguously 
dismissive and inflected with the cadence and syntax of Yiddish: “Not for rabbis.  At once go and 
make them change.  Tell them to write: Race, human; Religion, none” (89).  And in response to her 
daughter’s suggestion that she help to bless the Friday night candles, Eva’s feelings about Judaism 
are made clear: “Superstition!  From our ancestors, savages, afraid of the dark, of themselves: 
mumbo words and magic lights to scare away ghosts” (94). 
 Central to the conflict between Eva and David is David’s own abandonment of his historical 
legacy.  Ferrying Eva around the country, David becomes complicit in the marginalization of her 
concerns.  Indeed, as much as his own desire to live in the Haven can be read as a withdrawal, Los 
Angeles, where he and Eva finish the story, is defined by its capacity to isolate its elderly residents 
from the rest of the world: “It is back to the great city he brought her, to the dwelling places of the 
cast-off old” (101).  Beyond just his withdrawal from Eva’s concerns, though, David ends the story 
by confronting the extent to which he has abandoned the future that they imagined in their youth: 
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Escaped to the grandchildren whose childhoods were childish, who had never 
hungered, who lived unravaged by disease in warm houses of many rooms, who had 
all the school for which they cared, could walk on any street, stood a head taller than 
their grandparents—towered above, beautiful skins, straight backs, clear 
straightforward eyes. “Yes, you in Olshana,” he said to the town of sixty years ago, 
“they would be nobility to you.” 
And was this not the dream then, come true in ways undreamed? he asked. 
And are there no other children in the world? he answered, as if in her harsh voice. 
And the flame of freedom, the light of knowledge? 
And the drop, to spill no drop of blood? [. . . .] 
To let her die, and with her their youth of belief out of which her bright, 
betrayed words foamed; stained words, that on her working lips became stainless. 
(121-2) 
 
The grandchildren’s ease indicts David, in Eva’s voice.  But if the multigenerational family frame 
diverts David’s radical energies, his begrudging partnership with Eva, and the almost reflexive 
penetration of her consciousness into his recalls him to his ideals. 
At this point in the story Jeannie, whom earlier Eva had compared to Lisa, the Russian 
radical who taught Eva to read, seems to address David’s and Eva’s needs for continuity.  Julian 
Levinson notes that “Tell Me a Riddle,” one of the two longest selections in the Norton Anthology 
of Jewish Literature, offers in the character of Jeannie a comforting vision of the transmissibility of 
radical politics—evoking continuities between the old left and a nascent new left, meant, in the 
context of the Norton Anthology, to suggest the allied continuity of American Jewish culture (144).  
In the context of the Tell Me a Riddle collection as a whole, Jeannie’s reappearance, pacifying role, 
and identity as an artist, also offer partial resolution to the otherwise unmitigated tragedies with 
which the family ends each story.  Jeannie is transformed at the end of “Tell Me a Riddle” from the 
jaded and callous teenager of the previous stories into a social worker, disillusioned with a job that 
demands she disrupt a Mexican family’s mourning because their rituals violate California health 
codes.  This professional development, along with the beginning of her development as an artist, 
partially resolves David’s fear that with Eva will die their youth of belief.  Jeannie, alone among the 
family, finds peace in Eva: “shameful the joy, the pure overwhelming joy from being with her 
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grandmother; the peace, the serenity that breathed” (116).  Significantly, her qualms about her job 
center around its disruption of memorial practices.  This iteration of Jeannie is set apart by her care 
for the past—an attitude that transforms cultural memory into artistic action with political 
overtones.  Jeannie’s final words, which close the story and the collection, cement the reader’s sense 
that she provides the link between Eva and David’s generation and the present: “Leave her there, 
Grandaddy, it is all right.  She promised me.  Come back, come back and help her poor body to die” 
(125). 
Jeannie’s intervention enables the resolution of Eva and David’s story.  But “Tell Me a 
Riddle” ultimately expresses an ambivalence about the lineal logic that would see Jeannie herself as 
the resolution to the ideological dilemma of continued socialist engagement in the inhospitable 
context of Cold War America.  “Ahh children,” David exclaims towards the end of the story: 
“how we believed, how we belonged.”  And he yearned to package for each of the 
children, the grandchildren, for everyone, that joyous certainty, that sense of mattering, of 
moving and being moved, of being one and indivisible with the great of the past, with all the freed, 
ennobled.  Package it, stand on corners, in front of stadiums and on crowded beaches, 
knock on doors, give it as a fabled gift. 
 “And why not in cereal boxes, in soap packages?” he mocked himself. “aah. 
You have taken my senses, cadaver.” (122) 
 
David rediscovers his lost radical belief by framing it as his legacy and his inheritance.  But this 
recovery, while directly enabling his reconciliation with Eva, giving him access to an identification 
with Eva’s continued belief, is otherwise apparently without consequence.  This is not to say that 
this private epiphany is unimportant, the story continues to privilege the private, neglected 
emotional lives of its aged central characters—as in all the stories in the collection, the expression of 
its character’s emotional experience is crucial to the story’s narrative and political projects.  But the 
story’s conclusion with Eva’s death foregrounds the belatedness of the revelation, and the rupture 




Conclusion: The Metanarrative of Yonnondio and the Aesthetics of Unfulfillment 
 Yonnondio, Olsen’s unfinished novel written between 1932 and 1937 and published, finally, in 
1973, ends with a disclaimer, discounting its ending as a non-ending, and framing its completion as a 
response to contingency, rather than an unfettered authorial choice: 
Reader, it was not to have ended here,26 but it is nearly forty years since this book 
had to be set aside, never to come to completion. 
 These pages you have read are all that is deemed publishable of it.  Only 
fragments, rough drafts, outlines, scraps remain—to tell what might have been, and 
never will be now. 
 
Yonnondio! Yonnondio!—unlimned they disappear. (Yonnondio 133) 
 
The novel traces the progressive degradation of the Holbrook family as they travel from exploitative 
job to exploitative job, becoming poorer, sicker, and more run down with each move, and it ends 
before the clear narrative movement towards collective action that we might expect from a work of 
proletarian fiction.  In this context, “what might have been, and never will be now” reads as a 
lament with several significations: the failure of a book to reach its potential, an author to reach her 
conclusion, a plot to find its resolution, and a revolution be realized. 
                                                 
26 This construction is reminiscent of 19th Century invocations of the reader.  Of these, Garrett 
Stewart writes: “Even in the coils of a certain tutoring self-reference, this [a direct invocation of the 
presence of the reader and the mediating tangibility of the book] is the drastic ontological reflex that 
realism usually holds in check.  So it is that reading remains largely illegible in the genre whose plots 
necessitate so much mention of its everyday prominence” (18).  As she invokes the reader at the end 
of the book, Olsen calls attention to the text as text: to the shift from a documentary realism aligned 
with a pressing and present social movement to the nostalgic and elegiac lament signaled by the 
book’s title, itself only legible in reference to another memorial text and as a function of the book’s 
transformation (at best only partially realized) from historical intervention to historical document.  
Indeed, the action described in the afterward—setting aside the book—is an accurate projection not 
of the writer’s act (the book, for Olsen, was not a book or even a complete manuscript, but a series 
of drafts, outlines, fragments, and scraps throughout its composition, as she herself signals to the 
reader in the introduction and afterword) but of the reader’s, who, upon reading those words at the 
end of the book, literally moves to set aside the physical book in their hands.  Thus, though Olsen 
may refer directly to the process by which she abandoned the idea of the book, this action is 
mirrored most directly in the reader’s physical movement, enrolling the reader not only in the text’s 




The post-script’s multiply regretful tone is, however, tempered by Olsen’s account in the 
introduction of the text’s transformation from a lost manuscript into a published text, and from a 
mark of literary anachronism into a work of new relevance to literary and social history.  Though the 
final words the reader encounters in the novel’s original 1973 publication point to an absence—the 
phantom book that has not been published (the proximal subject of Olsen’s influential Silences)—the 
note opening the novel invokes what we might consider to be its author’s excessive presence—the 
distinctly divided selves of past author and present redactor that emerge with the novel’s delayed 
publication: “In this sense—the choices and omissions, the combinings and reconstruction—the 
book ceased to be solely the work of that long ago young writer and, in arduous partnership, became 
this older one’s as well.  But it is all the old manuscripts—no rewriting, no new writing” (Yonnondio 
vi–vii).27  In the same breath as it affirms Olsen’s reclamation of the work as a product of the literary 
present, the novel’s paratextual apparatus claims the text’s documentary authenticity (that the 
language, political milieu, and thematic pre-occupations all come down relatively unmolested “from 
the thirties”), and thus its historical significance.  In this framing, Yonnondio morphs from a text 
primarily about the ongoing oppression of working people to one about the representation (and the 
lack thereof) of the working class and of the revolutionary milieu that enabled the novel’s 
                                                 
27 Olsen’s correspondence indicates that the discomfort she felt at the publication of her work so 
long after its initial composition was in part a matter of embarrassment at its immature style.  From 
an August 28, 1973 letter to Hannah Green: “Nothing to be done about the found-finished parts, 
they have to stand (my writers [sic] sense revolting) in all their mawkishness, overwriting, 
ponderousness, triteness.  The rest, the certainty, some certainty, has to be mine but no more 
certainty reading the proofs (from word choices to meaning-important ones) (except o how I 
hardened Jim in selections made) than when working on the makings & I put in  took out  put in  
took out  reverted  re-nigged  judgment gone 
“I want it to die, be finished, behind me, done with. The decisions final, right or wrong.  Rid 
myself of it.” (“Letter to Hannah Green”) 
And from a letter to Harriet Wasserman, her literary agent: “Send nothing out to the mag’s 
[sic] without enough of this information so it is unmistakable how long ago this was written, that 
was awful that Curtis thought it writing I was doing now” (“Letter to Harriet Wasserman”). 
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composition. Yonnondio, therefore, engages with the moment contemporary to its publication as new 
evidence of its own past. 
The novel’s lack of an ending, in the context of Olsen’s career and the popular elision of 
American radicalism, comes to seem strategic.  The critical response to Yonnondio has tended to 
understand its lack of a written ending as an indication of the novel’s incipient estrangement from 
(and ascendance above) the aesthetic and narrative norms of 1930s proletarian fiction.  Constance 
Coiner (1995), for example, has argued that Olsen’s text embraces a strategic logic of open-
endedness, subverting the proscriptively authoritative voice of proletarian realism with an implicit 
appeal to the reader’s participation—a move towards the heteroglossic narrative forms that she sees 
as defining Olsen’s later writing, and that are less reductive or dismissive of women’s experience 
than the dogmatically masculinist mode of the genre as defined by Mike Gold28.  And Deborah 
Rosenfelt (1981) has conjectured that the novel remains uncompleted in part because, while the 
literature and criticism of the Marxist left provided a rich milieu for Olsen’s literary development, 
“the dominant tenets of proletarian realism also required a structure, scope, resolution, and political 
explicitness in some ways at odds with the particular nature of her developing craft” (“From the 
Thirties: Tillie Olsen and the Radical Tradition” 390).29  Thus Yonnondio, in its innovation of the 
                                                 
28 “[I]f one is a tanner and writer,” Gold writes, “let one dare to write the drama of a tannery; or of a 
clothing shop, or of a ditch-digger’s life, or of a hobo.  Let the bourgeois writers tell us about their 
spiritual drunkards or super-refined émigrés; or about their spiritual marriages and divorces, etc., that 
is their world; we must write about our own mud-puddle; it will prove infinitely more important” 
(qtd. in Coiner 24). 
29 It is worth noting that even for the Olsen of the 1930s, the revolutionary ending customary to the 
novel’s genre seemed out of step with the novel itself.  A plan for the unwritten chapters that Olsen 
sent to Donald Klopfer at Random House in 1935, while the book was still in active composition, 
situates the revolutionary moment outside of the scope of the novel: “as you see, the revolutionary 
part which was in the novel as I wrote it in Faribault isn’t in.  It can’t be—there’s too much in this, 
and I can’t have a 800 or more page tome. [. . . .] And the revolutionary part demands a whole book 
by itself” (qtd. in Reid 249).  Instead of a revolutionary awakening, the projected plan for the novel 
mandates a succession of dissolutions, deaths, tragedies, and withering character trajectories—not 
even the seemingly central figure, Mazie, the artistic Holbrook child whose sensibility structures the 
104 
 
genre in which it participates, is understood as a work ahead of its time, which is to say (though with 
a positive valence to the term): anachronistic.  In its abrupt and inconclusive ersatz ending, the novel 
becomes a synecdoche for the fate of thirties radicalism.  The metanarrative of the novel’s long non-
existence in print and incomplete recovery transposes its diegetic concern with the maturity of social 
conditions into the conditions of revolution onto an extradiegetic understanding of the text’s own 
failure to reach completion, and the concomitant change in historical conditions that render its 
ultimate fulfillment impossible, or at least, of limited value.  Yonnondio’s publication in 1974 claims 
the artifactual relevance of the Holbrooks, transposing its diegetic questions of fulfillment to a 
literary historical frame.  
The text’s intervention in literary history on the grounds of its incompleteness is complicated 
by the 1994 University of Nebraska Press edition of the book, edited by Linda Ray Pratt, which 
appends additional, fragmentary materials not incorporated into the 1974 Delacorte Press / 
Seymour Lawrence publication.30  What has changed, that these segments, formerly included among 
the “fragments, rough drafts, outlines, [and] scraps” remaining, are now, “deemed publishable,” if in 
a form that maintains their separation from the earlier text?  How is the nature of the text’s 
unfinished-ness altered by the migration of these fragments from the archive to the published 
record?  Is the text somehow more finished for their inclusion, or does their fragmentation, different 
                                                                                                                                                             
novel’s more lyrical passages escapes some sort of diminishment: “([. . .] there’s only two characters 
in this book that continue on, Mazie and Arthur, and then not as main characters)” (ibid.). 
30 These scenes substantially extend the dissolution of the Holbrook family: protagonist 
Mazie Holbrook is sexually molested by the man for whom she sells peanuts after school, two of the 
Holbrook children die, father Jim Holbrook briefly returns after abandoning the family (an event 
which is also outside of the scope of the 1974 edition) only to father another child with Anna 
Holbrook and then to leave, mother Anna begins literally to break up, losing two front teeth, and 
finally Anna, too, dies following an unsanitary abortion of the child fathered in the earlier episode.  
These scenes are key to the text’s afterlife (and a person can claim that this text has nothing but 
afterlife) both in countering the authorized text’s moderately happy ending of youngest daughter 
Bessie’s aesthetic self-realization, and in challenging the editorial closure imposed upon the earlier 
text by Olsen. 
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from the relatively unified structure of the rest of the work, underscore the fundamental 
incompleteness of the novel’s continuous narrative? 
What has changed, I would argue, is Olsen’s cultural position as a foundational and 
transformational voice in literary feminism (and a limited commodity, whose reputation is matched 
only by the scarcity of her output), and the profound influence of her deeply fragmentary text: 
Silences.  The publication of Silences in particular, in its thematic consideration of breaks in writing, 
and in its long, elliptical part two, which reads as notes and addenda to the main body of the text, 
provides both a justification and a model for the inclusion of still more overtly unfinished pieces in 
the Olsen canon.  These changes foreground the extent to which the novel is fundamentally about its 
unfinishedness. Olsen presents Yonnondio (the very title of which, taken from Whitman’s “lament for 
the aborigines,” which begins, “A song, a poem of itself—the word itself a dirge,” announces the 
novel as in part a meta-critical lament) as part of a forgotten lineage demanding a contemporary 
legacy—an artifact with distinct claims for immediate relevance.  The publication of the text in a 
University Press edition, moreover, justifies the inclusion of these additional uncompleted narrative 
lines on grounds of literary historical interest. 
The “present” of Yonnondio is at least three-fold: at once the diegetic present of the 1920s—
precursor to the radical thirties, the compositional present of the 1930s, and the editorial present of 
the 1970s.  The novel thus invokes a complicated temporal imaginary.  In reading the novel, the 
reader is asked to imagine the narrative as taking place in an unsustainable past leading to a 
revolutionary present and to understand the present of the novel’s intended readers as one that has 
failed (that is, to imagine that present’s imagination of its future, and to understanding that future, 
from the vantage of the reader’s own present, as one that never came to pass).  As published in 
1973, the novel inscribes a narrative of teleological progress, and its failure.  The text’s avowals of its 
own incompleteness point to the presumption, inscribed in the form, that the novel should have a 
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conclusive and authorized ending.  The novel is remarkable in part because it defies expectations of 
a novel’s unitary completeness. 
Olsen’s introduction to Yonnondio claims the continuity of Olsen’s past and present work 
even as it highlights the division between the “long ago young writer” who authored the work and 
the contemporary writer who takes ownership of the novel only “through arduous partnership.”  
The temporality of the novel’s authorship is thus split between the period of the book’s writing and 
that of its publication and reception: the “Tillie Olsen” on the book’s cover is both the radical writer 
whose work intervenes in the historical struggles of its moment and the recovery-minded redactor 
guiding the text’s engagement with its future. 
Yonnondio, in 1974, sits poised between revolution and retrospection—a position emblematic 
of the politics and aesthetics of Tell Me a Riddle.  But while the incompletion of Yonnondio is 
determined (or overdetermined) by circumstances, only later enlisted as a metanarrative argument 
for the text’s importance, Tell Me a Riddle claims incompletion as a formal principle.  Tell Me a Riddle 
understands continuity of character as a principle of legibility and continuity of ideology as at best an 
uncertain contingency.  In Yonnondio, the family, dissolving, reveals a historical problem.  In Tell Me a 
Riddle, that relationship between the family and radical politics is more complicated.  Insofar as the 
collection’s central family reproduces existing class structures, then the family’s desire for continuity 
reads, in the collection, as reactionary.  But the family also provides the collection’s main vehicle for 
productive emotional tension: the tragedy of the family’s de-radicalization, as such, only makes sense 
if we conceive of their politics not simply as a set of individual commitments, but as a tradition, 
betrayed in their embourgeoisement.  The story of Olsen’s own career, in which formal fragmentation at 
once reveals a professional tragedy and a virtuoso solution to the problem of representing disjointed 
individual development, further complicates the picture.  The form of the short story cycle doesn’t 
quite reconcile these tensions.  Rather, Olsen’s stories foreground dynamics of promise and deferral, 
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revolutionary breaks and the continuity of social idealism that enable Olsen to conceive of 
revolution as return and to enlist Jewish tradition as both antagonist and ally in a complex struggle 
for social justice.  Ultimately, too, the fragmentary unity of the story cycle allows Olsen to reclaim 
rupture as the coherent substance of her career: to cast her own work as a broken bridge that might 
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CHAPTER THREE: “Literature isn’t little stories!”: 
Cynthia Ozick’s Poetics of Littleness and the Construction of Jewish American Authorship 
 
As its title suggests, Cynthia Ozick’s 1969 story, “Envy; or, Yiddish in America,” aims to 
portray the particular frustrations, enmities, and jealousies of the post-War American Yiddish literary 
scene.  The story centers on a day in the life of the fictional Yiddish poet Edelshtein, embarked on a 
fruitless and increasingly unhinged quest for translation and living in the shadow of his wildly 
successful rival Ostrover.  An account of a particular ethnically and socially identifiable type of 
writer, written in a realistic mode, the story has a clear historical referent—and it is to this 
engagement with the history of American Jewish writing that its critics have directed most of their 
attention.  But “Envy” is also, as Sanford Pinsker has noted, “a story about the making of stories,” 
not solely an appraisal of Yiddish culture, but a more general consideration of what it is to be a 
writer, and what it means to write a story (47).  Indeed, not only is “Envy” about the making of 
stories, but it, itself, contains other stories, not simply sub-narratives, but renderings, in summary 
and transcription, of the kind of thing that we usually mean when we say “short fiction:” crafted, 
artistic, imaginative prose.  The two stories that Ozick “reproduces,” fables by the character Yankel 
Ostrover, a writer closely modeled on Isaac Bashevis Singer, stand out as the story-world’s sole 
successful entries of Yiddish letters into the mainstream of Anglophone American literature.  As 
contes a clef, lampooning events from the life of Envy’s protagonist Edelshtein, they call attention to 
Ozick’s own (very) thinly veiled representation of Bashevis Singer, and suggest a somewhat more 
obscure biographical referentiality for her protagonist Edelshtein. Indeed, one of Ostrover’s stories-
within-the-story is at the narrative and narratological center of Ozick’s tale.  The action of Ozick’s 
plot comes into narrative focus at the scene of a public reading of Ostrover’s work, where the first 
111 
 
public presentation of a story based on Edelshtein’s search for a translator brings the story from the 
generalized past of character development to a specific present of conflictual plot, synchronous with 
the writing of “Envy” itself.  It is through a short story—its content, the scene of its public 
presentation, the emotional reactions that it sparks, and the characters brought together by its 
reading—that “Envy” leaves the mode of description, and enters the mode of event.  Short stories, 
then, are both the medium and a central subject of Ozick’s narrative. 
 Despite the title’s identification of “Yiddish in America” as the story’s focus, Ozick has 
argued in recent years that its characters—particularly its protagonist, Edelshtein—were based not 
on American Yiddishists but on American Hebrew writers, one of whom, Abraham Regelson, was 
her uncle.31  Michael Weingrad, picking up on Ozick’s identification of Regelson and his Hebraist 
colleagues as a key source for the story, notes that despite Ozick’s own impulse to praise Hebrew in 
other writings and her various nods to the American Hebrew context in “Envy” itself: 
the Hebraists upon whom Ozick based the characters in her story remain hidden [. . 
.], only revealed by the author in later interviews.  The work of the story, Ozick has 
explained, is to mourn the demise of Yiddish.  A story mourning the demise of 
Hebrew in the United States would be more ambivalent, as, unlike Yiddish, the 
language thrives elsewhere, in Israel. [. . . .] American Jewish ignorance is ignorance 
of Yiddish.  Hebrew on the other hand, cannot be mourned because it is a success—
only not in America. (239–40) 
 
If the figure of the American Hebrew poet as such isn’t fit for the kind of cultural work that Ozick 
wants her story to perform, the fungibility of Jewish authorial identity that authorizes her 
                                                 
31 See, for example, the author’s comments in a 2005 interview conducted as a part of London’s 
Jewish Book Week: 
[“Envy”] was inspired by … I mentioned my uncle, the Hebrew poet.  There was a 
little organisation called “The Hebrew Poetry Society of America” and there were 
very few members.  All of them, including my uncle, finally ended up in what then 
became Israel, except Gabriel Preil who lived with his mother and couldn’t leave his 
mother because he was a ‘momma’s boy’, and he is a great poet also.  I think he was 
afraid to get on an aeroplane. 
I went to these sessions as a child and I saw the—what shall we say?—well, 
yes, the envy among this tiny handful of poets and how they couldn’t stand each 
other, and they only had each other to read their work.  I transmuted it into Yiddish. 
(“Ozick in Conversation with Mark Lawson”) 
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transposition of Hebrew writer to Yiddish context is significant for our discussion.  It is not only the 
Hebrew writer who serves as a model for Ozick’s frustrated Yiddishists, but the Anglophone Ozick 
herself.  Indeed, it is not only through their Jewish linguistic media that Ozick’s story unifies Hebrew 
and Yiddish poets, but through their shared intelligibility as representatives of particular professional 
frustrations faced by authors.  Put another way, “Envy” understands the plight of Yiddish writers 
not only as a figure for Jewish writing more generally, but as a symbolic figure for the more 
mundane disappointment of the professional lives of unknown or poorly known writers.  In this 
regard, Ozick’s story extends a theme that we saw to be central to Tillie Olsen’s career: the reading 
of an author’s non-production as a correlative of larger social injustices.  Jewishness, however, 
functions differently for Ozick than it did for Olsen.  Whatever her biographical connections to 
Judaism and Jewish culture, Olsen’s engagement with Jewishness in her work is comparatively 
limited.  For Ozick, however, Jewishness is not only a biographical fact but also, as the thematic 
substance of much of her fiction and the ground in which many of her signal ethical interests are 
rooted, a central professional concern.  Thus, while Jewishness, for Olsen, has a specifically political 
valence as an imperfect framework for imagining the continuity of a radical politics in the de-
radicalized Cold War world, the relationship between an author’s biographical Jewishness and her or 
his professional identity is not among Olsen’s main concerns.  But the identity of the Jewish literary 
professional, as such, is indeed central to Ozick’s writing, particularly at the phase of her career in 
which she composed “Envy.” 
This chapter aims to explain the significance of the short story form in “Envy.”  To think 
about the place of the short story in Ozick’s tale is to understand its treatment of the mystery of 
literary success and failure as one grounded in the materially specific conditions of the writer’s life, 
work, and professional milieu.  It is, moreover, to understand that Ozick’s treatment of Yiddish 
itself, and, more pointedly, of the ramifications of the Holocaust for American Yiddish culture, is 
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inseparable from a perhaps surprisingly material consideration of the author’s career.  “Envy”’s 
approach to the social world of American Yiddish writing appears far from reverent, and this 
treatment of the story’s subject was, in the time of its publication, controversial.  Irving Howe, 
writing in his memoir A Margin of Hope, described the story as “at once brilliant and malicious, [. . . . 
Its total effect] reductive and, in the view of the Yiddish writers, demeaning” (265).  Yiddish writer 
Elias Schulman, responding to the story in Commentary, the venue in which it first appeared, offered 
the particularly harsh evaluation that, “[n]ot since the days of Dr. Goebbels have we seen expressed 
in writing such hatred towards Jews, Yiddish, and Yiddish literature” (18).  What these polemical 
responses leave out, however, is a sense of the story’s deep connection of the events of recent 
Jewish history to the working life of the Jewish writer, and of the story’s exploration of the porous 
boundaries between Jewish and authorial identities.  In the reading of “Envy” that follows, I would 
like to suggest a reappraisal of Ozick’s now canonical work that understands its treatment of 
Jewishness to proceed through its often quite pessimistic consideration of the possibilities and 
limitations of an author’s career.  Secular authorial identity, understood by Ozick to draw together 
the profane, the sacred, and the profanely sacred aspiration to pure aesthetic achievement, is, I 
argue, inseparable from the story’s consideration of the broader history of Yiddish and American 
Jewish letters.  In “Envy,” the particular situation of the Yiddish writer in post-war America, already 
a transposition of the significantly different situation of American Hebrew writers, becomes a 
generalizable figure for authorial frustration. 
Within this framework, the short story maintains a position of unique importance.  The 
smallness of the short story is of a piece with the narrow focus that Ozick advocates for American 
Jewish letters in the metaphor of the shofar in her 1970 essay “America: Toward Yavneh”32: “If we 
blow into the narrow end of the shofar we will be heard far.  But if we choose to be Mankind rather 
                                                 
32 Originally delivered under the title, “America: Toward a New Yiddish.” 
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than Jewish and blow into the wider part, we will not be heard at all; for us, America will have been 
in vain.” (34).  The shofar’s narrow end—what Ozick describes as “the inch-hole” through which 
“the splendor spreads wide”—is not only a figure for a robustly particularist Jewish culture but also 
a broader signifier of formal smallness.  Though Ozick doesn’t go so far as to advocate the short 
story as a paradigmatic or even a particularly valuable (or particularly Jewish) form, short fiction 
nonetheless serves her as a medium for a vibrant, immediate, and communally oriented Jewish 
literary culture.  In “Envy,” the short story emerges as the form at once of intimate, yet public 
conversation between members of the same community and a vehicle of passage into the secular 
Anglophone literary canon.  At the same time, the smallness of the story echoes and amplifies the 
demographic diminishment of American Yiddish literary culture in this period.  If, in the story’s 
imagination, the littleness of Yiddish in America is at once the pettiness of “envy,” and “a littleness, 
a tiny light—oh little holy light!” (42)—then the short story itself serves as a formal synthesis of the 
profane and the elevated in Yiddish and Jewish life. 
 
I would like first to turn to a little-discussed aspect of the 1970 essay I referenced earlier: the 
self-description with which Ozick introduces and authorizes her polemical cry for a new “liturgical 
literature,” that will “last for the Jews” (“America: Toward Yavneh” 28).  In examining Ozick’s 
invocation of “the inch-hole,” I would like to argue that the author’s interest in the cultural 
possibilities of amplification extend not only to minority politics, but also to minority poetics: to a 
particular aspiration for a short fiction that will resonate more loudly and broadly than its size would 
suggest.  In my reading of Ozick’s argument, the size of a literary work is not incidental to its more 
significant aesthetic and cultural ambitions, but is a key indicator of those ambitions as they manifest 
themselves in the person of the professional author.  The form of the short story—and the charge 
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of “minorness” that it invites—becomes for Ozick a site in which literary power and literary prestige 
might both be generated. 
The theory of Jewish literary production advanced in Ozick’s “America: Toward Yavneh” 
set off from the premises that Jewish authors who attempt to work in the cultural frames of diaspora 
are doomed to historical obscurity, and that modernist artistic autonomy and post-modernist 
metafictional experimentations, understanding art as its own object, are essentially idolatrous.  Here, 
Ozick limns a portrait of the essentially Jewish writer—a writer who is both religiously Jewish (“[t]he 
secular Jew is a figment; when a Jew becomes a secular person he is no longer a Jew” [“America” 
28]) and (somewhat at odds with Ozick’s insistence that Jewishness is an exclusively religious 
category) is excluded from gentile culture by virtue of his or her Jewish identity (i.e., for reasons not 
related to Jewish practice or sensibility, but what Ozick understands as Western Culture’s bias 
against the Jew, as such—a notion which depends on an essentialized understanding of the identity 
of Jewish writers).  On these grounds, Ozick argues that lasting Jewish literary achievement in 
diaspora can only occur in a “liturgical” idiom, “in command of the reciprocal moral imagination [. . 
. , possessing] a choral voice, a communal voice, the echo of the voice of the Lord of History” 
(“America” 28).  The Jewish writer’s task is to negotiate literary success on Jewish terms.  The 
pressures on the Jewish writer, as Ozick articulates them in 1970, are thus both intrinsic and 
extrinsic: intrinsic in that the Jewish writer is bound by a primary obligation to write within a frame 
defined by Jewish ethics; extrinsic because the biographical fact of their Jewish identification (as 
distinct from the ethical orientation that would mark their work as Jewish) a priori excludes them 
from participation in the literary tradition of Western Culture.  In the logic of Ozick’s argument, 
Jewish literature—that is, literature that operates in a Jewish mode—secures the ethnically Jewish 
writer’s place in literary history by abandoning the untenable aim of lasting success among the 
gentiles for the possibility of lasting achievement among the Jews (though it maintains the possibility 
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that this intramural success might open up onto broader acclaim).  Ozick’s call for a liturgical 
literature is thus a call for cultural autonomy—a reaction against what she understands as the 
categorical exclusion of Jews from an essentially Christian cultural field, and a call for the 
development of a particularistic literature on identitarian grounds.  “If we blow into the narrow end 
of the shofar,” she writes, “we will be heard far.  But if we choose to be Mankind rather than Jewish 
and blow into the wider part, we will not be heard at all; for us, America will have been in vain” (34). 
So argues Ozick in 1970.  By the time of her 2005 contribution to Who We Are: On Being (and 
Not Being) a Jewish American Writer, written after thirty-five years of successful engagement with the 
literary world, Ozick’s position is substantially altered: 
A Jewish book is didactic.  It is dedicated to the promotion of virtue attained 
through study.  It summons obligation.  It presupposes a Creator and His 
handiwork.  Is what is popularly termed the Jewish-American novel (if in fact there 
exists such an entity today) likely to be a Jewish book? 
 I think not; indeed, I hope not.  If a novel’s salient aim is virtue, I want to 
throw it against the wall.  It is commonly understood (never mind the bigots’ 
immemorial canards) that to be a Jew is to be a good citizen, to be socially 
responsible, to be charitable, to feel pity, to be principled, to stand against outrage.  
To be a novelist is to be the opposite—to seize unrestraint and freedom, even 
demonic freedom, imagination with its reins cut loose.  The term “Jewish writer” 
ought to be an oxymoron.  That may be why novelists born Jewish, yet drawn wholly 
to the wild side—Norman Mailer, for instance—are not altogether wrong when they 
decline to be counted among Jewish writers. 
 What we want from novels is not what we want from the transcendent 
liturgies of the synagogue.  The light a genuine novel gives out is struck off by the 
nightmare calculations of art: story, language (language especially), irony, comedy, the 
crooked lanes of desire and deceit. (“Tradition and (or Versus) the Jewish Writer” 
125–6, emphasis in the original) 
 
No longer seeking a synthesis of authorial and Jewish identities in a literature that “touches on the 
liturgical,” Ozick now understands the two categories to have reached a détente in their 
incommensurability.  Indeed, the more recent essay’s emphatic separation of the “transcendent 
liturgies of the synagogue” and “the light [of] a genuine novel” clearly repudiate Ozick’s earlier 
claims, and its brief mention of Norman Mailer further solidifies its status as a refutation of Ozick’s 
much-discussed polemic: if the Ozick of 1970 asks, “[w]hy, [. . .] does Norman Mailer, born in the 
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shtetl called Brooklyn, so strenuously and with so little irony turn himself into Esau?” and answers, 
“Because he supposes that in the land of Esau the means to glory is Esau’s means,” the Ozick of 
2005 appears to have concluded either that the means to glory is Esau’s means or that America is 
not the land of Esau, and that this glory, whatever its terms, is both attainable by the Jewish writer 
and, attained, is not half bad.  “Writers of fiction,” she writes, “ought to be unwilling to stand for 
anything other than Story, however deeply they may be attached to a tradition” (“Tradition” 128). 
 Ozick’s turnabout is aligned with changes in the ideological context of Jewish American 
cultural politics: Ozick’s argument in “America: Toward a New Yiddish” takes a line that is 
fundamentally identitarian, and that bears affinities with multiculturalist paradigms of literary history; 
“Tradition and (or Versus) the Jewish Writer” rejects the multiculturalist, identitarian grounds of her 
earlier argument. 33  The 1970 essay’s claim that, “[i]f [Jewish writing] is centrally Jewish it will last for 
Jews; if it is not centrally Jewish it will last neither for Jews nor for the host nation,” holds out the 
possibility that “centrally Jewish” writing might last for the host-nation too, part of the rise to 
prominence of literary cultural pluralism that was, by 1970, well underway (“America” 27–8).34  
                                                 
33 For a fuller discussion of the uneasy position of Jewish American writers in multicultural 
paradigms of literary history, see Andrew Furman, Contemporary Jewish American Writers and the 
Multicultural Dilemma: Return of the Exiled (2000).  While Jewish American writing has a clear place in 
an earlier, pluralist multicultural literary history, Furman argues, the shift to an oppositional 
multiculturalism rooted in a theoretical concern for the literary responses to racial and ethnic 
oppression categorically excludes contemporary Jewish and other white-ethnic writing.  Furman 
argues, essentially, for the re-incorporation of Jewish American literature under the old rubric of 
multicultural pluralism.  Ozick, of course, argues for the wholesale abandonment of multiculturalism 
as such, in favor of a universalized, and universalizing, “literature.”  It should be noted that while 
pluralist multiculturalism is mainly interested in the inclusion of texts in the canons of academic 
literary study (that is, in the anthologies and syllabi that define the field) using a generalized 
“difference” as the basis of its epistemology, what Furman, following Gregory Jay, calls 
“oppositional multiculturalism” understands its object to be social and political oppression, 
suggesting an shift from broadly cultural to broadly political categories of analysis. 
34 Christopher Douglas, in his Genealogy of Literary Multiculturalism (2009), traces the first wave of 
literary multiculturalism to the advent and popularization of Boazian anthropology in the 1920s and 
30s.  In brief, he argues that the Boazian understanding of racial and ethnic cultures (most famously 
exemplified in literature by Boaz’s onetime assistant, Zora Neale Hurston), returns in the 60s and 
70s to underpin a third wave of multiculturalist literature, characterized by an investment in cultural 
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“Tradition” abandons this hope in language that suggests that the Jewish writer may now stake his 
or her claims on putatively universal aesthetic grounds: “no writer should be expected to be a moral 
champion or a representative of ‘identity.’  That way lies tract and sermon and polemic, or, worse 
yet, syrup” (128). 
Though Ozick’s 1970 remarks posit that a writer’s endurance for posterity is the test for that 
writer’s success, Ozick’s success in her own time, as a well-regarded literary writer, undercuts her 
earlier contention that Jewish writers have little place in gentile culture.  The intersection of the now-
established author’s success and her radical repudiation of the statements of her early career calls 
attention to the importance of her own professional biography in her argument that the Jewish 
writer is at an inherent structural disadvantage in any lasting participation in gentile culture.35  To be 
sure, Ozick frames her critique in terms that exceed any individual writer’s life: she questions 
whether a Jewish writer can last (i.e., have a continued impact for future generations of readers and 
culture producers) in a non-Jewish idiom.  Nonetheless, this exhortation to canonicity is only part of 
                                                                                                                                                             
nationalism, though it is briefly eclipsed in the 40s, 50s, and 60s by the sociological understanding 
that racialized subjectivity is socially determined (exemplified, for example, in Richard Wright’s 
fiction).  Ozick’s essay lies somewhere between these two poles (a tension which may account for 
her later abandonment of its premises), defining Jewish writing by reference to external notions of 
Jewish culture, but understanding the position of the Jewish writer to be conditioned by gentile 
culture’s exclusion of the Jew.  She thus brings together claims for the self-sufficiency of Jewish 
culture with claims for the externally circumscribed position of the Jewish writer akin to Richard 
Wright’s understanding of African-American difference as a function of white oppression and 
Sartre’s claim, in “Anti-Semite and Jew” that the Jew is defined always with reference to the hatred 
of the Jew. 
35 Elaine Kauvar notes the connection between biography and fiction in the wrtier’s work: “[F]or [T. 
S.] Eliot the mind that creates was separate from the man who suffered; for Ozick they are 
inseparable and their union exhibits itself in the forms she declares twins, the biography and the 
novel” (xi). Moreover, she writes, “In her refusal to divide the author from the text, Ozick reaffirms 
the writer’s creative and communicative power and makes the texts that writers construct their own 
rather than the autonomous products of readers” (240).  In a related line of argument, Sanford 
Pinsker writes, “‘Envy’ is a story about the making of stories, from Ozick’s telling ‘imitations’ of 
Ostrover/Singer to her uncompromising ‘lives of Yiddish poets.’  Those who read the tale as a 
roman à clef failed to give enough space to Ozick’s own painful experiences as one who sat, like 
Edelshtein, and watched others being lionized.  In this case, the lack of publication—and let us say it 




a larger concern for the writer’s access to publication—a condition which in most cases precedes any 
possibility of canonization, and which has a particular importance in separating Ozick’s ideas about 
Jews, as such, from her ideas about Jewish writers, defined at least as much by their profession as 
their religion.  Though the main force of Ozick’s 1970 polemic is directed at the unique conditions 
Jewishness appears to impose on the Jewish writer, its argument is underwritten by the experience of 
commercial publication that Ozick faces as an unknown first novelist—that is, by virtue of her 
professional (or pre-professional) identity alone. 
Ozick’s essay, adapted from an address delivered at the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, 
Israel, directly responds to a lecture given at the same forum, two years prior, by the critic George 
Steiner.  Where Steiner, by Ozick’s account, offers himself as a paragon of diaspora achievement in a 
spirited defense of the generative rootlessness of diasporic life, Ozick presents herself as Steiner’s 
antithesis: a model of diaspora failure. “I am a writer,” she writes: 
slow and unprolific, largely unknown.  Obscurity is here doubly and triply pertinent, 
for to be a writer is to be almost nothing; the writer is not a religious thinker, or a 
philosopher, or a political scientist, or a historian, or a sociologist, or a philologist.  
To be a writer is to be an autodidact, with all the limitations, gaps, and gaucheries 
typical of the autodidact, who belabors clichés as though they were sacral revelations. 
(22) 
 
Ozick here presents the writer as a paradigmatic minor figure, and herself as exemplary in her 
marginalization.  The writer, moreover, is a figure of isolation—a person not engaged in the 
communal production of knowledge that typifies the humanities and social sciences, but in the 
private and isolated project of discovering a personal, aesthetic truth: a romantic conception of the 
creative individual that allows for connection with social world mainly through the decidedly 
unromantic mechanisms of the culture industry.  The situation of the writer, as Ozick has it, is thus 
one of littleness, minorness, a vanishing importance, but one which nonetheless holds out the 
possibility of remediation through wide readership.  If the author toils in obscurity, the work is 
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redeemed in publicity.  This situation, offering at best a troubled redemption of the writer’s lot, has 
formal implications.  Not much later in the essay, Ozick continues: 
When at last I wrote a huge novel I meant it to be a Work of Art—but as the years 
ground through that labor, it turned, amazingly and horribly, into a curse.  I 
discovered at the end that I had cursed the world I lived in, grain by grain.  And I did 
not know why.  Furthermore, that immense and silent and obscure labor had little 
response—my work did not speak to the gentiles, for whom it was begun, nor to the 
Jews, for whom it had been finished.  And I did not know why. (23, emphasis added) 
 
Here, the size of Ozick’s first novel, Trust, is integral to its folly.  And it is significantly by virtue of 
its length, and the length of time required for its composition, that the novel stands as a monument 
to the absolute devotion to art that for Ozick shades so easily into idolatry.  But part of the problem 
is also that the novel remains unread.  In a 1984 review of Cyril Connoly’s Enemies of Promise, Ozick 
remarks on the circumstances of her first novel’s writing and publication: a slew of rejections, and a 
long layover on the journey to the presses, untouched in an editor’s desk drawer: “[A]ll the while I 
was getting older and older.  Envy of the published ate at me; so did the shame of so much nibbling 
defeat. [. . . .] I wrote, and read, and filled volumes of Woolworth diaries with the outcry of failure—
the failure to enter the gates of one’s own literary generation, the anguish of exclusion from its 
argument and tone, its experience and evolution” (63). 
 The heft of Ozick’s failed tome, as she describes it in “Towards a New Yiddish” is a 
correlative for the wide world signified by the Jamesian high art tradition.  But it also signifies the 
long delay in the writer’s entry into the literary conversations of her time: a shadow existence of 
unfulfilled ambition at the cultural periphery—issues at the heart of Ozick’s portrayal of the Yiddish 
poet’s futile quest for fame in “Envy.”  The short story, in its comparative littleness, has decidedly 
different stakes from those of the novel: the story writer’s labor may, too, be silent and obscure, but 
it is unlikely to be immense in the way that Ozick’s first novel is immense, and its size is therefore 
unlikely to indict the writer’s assessment of the fit between her ambition and her skill.  In this 
context, Ozick’s turn towards the short story, sustained through the publication of her next three 
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volumes, The Pagan Rabbi and Other Stories (1971, containing “Envy”), Bloodshed and Three Novellas 
(1976), and Levitation: Five Fictions (1982), is a move away from the pursuit of a singular masterpiece 
in a Jamesian mode, towards a form that, at the very least, doesn’t require ten years to produce, and 
doesn’t make so exclusive a claim on a writer’s time and reputation.  In contrast to the novel of 
Ozick’s compositional experience, the short story is a genre of immediacy, both of composition and 
of publication: one capable of abrupt intervention into public literary culture.  It is also, crucially, 
and by the same virtues, a genre of gossip, and it is through gossip that it enters the world of 
“Envy.”  
 
The story that Yankel Ostrover presents to the public in a reading at the 92nd St. Y amounts 
to a public literary humiliation for Ozick’s protagonist Edelshtein, a beleaguered and largely unread 
Yiddish poet who is in attendance at the hall.36  Ostrover, a success, hearing of Edelshtein’s 
unsuccessful hunt for someone to translate his verse, pens a tale about a failed poet, a writer in the 
imaginary language of Zwrdlish, who sells his soul to the devil piece by piece for fluency in many 
languages, eventually speaking all but Zwrdlish itself.  The poet remains, nonetheless, a failure, 
writing bad poetry for obscurity in an infernal office, his lines swept away into the great fire as each 
stanza is finished.  “He wrote in every language but Zwrdlish,” Ostrover intones, “and every poem 
he wrote he had to throw out the window because it was trash anyhow, though he did not realize it.” 
(61). 
                                                 
36 While Ozick’s story treats the Y primarily as the site of Ostrover’s elevation and Edelshtein’s 
exclusion, between 1963 and 1969, the venue served as the location for an important series of 
readings by major American Yiddish poets of the era: a site in which a writer like Edelshtein would 
have been likely to enjoy public contact with his audience.  Ozick herself participated in the final 
reading of the series as one of several translators to present work undertaken for Irving Howe and 
Eliezer Greenberg’s Treasury of Yiddish Poetry (1969).  For more on this lecture series, including a 
reading of “Envy,” see Jan Schwarz, “Glatshteyn, Singer, Howe, and Ozick: Performing Yiddish 
Poetry at the 92 Street Y, 1963–1969.” 
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It is in this context of what is essentially a literary rout—a demonstration of Ostrover’s 
competitive dominance over Edelshtein—that Edelshtein stages an imaginary argument with 
Ostrover about the nature of literature itself: 
OSTROVER: Hersheleh, I admit I insulted you, but who will know?  It’s only a make-
believe story, a game. 
EDELSHTEIN: Literature isn’t a game!  Literature isn’t little stories! 
OSTROVER: So what is it, Torah?  You scream out loud like a Jew, Edelshtein.  Be 
quiet, they’ll hear you. (68) 
 
On its face, Edelshtein’s objection to the imagined Ostrover’s dismissal of his story is part of a 
defense of literature against the trivialization that Ostrover (and his success) represent.  The 
imagined argument between Edelshtein and his rival depends upon the difference in each figure’s 
professional achievements.  Edelshtein, not having achieved a broad readership, imagines an 
Ostrover who trivializes literature as a matter of course.  Indeed, the entire apparatus of Ostrover’s 
success, as Edelshtein understands it, rests on trivialization, a shallowness akin to the joking parries 
with which he deflects serious questions following his public reading (e.g.: “Q: What would happen 
if you weren’t translated into English? A: the pygmies and the Eskimos would read me instead.  
Nowadays to be Ostrover is to be a worldwide industry.  Q: Then why don’t you write about 
worldwide things like wars?  A: Because I’m afraid of loud noises” [62]37).  But if little stories are 
                                                 
37 Ostrover’s repartee, I should note, here reveals itself to be more significant than its offhanded 
delivery would suggest.  As a performer addressing an audience well acquainted with his public 
persona, Ostrover’s task in the Q and A is essentially one of characterization.  The various feints 
that Ostrover employs to avoid the appearance of sincerity support an understanding of authorial 
popularity as something rooted in the concealment of the biographical author.  Playfully conflating 
the world of his stories and the world in which he lives, Ostrover’s comment that he doesn’t write 
about “worldwide things like wars” because he is “afraid of loud noises” writes him into his own 
stories in a way that foregrounds the common objectification of character and author-figure.  
Though Ostrover of course doesn’t believe that writing about a war entails the physiological 
experience of hearing a loud noise, the same understanding of authorship (and celebrity) that 
renders Ostrover “a worldwide industry”—i.e., not a specific historically bounded individual but a 
disembodied commodity—turns the writer into a character of literary discourse.  All the same, 
Ostrover’s recourse to personal preference—“I don’t like loud noises”—points to the working 
writer’s prerogative: the writer writes what the writer wants. To close this digression, I would like to 
point out that the issues of authorial representation raised by Ostrover’s obligingly raffish banter 
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here implicitly posed against an aesthetically and intellectually weightier poetry, they are also 
understood to have the cultural capital of a comparatively greater readership and marketability.  
Little stories may, in Edelshtein’s estimation, be trivial, but they are also publishable. 
 “Little stories” and the short story are, of course, not the same thing.  But the “smallness” of 
the little story—a smallness that refers at once to its cultural import, its pettiness, its apparently easy 
legibility, and the number of words it contains—reflects, too, on the smallness of the short story as a 
literary genre.  “Envy’s” dualistic construction of holy littleness and petty littleness breaks along 
formal lines.  In the story’s formal logic, the “holy” littleness of Yiddish, given its fullest elaboration 
in the verse that Edelshtein recites following Ostrover’s reading, is fundamentally poetic; the 
profane littleness of gossip is the littleness of Ostrover’s “little stories,” and of short prose.  Though 
not all short stories, of course, are vehicles of gossip, every short story that “Envy” reproduces 
(including, arguably, Ozick’s story itself) is, or at least flirts with that genre, more social than literary.  
To be very clear, I don’t mean to suggest that Ozick thinks (or that I think) that the short story is 
uniquely and essentially rooted in gossip.  What I do want to argue, however, is that “Envy” presents 
an undeniable correlation between the short story form and the increasingly and definingly 
circumscribed community that it represents—and that its understanding of the social smallness of 
American Yiddish letters develops in tandem with its consideration of the writer’s career through the 
crude category of literary length. 
Issues of scale emerge as early as the story’s bifurcated title: “Envy” locates the story in the 
comparatively narrow frame of its characters’ emotional world; “Yiddish in America” casts it into 
the realm of sociological generalization.  The title’s conflationary “or” therefore contains the 
                                                                                                                                                             
manifest themselves as transformations of scale.  Ostrover is at once a worldwide industry and a 
private individual, a writer of international renown and a chronicler of a small world of Jews and 
dybbuks.  A key task of “Envy,” I would argue, is to elucidate the nature of the “smallness” that 
Ozick understands to adhere to Yiddish (and that suggests both a particular Jewish intimacy and the 




provocative suggestion that the broader historical category of “Yiddish in America” might 
adequately be described in terms of “envy,” not only an emotion that implies a particular, localized 
envious action, but also one redolent of pettiness—a version of littleness that carries a clear negative 
connotation.  It is worth noting, here, that it was not Ozick but Commentary editor Norman 
Podhoretz who appended “Envy [. . .]” to the submitted manuscript’s “Yiddish in America” when 
the story first appeared in print in that magazine (Cohen 62).  Ozick, however, retained this title in 
subsequent republications over which she presumably had greater control (as, indeed, she has 
changed the title of her well-known essay “America: Toward a New Yiddish,” to “America: Toward 
Yavneh”).  Hana Wirth-Nesher understands the title to move in the opposite scalar direction, “from 
the general sentiment of envy into a particular milieu of Jewish American literature” (142).  While 
Wirth-Nesher’s reading emphasizes the story’s treatment of the particular contours of Jewish 
American and American Yiddish literary culture as against a general and universally available 
affective experience, my understanding of the story focuses on its negotiation between the 
particularistic but still sociologically generalizable portrayal of American Yiddish literary culture and 
the irreducibly idiosyncratic history of particular authors.  These two readings, I would argue, are not 
irreconcilable, but vanishingly little attention has been paid to the story’s treatment of authorship as 
a category at once as general as Jewishness and narrowly defined by the particular career of specific 
writers. 
The intersection between the literary short story and the gossip of a small community is still 
more evident in another fable taken from Ostrover and Edelshtein’s lives: a rendering of an affair 
between Ostrover and Edelshtein’s wife, as a parable about the inescapability of impotence.  With 
Ostrover’s establishment as a major modern writer, this event in his and Edelshtein’s life, as 
recorded in fiction, becomes a matter not of personal history, but of literary record.  It is this 
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transformation, from the stuff of biography to the stuff of literature, that is at stake in Edelshtein’s 
defensive definition of “little stories.” 
Edelshtein’s reaction to the circulation of his petite histoire reveals a resistance to 
understanding his own life as something transmutable into fiction—a remarkable position, 
considering the poet’s own use of the event of his wife’s affair and miscarriage as the fodder for a 
mournful lyric published in the small journal Bitterer Yam. 
A stupid fable!  Three decades later—Mireleh dead of a cancerous uterus, 
[Ostrover’s wife] Pesha encrusted with royal lies in Time magazine [. . .]—this piece 
of insignificant mystification, this pollution, included also in Ostrover’s Complete Tales 
(Kimmel & Segal, 1968), was the subject of graduate dissertations in comparative 
literature, as if Ostrover were Thomas Mann, or even Albert Camus.  When all that 
happened was that Pesha and Mireleh had gone to the movies now and then—and 
such a long time ago! (50) 
 
The littleness of this story, in the pejorative sense in which Edelshtein uses the term after Ostrover’s 
lecture, consists in the way in which it registers, for Edelshtein, not as a crafted short story, but 
simply as a record of the events it contains.  As Edelshtein has it, Ostrover’s tale is significant for 
“all that happened” in it—it is a story in the same sense captured by the narratological distinction 
between story and discourse, in which story refers to the events that are the raw material of the tale, 
and discourse refers to their constructed composition.38  If Edelshtein’s transposition of the event 
into a poetic key—a process that, in the identification of the lyric “I” with the writer, maintains the 
distinction between the event’s historical occurrence and the poet’s reflection—registers as an 
artistic act, then Ostrover’s fictionalization appears to the poet as something simultaneously less 
artistic and less aesthetically honest.  For Edelshtein, what Ostrover proffers his readers is not the 
“literary” representation of the writer’s consciousness, but the sub-literary reporting of historical 
events. 
                                                 
38 See Seymour Chatman, Story and Discourse. 
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This understanding of the story as something that can comprehensively be understood as its 
events, relates, I would argue, to Edelshtein’s self-understanding as a professional writer. By 
confining his analysis of Ostrover’s tale to the level of the personal, Edelshtein limits his 
understanding of the story writer’s success to biographical, rather than literary explanations. Thus, 
the key to the mystery of Ostrover’s success is not, for Edelshtein, to be found in the stories’ 
technical achievement or artistic merit, but rather lies buried in Ostrover’s commonplace 
biography:39  
The same as anybody, a columnist for one of the Yiddish dailies, a humorist, a cheap 
fast article-writer, a squeezer-out of real-life tales.  Like anybody else, he saved up a 
few dollars, put a paper clip over the stories, and hired a Yiddish press to print up a 
hundred copies.  A book.  Twenty-five copies he gave to people he counted as 
relatives, another twenty-five he sent to enemies and rivals, the rest he kept under his 
bed in the original cartons.  Like anybody else, his literary gods were Chekhov and 
Tolstoy, Peretz and Sholem Aleichem.  From this, how did he come to The New 
Yorker, to Playboy, to big lecture fees, invitations to Yale and M.I.T. and Vassar, to the 
Midwest, to Buenos Aires, to a literary agent, to a publisher on Madison Avenue? 
(48) 
 
Ostrover moves, in this account, not only from the apparently circumscribed and avowedly insular 
world of Yiddish self-publication to the wider world of commercial publication, but also from the 
mode of “squeez[ing]-out [. . .] real-life tales” to that of writing literature.  Edelshtein’s closeness to 
the stories’ sources, however, leaves him stuck on their real life antecedents.40  The sneering answer 
of Paula, wife of Edelshtein’s crony, Baumzweig, to the question that ends this characterization of 
                                                 
39 Part of Edelshtein’s myopia here, too, might stem from his overestimation of the Yiddish 
readership for poetry.  According to the editors of the Penguin Book of Modern Yiddish Verse, “[p]rose 
[in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries] has the further advantage of appealing to a large 
audience of Yiddish readers for whom the stories of Sholem Aleichem and Avrom Reisen seem like 
sparkling mirrors into their lives, while Yiddish poetry, rarely if ever able to gain a mass audience, 
must undertake the difficult task of training a corps of qualified readers” (Howe, et al. 15). 
40 In light of his complementary bitterness toward successful Anglophone Jewish American writers, 
this aspect of Edelshtein’s critical recourse to biography echoes what Benjamin Schreier has 
identified as an overdetermined critical attention to the Jewish biography of Jewish American 
writers—one that in the case at least of story writer, poet, and editor Delmore Schwarz, comes at the 
expense of attention to the author’s own distrust of apparent semiotic stability.  See Schreier, “Jew 
Historicism: Delmore Schwarz and Overdetermination.” 
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Ostrover’s start in the business also remains at the level of the personal and the biographical: “he 
sleeps with the right translators.”  I do not mean to suggest that Ozick’s story authorizes this 
understanding of the divide between the literary and the anecdotal.  In an important sense, the “little 
story” of Edelshtein’s misery both is and prompts the short story that is “Envy.”  If we take 
Edelshtein’s meaning of “little stories” to be the putatively unliterary material of real life—Mireleh 
and Pesha’s trips to the movies, his own futile search for translation—then we must consider, too, 
how the question of just what transforms the little stories of anecdotal history into the art of fiction 
resonates in Ozick’s story itself. 
In his letter to Kimmel & Segal, Edelshtein claims a privileged position for poetry, vis-à-vis 
the story: “Esteemed Gentlemen, you publish only one Yiddish writer, not even a Poet, only a Story-
writer” (52–3).  In part, this is a self-interested bid for his own publication, but it nonetheless 
reflects an understanding of genres in hierarchical arrangement, with stories in a position of 
inherently lesser artistic merit than poetry.  The story itself advances a dialectical understanding of 
these two modes of Yiddish littleness—a version, too, of the division of sacred from profane.  A 
poetics of smallness subtends the story’s aesthetics, linking the petty emotion of envy to 
understandings of Yiddish as a language of intimacy, and to the shortness of the short story itself.  
Indeed, though we cannot credit Edelshtein’s distinction between literature and little stories as the 
story’s aesthetic philosophy, the question of the intersection between high art and petty gossip is 
central to the story, and must figure into our interpretation of its form. 
The category of “little story,” exemplified in the pair of tales that Ostrover bases on events 
in Edelshtein’s life, is subjective, connoting a broad and flexible triviality.  To some extent, 
Edelshtein understands this pejorative littleness in terms of technique—the unserious jokiness of 
Ostrover’s style qualifies most of his work as “little stories”—but it clearly also has much to do with 
the nearness of Ostrover’s stories to the private events of Edelshtein’s life.  The episode of Mireleh, 
128 
 
Peshe, and Ostrover’s love triangle, for instance, rates as un-literary for Edelshtein because he 
understands himself to have participated in the tale’s story, a position from which he is blind to the 
discursive structure that Ostrover builds around it.  In this sense, the distinction that Edelshtein 
wishes to draw between literature and little stories is one that separates his life from his work as 
literary objects.  Edelshtein wishes, above all, to enter literary history as an author.  Ostrover’s 
stories would draft him instead as a character. 
The poet’s concern with the grounds on which he may engage with literary production is 
evident in the poem that he recites in the lobby of the YMHA reading hall, a performance that 
serves as a counterpoint to Ostrover’s mocking tale.  The poem, beginning as an address to the 
“little fathers, little uncles” who people the Eastern European Jewish world that Edelshtein has left 
behind, now destroyed in the Holocaust, meditates on Yiddish poet’s dual alienation: from the 
figures that he addresses and from history which has in multiple ways “left [him] out.”  For the sake 
of discussion, I have reproduced the poem in full, along with the narration that indicates the mode 
of its performance, as an appendix to this chapter. 
Littleness is present in the poem’s opening lines in a way that, for Ozick’s readers (as 
opposed to the characters in the story-world), underlines the ambiguity, variability, and cultural 
specificity of the term.  Edelshtein’s poem appears in Ozick’s text in English, translated from the 
diegetic Yiddish by the unmarked agency of the narrator.  It is therefore not possible to know from 
the text of the story itself whether the Yiddish “original” begins, like its translation, with the word 
“kleyne” (“little,” which would refer directly to the stature of the fathers invoked), or with the 
diminutive, “tatelekh” (“little fathers,” which would imply a degree of emotional closeness between 
the speaker and his auditors).  By the final stanza, screamed by Edelshtein, littleness has become a 
hypostatized figure, itself the poem’s auditor (“Littleness, I speak to you”).  The “little fathers, little 
uncles” whom the poet earlier understands precisely in terms of their embodiment (their beards, the 
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glasses they hold, their curly hair, their eyes, fingers, and long coats) dematerialize, at the poem’s 
end, into littleness itself, and it is littleness, as much as the fathers and uncles themselves, at whose 
grave the poet sings.  The final stanza transforms the characteristic weight of littleness from that 
which attends the writer’s nostalgia for his now alien ancestors to that which binds poet and subject 
alike.  Though the poet recognizes his inability to fall into his subjects’ grave, their littleness is finally 
transferred to his “little huddle,” “little hovels,” and the “little, little words” that he chants in elegy 
(71).  The assumption of littleness as a characteristic of Edelshtein’s poetry, indicating the paucity of 
writing in the face of the destruction of Eastern European Jewry, is at the same time a lament for 
the loss of what would seem to be a respectable position from which to inhabit a “little” identity.  
From the perspective of the story, Edelshtein cannot be little in the way that his little fathers and 
little uncles are little.  However humble his poetics, his desire is unquestionably for international 
fame. 
To a large extent, this registers in the poem as it appears in situ as a conflict between Yiddish 
and English paradigms of grammatical diminution.  From the poem’s first word, already separated 
from the rest of the poem by several paragraphs of dialogue and narration and recited by one of the 
poem’s readers and not, like the rest of the poem, by the poet himself, the texture of the Yiddish 
poem’s language of littleness is occluded by its translation and rendered ambiguous by this 
occlusion.  That English has no direct equivalent for “tatelekh”—a plural diminutive modifier—
constrains the nature of the littleness that ultimately overtakes the little men of the first stanza as the 
object of poetic attention.  But the poem that Edelshtein shouts, though he shouts it in Yiddish, in 
fact exists only in English.  It is a translation without an original.  Though the poem exists only as 
translation, however, its interpretation necessarily takes place in the shadow of the unrecoverable 
Yiddish “original.”  In translation, the littleness of the poem’s little men is marked from the very 
beginning: the men are not addressed in the diminutive, but are diminished in a qualitatively 
130 
 
different way by the adjective that modifies them.  To the reader conscious of the translator’s 
intervention, the poem’s poetics turn on the limited ability of English to render the diminutive as a 
common habit of speech.  The hypothetical Yiddish original offers the poet a choice: the strong 
assertion of the fathers’ and uncles’ littleness from the poem’s opening or the gradual transformation 
of the –lekh in “Tatelekh, feterlekh” into the subject of the poetic address.  The English translation, 
however, settles this choice by linguistic default: in the absence of a common diminutive mode, the 
modifying adjective wins out over the conventionally affectionate form of address. 
Translation—the transposition of the poet’s text from Yiddish to English—changes the 
framework through which littleness, always a relational attribute, is determined.  Though the poem 
appears in the story with the conceit that it is recited in the untranslated Yiddish original, its subject 
is that of the situation of the Yiddish poet in an Anglophone context.  The question of how to 
translate the poem’s first line back into Yiddish, a proxy for the question of how to reconcile the 
cultural assumptions of Yiddish and English, illuminates a rift already existing in the poem between 
the speaker and his absent auditors.  Even if the speaker addresses his little fathers and little uncles 
in the familiar diminutive, the littleness that he associates with their cultural milieu is unavoidably 
also that of the cosmopolitan speaker’s perception of the shtetl.  Despite the poet’s desire to “fall 
into your graves,” proclaiming that he “[has] no business being your future,” he is alienated from the 
world that he addresses, enlarged beyond its bounds: “the village is so little it fits into my nostril” 
(70–1).  Edelshtein’s predicament consists in his position between these two identifications.  Though 
he is alienated from the intimacy of the old world by his participation in emancipated cultural 
modernity, he remains a minor figure in his wider world, and not simply because of the language in 
which he composes. 
Any interpretation of Edelshtein’s poem, as such, is caught between the poem itself as a text 
that theoretically exists in print (i.e., in a form other than Edelshtein’s performance, and therefore 
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separated from its author’s body and accessible without his direct intervention) and the circumstance 
and mode of its recitation.  To a large extent, the poem is inseparable from its dramatic situation, as 
Ozick’s story enlists the poem as an element of characterization.  Recited on a cue from a young fan 
of Ostrover who hears and recognizes the poet’s name after the reading, Edelshtein’s humbly 
offered declamation—“It’ll take a minute only, I promise”41 (70)—soon becomes an uncontrollable 
utterance: littleness, shouted.  The poem appears in the story’s context not with the depersonalizing 
structures of publication or official promotion (the paratextual apparatus that removes the work 
from the singly produced manuscript to the reproduced and objectified literary object, the lectern 
that shields the speaker and authorizes the speech as an event of public record), but accompanied by 
an eruption bodily response as Edelshtein presents his own work before an audience.  From the 
beginning of his recitation, “he clawed at his wet face and declaimed,” “[h]e gargled, breathed, 
coughed, choked, tears invaded some false channel in his throat,” “each bawled word” is “a seizure,” 
and twice “he screamed” (70–71).  If the poem appears as something of a tour de force, it is in large 
part through its invigorating effect on its own creator.  Indeed, Edelshtein’s delivery cuts against the 
poem’s generic self-description: a screamed lullaby surely misses its mark. 
All the same, it is significant that the poem is presented in full—a condition that neither of 
Ostrover’s stories enjoy, one being summarized and the other cut off by Edelshtein’s musings.  
Indeed, the poem is voiced in its entirety despite the increasing unseemliness of Edelshtein’s fervor 
and the embarrassment of at least one of his friends—“Into his ear Paula said, ‘Hersheleh, I 
apologize, come home with us, please, please, I apologize.’ Edelshtein gave her a push, he intended 
to finish” (71).  Edelshtein’s desire to finish his work, and the inclusion of the work itself in “Envy,” 
marks a will to different mode of representation than that offered by either Ostrover’s or Ozick’s 
prose.  Edelshtein’s struggle to finish his recitation is a struggle for him to be represented not simply 
                                                 
41 It doesn’t. 
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as an author, but through his work: a struggle, essentially, against characterization.  Edelshtein’s entry 
of the poem into the record of the story is his bid to be a part of “literature” rather than “little 
stories.”  But the task of, “Envy,” I would argue, is to dismantle this distinction.  It is precisely the 
little story of Edelshtein’s life as a writer, a narrative that to some extent mirrors Ozick’s own 
writerly experience, that Ozick’s work proposes as literature. 
 This is evident too in a scene directly following the reading at the Y: Edelshtein’s brief, 
voyeuristic encounter with a sleeping Baumzweig and Paula.  Edelshtein has returned to Baumzweig 
and Paula’s apartment where, his hosts asleep, he pens a letter to Hannah, his would-be translator. “I 
am a man,” he begins, “writing you in the room of a house of another man.  He and I are secret 
enemies, so under his roof it is difficult to write the truth.  Yet I swear to you I will speak these 
words with my whole heart’s honesty.  I do not remember either your face or your body.  Vaguely 
your angry voice.  To me you are an abstraction. [. . . .] It is an incarnation of the future to whom 
this letter is addressed” (73–4).  The letter, then, begins with an image of its writer, embodied and 
emplaced in a setting that works to restrict his candor, writing to a correspondent whom he 
conceives to be a disembodied figure of futurity.  This contrast between the physically defined and 
constrained Edelshtein and the almost wholly conceptualized avatar of youthful modernity sets the 
terms for the immediately following encounter with the sleeping forms of Baumzweig and Paula.  
Edelshtein imagines Hannah not only as a translator into English, but also as a vehicle beyond his 
narrow social circle to the incorporeal world of distributed, impersonal readership.  Translation, as 
Edelshtein imagines it here, begins with dematerialization: the move from an embodied historical 
actor (Hannah at the lecture) to a disembodied agent of the effacement of form (Hannah as 
translator, resituating the text in a new language).42 
                                                 
42 In The Holocaust of Texts: Genocide, Literature, and Personification, Amy Hungerford argues that one 
prominent response to the philosophical and ontological questions posed by the Holocaust, 
emblematized by the creation of genocide as a category of criminal activity, was an impulse towards 
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In contrast to Hannah’s idealized futurity, Baumzweig and Paula present Edelshtein with a 
richly concrete spectacle of aging bodies, identified more with past action and present decay than 
with future possibilities: 
He turned the paper over and wrote in big letters: 
EDELSHTEIN GONE, 
and went down to the corridor with it in pursuit of Paula’s snore.  Taken without 
ridicule a pleasant riverside noise.  Bird.  More cow to the sight: the connubial bed, 
under his gaze, gnarled and lumped—in it this old male and this old female.  He was 
surprised on such a cold night they slept with only one blanket, gauzy cotton.  They 
lay like a pair of kingdoms in summer.  Long ago they had been at war, now they 
were exhausted into downy truce.  Hair all over Baumzweig.  Even his leg-hairs gone 
white.  Nightstands, a pair of them, on either side of the bed, heaped with papers, 
books, magazines, lampshades sticking up out of all that like figurines on a prow—
                                                                                                                                                             
the personification of texts—that is, an understanding of the text (and culture more generally) as an 
object that can be murdered, and thus that is possessed of a quasi-human status.  The problem with 
this understanding of textuality, she argues, is in the logic by which it replaces an understanding of 
humanity as something that inheres in the embodied person, along with the specific moral 
obligations that embodiment entails, with an understanding of humanity as something that inheres 
in culture, divorced from particular, instantiated individuals: “The material difference between texts 
and persons comes down to embodiment, and embodiment (to oversimplify) comes down to the 
capacity for pain and the fact of morality. [. . . .] By exalting—and at the same time, reducing—the 
literary to the personal, the text to the embodied person, we both constrict our freedom (to disagree, 
to read, not to read) and expand our obligations (to agree, to read, not to read)” (154–5).  If, in the 
logic of post-war textual personification, “the highest cultural value is assigned not simply to persons 
in the humanistic sense, but to persons as embodying cultural identities,” then our humanistic 
obligation to our fellow people as such is necessarily subordinated to our more diffuse obligation to 
culture, and thus to people as bearers of cultural content (11). 
 While Ozick unquestionably understands Jewishness to entail some “obligation to culture,” 
“Envy,” as I have argued in this chapter and as I develop further below, shows a clear concern for 
the integrity and literary value of the embodied character, over and against aspirations to a 
disembodied futurity and cultural continuity.  This is not to say that Ozick herself rejects the 
aspiration to the canon that underwrites her “America” essay and that justifies Edelshtein’s lust for 
wide publication (even if present popularity and literary longevity are far from the same thing).  I 
would like to argue, however, that the opposition that Hungerford identifies between the obligation 
to culture and the obligation to embodied humanity accounts for a key tension between the story’s 
avowed concern for the fate of Yiddish, as such, and its substantial focus on the biography of the 
writer and the affective experience of literary failure.  Edelshtein’s claims to represent Yiddish are 
always dubious, and often contested even in the character’s interior consciousness.  In part this is 
because these claims align so directly with Edelshtein’s self-interest, suggesting that they can never 
truly be disinterested assertions (i.e., that Edelshtein himself never quite buys that to translate his 
verse is to “save Yiddish”).  But the uneasy fit between Edelshtein and “Yiddish poetry” per se 
speaks to a larger skepticism of representation at work in the story (and extending to Edelshtein’s ire 
towards “so-called Jewish novelists” [79]). 
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the bedroom was Baumzweig’s second office.  Towers of back issues on the floor.  
On the dresser a typewriter besieged by Paula’s toilet water bottles and face powder.  
Fragrance mixed with urinous hints.  Edelshtein went on looking at the sleepers.  
How reduced they seemed, each breath a little demand for more, more, more, a 
shudder of jowls; how they heaved a knee, a thumb; the tiny blue veins all over 
Paula’s neck.  Her nightgown was stretched away and he saw that her breasts had 
dropped sidewise and, though still very fat, hung in pitiful creased bags of mole-
dappled skin.  Baumzweig wore only his underwear: his thighs were full of picked 
sores. 
He put EDELSHTEIN GONE between their heads.  Then he took it away—on 
the other side was his real message: secret enemies.  He folded the sheet inside his 
coat pocket and squeezed into his shoes.  Cowardly.  Pity for breathing carrion.  All 
pity is self-pity.  Goethe on his death bed: more light! (75–6) 
 
This encounter, predicated on voyeuristic revelation, closes with textual concealment in the name of 
pity.  If Hannah’s disembodiment signals the kind of futurity to which Edelshtein aspires—one 
which depends on his works’ consumption by an unseen audience and his own attendant 
transformation from a man writing in obscurity to a Writer, known by his works—then Baumzweig 
and Paula, in their closely observed, grotesque physicality, offer an opposing image of the writer’s 
compositional present, and an occasion for Edelshtein to retreat from what he realizes would be a 
hurtful publication.  The letter that Edelshtein drafts and ultimately removes from between 
Baumzweig and Paula couches his appeal for translation as a bid to save Yiddish, transfiguring the 
poet into a figure for the language itself.  But even for Edelshtein, this rings a false note: “he knew 
he lied, lied, lied. [. . . .] What did the death of Jews have to do with his own troubles? His cry was 
ego and more ego. [. . . .] He wanted someone to read his poems, no one could read his poems. Filth 
and exploitation to throw in history” (75).  Not wholly reducible to a representative of Yiddish, 
Edelshtein is recalled to the containment of his troubles in his body: he is “this old man,” as much 
as his companions are “this old male and this old female.”43  Edelshtein’s turn from a magnified 
                                                 
43 This understanding, of course, removes Edelshtein from the social and historical context in which 
his troubles are, in fact, situated.  Just as he argues too forcefully for his significance as the possible 
salvation of world Yiddish culture, he here removes himself too completely from the history of 
Yiddish and Yiddish speakers.  His troubles also have to do with the structure of the publishing 
industry, which is not a major part of his critique. 
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understanding of his own importance to an intensely localized view of his immediate social circle is 
itself a turn to littleness.  The poet’s narrated thought, “how reduced they seemed,” forms the basis 
of an intimate moral perception.  Far from dehumanizing the subjects of his gaze, Edelshtein’s 
conception of Baumzweig and Paula as “breathing carrion” is precisely what authorizes the pity he 
displays in removing the note.  It is in this sense, too, that the ugly pettiness of the story’s governing 
emotion can be understood as a reverent gesture, the “gift” that Ozick claimed she “felt as if [she] 
held up [. . .] to my mother and father, and in return they had struck me a blow on the skull” (“A 
Bintel Brief” 60). 
 
“Envy” is a story about what it is to be a writer, failing.  Its protagonist has his greatest 
opportunities for success behind him and futility ahead of him.  A Yiddish poet publishing in 
obscure journals for a dwindling readership, he finds his work unmarketable in the translation that 
would offer it a chance at broad popularity.  The arc of Edelshtein’s career is unavoidably connected 
with the fate of Yiddish, determined by the arc of the linguistic medium in which he writes, and it is 
through its connection to the decline of Yiddish as such that Edelshtein’s otherwise personal failure, 
sad, but not of particularly apparent historical resonance, makes its strongest bid for broader 
significance.  But the nature of the connection between Edelshtein’s obscurity and the fate of 
American Yiddish culture—a connection at once symbolic, metonymic, and historical—is not as 
straightforward as the story’s doubly generalizing title might imply. 
Edelshtein’s quest for a translator is essentially self-interested: though he occasionally 
justifies his fervor by framing the translation of his poems as one and the same with the salvation of 
Yiddish itself, it is clear that he is motivated by a desire for personal success: “[t]ranslated I’d be 
famous,” he pleads to his reluctant would-be translator, “this you don’t understand” (98).  Indeed, 
though Edelshtein, in a much quoted section of the story, implores Hannah, his potential translator, 
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to embrace Yiddish, and thus to “[c]hoose death or death.  Which is to say death through forgetting 
or death through translation” (74), he elsewhere describes the virtues of translation precisely in 
terms of what it can do for the author, with little concern for what it might do to the work.  
Meditating on the sudden celebrity of a young and undistinguished Yiddish poet, recently surfaced 
in the Soviet Union, the granddaughter or niece (he speculates) of Soviet Yiddish “marranos,” 
Edelshtein considers Russian as an alternate mode of passage into world literature: “He visualized 
himself translated into Russian, covertly, by the Marranos’ daughter.  To be circulated, in typescript, 
underground: to be read, read!” (85).  In Edelshtein’s fantasy of his works’ samizdat circulation in 
Russian—“[a] thick language, a world language” (ibid.)—it is the writer who experiences translation, 
and the writer who is read, to his own rapturous gratification.  Indeed, the story’s consideration of 
the ethics of translation centers primarily, nearly entirely, on the writer seeking to be translated.  In 
Edelshtein’s understanding of translation from Yiddish-to-English, translation is almost 
synonymous with mass success (the kind of success that Edelshtein and Baumzweig find most 
compelling).  But the cultural politics of translation that underlie Edelshtein’s ambition imply that 
allowing one’s work to be translated is to invite the charge of selling out.  Edelshtein’s pursuit of 
translation is thus an acknowledgement that Yiddish offers him no future, and, taken to its extreme, 
the expression of a desire to be free of Jewish culture as the defining frame for his literary efforts 
(how else to interpret his epiphanic [if brief] embrace of Jewish particularity near the story’s end, but 
as an acknowledgement that he wanted out of “Jewish literature” and in to “world literature” all 
along?: “He saw everything in miraculous reversal, blessed—everything plain, distinct, 
understandable, true.  What he understood was this: that the ghetto was the real world and the 
outside world only a ghetto” [96]).  To some degree, then, Ozick’s story equates translation from the 
Yiddish, at least from the perspective of the translated author, with the betrayal of ethnically specific 
form.  The story’s logic here essentializes the language, associating Yiddish with a nascent cultural 
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politics of ethnic nationalism, and translation—the move away from particularly Jewish form—with 
an abandonment of Jewish cultural commitments. 
But if the story’s author-based consideration of translation from the Yiddish is suspicious of 
the capitulation to non-Jewish cultural influence that it may imply, Ozick elsewhere (and in relation 
to the composition of “Envy”) describes her own efforts in Yiddish-to-English translation, from the 
translator’s perspective, as a way of inhabiting an earlier generation’s Jewishness.  “My father is gone 
now, but I continue to find him in these poems.  And as I struggled with each poem, condemned by 
the hopeless nature of translation to failure, it seemed to me that I became the poet who had written 
it.  Chaim Grade’s ‘Elegy for the Soviet Yiddish Writers,’ for instance, endures in the marrow and 
has irresistibly entered our moral landscape” (“A Bintel Brief” 60, emphasis in the original).44  If to 
be translated is in part to allow oneself to be removed from a Jewishly particular context in pursuit 
of wider celebrity, then to translate from Yiddish is to assume imaginative residence in the more 
Jewishly particular milieu. 
The citation of Grade in Ozick’s comments on translation suggests a specific connection 
between Ozick’s work on this particular poem and her conception of “Envy.”  Ozick’s description 
in “Envy” of the Soviet Yiddishists as “Marranos” is likely a reference to Grade’s “Elegy,” which 
Ozick indeed translated for Howe and Greenberg’s Treasury of Yiddish Poetry (1969):45 “And so I tell / 
your merits, have always looked to your defense, not to justify / for pity of your deaths, but for what 
you were when all the space / of Russia sustained you still, and you lived your deathly lie: / 
                                                 
44 See also Ozick’s “A Translator’s Monologue,” in which she makes a similar argument that 
translation, though finally an impossible task, calls upon the translator to inhabit the writer’s 
consciousness, and to re-write the work, in a new linguistic medium, through this act of imaginative 
identification. 
45 All of the nine Jewish writers whom Ozick references in this section of the story as victims of 
Stalin’s purges are also referenced in Grade’s poem, the first verse of which ends with his 
description of the Soviet writers as hidden Jews.  Only two writers, the author and critic Yekhezkl 




Marranos—your deepest self denies your face” (12–16, Ozick’s translation) [“Deriber hob ikh 
shtendik nokhgezukht af aykh a zkhus, / nit makhmes ayer toyt hob ikh af aykh gefunen zkhusim; / 
bay ayer lebn nokh in land fun rekhovesdikn rus / hob ikh gevust, az in der tif fun harts zayt ir 
anusim” (13–16)].  Like Ozick’s “Envy,” Grade’s poem concerns the lives (and deaths) of Yiddish 
writers in adverse conditions (albeit dramatically different conditions from those facing Edelshtein 
and his cronies).  Grade’s elegy, published ten years after Stalin’s August 1952 purge of Soviet Jewish 
writers, describes the poet’s relationships with writers murdered by Stalin’s regime, unsparingly 
faulting them for their support for the system under which they would ultimately be killed.  The 
poem is at once intimate and admonitory in ways that echo the strategy of unattractive intimacy that 
Ozick, I argue, employs in her portrayal of “Envy”’s Yiddishists.  Where the central stanzas of 
Grade’s poem proceed through specific recollections of Soviet Yiddishists, memorializing each in 
turn through biographical and physical characterizations and considerations of their attitudes 
towards the regime, his final stanza returns to the poet’s grief, mediated through the language he 
shares with the elegized victims, a theme introduced in the opening lines that give the Yiddish poem 
its title, “I weep for you with all the letters of the alphabet” [“Ikh veyn af aykh mit ale oysyes fun 
dem alef-beys”].  The changes that Ozick’s translation introduces into this stanza, then, suggest her 
response to the particular problem of translating grief for Yiddish, in Yiddish, into an English 
context—a key problematic for the specific cultural context that “Envy” invokes. 
Grade’s original closing stanza, for which I offer a translation here that aims for fidelity to 
the poem’s syntax, emphasizes the changed state of Yiddish in a post-purge world, and the specific 
inheritance of the Yiddish writer who understands his own writing to exist in the specific wake of 
Stalin’s atrocities: 
Ghosts justify the depth of my sadness, 
With their lost, silent, and ashamed smiles. 
From your dreams and fevers through long nights, 
There remained the beauty of a ruined temple. 
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In your poems, you were like a river, 
That reflects up the existing world—reversed. 
There remained a young generation that doesn’t ask about you, 
And not about me, and not about our generational sadness. 
For your body-and-soul killed in the darkness, 
Your widows received—money, a blood-ransom. 
But your language, which executioners made mute, 
Is still mute in the land, where poets still sing ceaselessly. 
For me your language remained!  Like the clothes remain, 
of a drowned man, who remains lying in the river. 
O, your borrowed happiness doesn’t remain for me, 
But only the bitterness of your Yiddish/Jewish melody.46 (109, my translation) 
 
Ozick’s translation of the stanza differs in crucial ways from a more literal rendition of the Yiddish: 
Ghosts justify my despair, phantom faces 
smile their lost mute shame. 
Through nights of fever and dream 
you razed your palaces 
to glimmering ruin.  In your poems you were 
like a pond—crooked mirror 
to the world of truth.  The young 
have forgotten you and me and the hour 
of our grief.  Your widows receive their dower 
of blood money.  But your darkly murdered tongue, 
silenced by the hangman’s noose, 
                                                 
46 I have opted here for a translation that privileges semantic meaning over lyricism and poetic 
form—both clearly central conditions of Ozick’s own translation.  Much is lost in this rendering of 
the verse, but I hope it will aid my non-Yiddish speaking readers in assessing some of the 
compositional choices that Ozick’s own translation reflects.  Below is a transliteration of the verse in 
its original Yiddish. 
Vi troyerik mir iz vos shotns gibn mir gerekht 
mit zayer blondzshendikn, shtumen un farshemtn shmaykhl. 
Fun ayer kholemen un fibern durkh lange nekht, 
geblibn iz di sheynkayt fun a ruinirtn hikhl. 
In ayer lid zayt ir geven geglikhn tsu a taykh, 
vos shpiglt op di vorhaftike velt—kapoyer. 
Geblibn iz a yunger dor vos fregt zikh nit af aykh, 
un nit af mir, un nit af undzer doyresdikn troyer. 
Far ayer layb-un-lebn in der finster umgebrakht, 
bakumen hobn ayer almones—gelt, dmey-koyper. 
Nor ayer loshn, vos tlonim hobn shtum gemakht, 
iz vayter shtum in land, vu dikhter zingen nokh on oyfher. 
Iz mir geblibn ayer loshn!  Vi es blaybt dos klayd 
fun a dertrunkenem vos iz in taykh geblibn lign. 
O, mir iz nit geblibn ayer oysgeborgte frayd, 
nor gor dos biternish fun ayer yidishlekhn nigun. 
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is no longer heard, though the muse 
again sings in the land.  You left 
me your language, lilted with joy.  But oh, I am bereft— 
I wear your Yiddish like a drowned man’s shirt, 
wearing out the hurt. 
 
The most significant alterations introduced by Ozick into the final stanza of Grade’s elegy are the 
possibility of redemption—of “wearing out the hurt”—and the absence of a strong emphasis on 
those things that “remain” after the Soviet poets’ deaths.  These two changes converge in Ozick’s 
translation of the poem’s final simile.  In Grade’s original, the simile of the drowned man elaborates 
how Yiddish remains for Grade, rather than what the poet does with Yiddish in the wake of the Soviet 
writers’ murder, as in Ozick’s construction.  While Ozick’s speaker engages in a gesture of recovery, 
taking the shirt from the drowned man on himself, Grade’s drowned man is unredeemed—he “iz in 
taykh geblibn lign” [“remained lying in the river”].  The clothes covering his corpse are thus 
garments that have outlived their use, and symbols of the drowned man’s abandonment.  Remaining 
either on the body or on the shore in the Yiddish original, the clothes point to the absence of a 
burial shroud and of the ritual care for the dead such a shroud implies.  The pathos of Grade’s image 
rests not simply in the drowning, but in the body’s abandonment.  The clothes on the man in the 
river thus signify the absence of social concern: the breakdown of those rituals that claim even an 
unliving body as part of society and therefore subject to social codes that recall the humanity the 
corpse once contained.  If Yiddish remains for Grade “like the clothes remain of a drowned man 
who remains lying in the river,” the language thus remains as a symbol of abandonment and 
desecration.  Ozick’s translated speaker, however, actively assumes the mantle of Yiddish—“I wear 
your Yiddish like a drowned man’s shirt”—accepting it as an inheritance, transferred from one 
owner to another, later owner.  Yiddish, in the Yiddish, however, is not left to Grade specifically; it 
is simply left.  Grade’s emphasis on the language remaining depersonalizes the closing connection 
between the speaker and his Soviet colleagues.  The language does not pass directly from one to the 
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other, as a bequest from one generation to their successors, but is altered by its use and history for 
the murdered writers’ contemporaries. 
In its emphasis on the remaining traces of the Soviet Yiddish writers and its interrogation of 
the ways in which these traces remain, the poem’s closing lines recapitulate the mediated relationship 
between Grade and the subjects of his elegy introduced in the poem’s first lines: “Ikh vayn af aykh 
mit ale oysyes fun dem alef-beys, / vos ir hot im farnutst tsu zingen hoferdike lider. [I weep for you 
with all the letters of the alef-beys, / that you used to sing hopeful songs].”  Here, too, Yiddish is a 
malleable medium that exists between Grade and his subjects.  This is not to say that Grade’s 
relationship with the Soviet writers is exclusively literary, occurring only in the identity of the letters 
that they use.  Grade’s address to the Soviet Yiddish writers is in fact both literary and personal, 
considering both the Soviet writers’ public figures and the poet’s private impressions, gathered on 
visits with them in the Soviet Union.  But the relationship that these writers share by virtue of their 
mutual manipulation of Yiddish letters is distinct from the personal connections also present in the 
poem in that it offers the possibility of situating the Yiddish reader in a parallel relationship to the 
one the poet shares with his colleagues.  When Grade and Leib Kvitko kiss goodbye in the poem’s 
fifth stanza, the reader doesn’t, too, kiss Kvitko—the poets touch; the reader touches no one.  But 
when the poet and the Soviet writers are understood to be connected through their usage of Yiddish 
letters, the Yiddish reader is at the same mediated remove from the Soviet writers and the elegist as 
the writers are from each other.  In casting Yiddish as a constant between his dolorous verse and the 
murdered writers’ “hoferdike lider,” Grade construes the language as a vehicle of a suggestive near-
intimacy shared by the reader of the Yiddish text. 
To put this another way, Grade’s poem presents a particular problem for its translator in the 
way that it figures Yiddish as the thread connecting Grade and the Soviet poets.  “All the letters of 
the alphabet,” are not the same as “ale oysyes fun dem alef-beys”—or, more to the point, they are 
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not the same as אלע אותיות פון דעם אלף בית  Read in the context of translation, the opening lines 
foreground the particular unification of Yiddish writers through the language itself.  In English 
translation, there is no Jewishly particular valence to “all the letters of the alphabet,” or, rather, the 
English reader, to understand the material contours of the linguistic connection between the Soviet 
writers and Grade must imagine that the “letters of the alphabet” are the “oysyes fun dem alef-
beys.” 
  The closing lines of Grade’s Yiddish emphasize the common stock of Jewish suffering: 
Grade is left not with the “borrowed happiness” that the Soviet writers held in proportion to their 
faith in the Soviet system, but with “the bitterness of your Jewish melody.”  While the misguided 
hopefulness of the Soviet writers vanishes with their murder, Jewish melancholy runs through their 
verses as a component of the language.  And Ozick’s translation, tellingly, elides Grade’s emphasis 
on the Yiddish melody as a vehicle for the expression of suffering.  Instead, the language emerges in 
her translation “lilted with joy,” and it is the poet, “bereft,” who introduces the melancholy note, 
albeit in a the quasi-therapeutic context of “wearing out the hurt.”  The poet’s sadness, prompted 
though it is by the death of his friends and the implications that their murders hold for the future of 
Yiddish as a world literary language, becomes in Ozick’s telling not a property of the language, 
activated by the poet’s emotion, but an artifact of the poet’s emotion, imposed on the language.  
Ozick’s translation thus introduces a note of optimism in the promise that the contemporary 
Yiddish poet might “wear out the hurt” that in Grade’s original appears endemic to Yiddish itself. 
This transformation of the bitterness of the language to the melancholy of the poet 
prefigures the universalizing gesture of “Envy” in which the suffering of the frustrated Yiddish 
writer in America stands as an emblem of the anguished striving of young writers as such.  In 
Ozick’s translation of Grade’s closing lines, Yiddish is, in a sense, already translated and redeemed in 
its translation.  Through the agency of the Yiddish translator, bringing Yiddish into the more widely 
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read context of English, the hurt can be worn out, the language recuperated and redeemed.  Where 
Grade’s speaker, forgotten by the younger generation, possesses a muted language structured by 
sadness, Ozick writes the final lines, I would argue, more as a translator, vivified by her work of 
recovery, than out of fidelity to the original. 
Underpinning the criticisms leveled at Ozick’s story upon its initial publication is the sense 
that the story does an injustice to the writers that it represents, elevating its author—a member of 
the increasingly hot category of Jewish American writers47—at the expense of increasingly 
disadvantaged Yiddish writers.  The liberties that Ozick takes with the translation of Grade’s final 
lines, however, suggests the prominence of the redemptive frame in Ozick’s use of Yiddish source 
material.  A parallel to Ozick’s position vis-à-vis the Yiddish poets, then, can be found in the 
composition that Edelshtein condemns as a “little story.”  Ostrover’s tale of the Zwrdlish poet, 
narrated from a position of achieved literary success, is a cruel caricature, but it nonetheless 
articulates a problem central to Ozick’s story: that of marking the value of a literary work without 
recourse to readers; that is: to the literary marketplace or the literary critical apparatus.  Removed, in 
the poet’s damnation, from any literary, social, or historical context, the Zwrdlish poet’s terrible 
poetry finally vanishes before it has a chance to fail.  What tragedy there is in Ostrover’s story lies in 
its protagonist’s eternal unawareness of his own mediocrity.  “‘Remember that you are in hell,’ Satan 
says sternly, ‘here you write only for oblivion.’  The poet begins to weep.  ‘No difference, no 
                                                 
47 In the world of the story, Jewish American writers are definitely “a thing.”  Where Anglophone 
Jewish writers appear in the story, they enter the page as “so-called” Jewish American writers (138, 
160) or have their modifier marked with italics: “Jewish novelists!  Savages!” (161).  In his letter to 
Kimmel and Segal, Ostrover’s (fictional) publishers, Edelshtein names “Roth Philip/ Rosen Norma/ 
Melammed Bernie/ Friedman B.J./ Paley Grace/ Bellow Saul/ Mailer Norman” as authors about 
whom he has definite opinions.  In a later letter to Hannah, a young, American born Yiddish 
speaker whom he courts as a translator, he singles out “Elkin, Stanley” for the condemnable 
shallowness of his Jewish knowledge.  In each case, Edelshtein understands the Jewishness of 
Anglophone “Jewish” authors to be something produced not in their published fiction, but in the 
mouths of unnamed members of the literary establishment.  That is to say, they appear as a group 




difference!  It was the same up there!  O Zwrdl, I curse you that you nurtured me!’  ‘And still he 
doesn’t see the point!’ says Satan, exasperated” (60).  The Zwrdlish poet, having failed relentlessly 
and predictably in each language he tries on earth, remains uneducated by the literary marketplace.  
Ostrover casts the market for publication as an effective arbiter of literary quality, and the Zwrdlish 
poet, meant to be read as Edelshtein (“That one you shouldn’t throw out the window,” Ostrover 
quips after an impromptu recitation of one of Edelshtein’s poems), as a fool for missing its message.  
The Zwrdlish poet’s curse remains one of misapprehension—what for him is the tragedy of good 
work unjustly thwarted is for the auditor the dark comedy of misdirected grief. 
The case of Edelshtein’s grief, however, is more complicated that that of his parodic avatar.  
Though the motive of preserving Yiddish often serves as a rhetorical cudgel in Edelshtein’s 
harangues of publishers and reluctant translators (a fact that he himself recognizes: “The difference 
between [Edelshtein] and Ostrover was this: Ostrover wanted to save only himself, Edelshtein 
wanted to save Yiddish. / Immediately he felt he lied” [56]) his late epiphanic understanding of 
Yiddish (and Jewish particularity) as a blessing suggests a real tenderness for the language, and true 
grief—and not only self-pity—at its loss (96).  Moreover, the loss of Yiddish is understood nearly 
from the story’s opening as a historical tragedy both greater than Edelshtein’s personal problems 
and essential to their mitigation: “And the language was lost, murdered.  The language—a museum.  
Of what other language can it be said that it died a sudden and definite death, in a given decade, on a 
given piece of soil? [. . . .] Yiddish, a littleness, a tiny light—oh little holy light!—dead, vanished.  
Perished.  Sent into darkness. / This was Edelshtein’s subject” (42).  This move from elegy for 
Yiddish to the professional use of that elegy marks the central tension of the story’s treatment of 
Edelshtein’s career.  The lament, in the narrator’s voice, over the dissolution of Yiddish seems at 
first to stand on its own: a moment of mourning establishing the historical and emotional mode of 
the text.  But the abrupt identification of what appeared to be the narrator’s threnody as 
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“Edelshtein’s subject” moves the reader from a solemn consideration of Yiddish as a dead language 
to a consideration of Yiddish as a determining component of a working writer’s life.   While both 
Edelshtein and the poet in Ostrover’s story mourn their unheralded genius, Edelshtein lacks the 
clear dismissal of the “plain rejection slip, no letter,” that the Zwrdlish poet ignores (59).  
Edelshtein’s rejection, as presented in the story, precedes any evaluation of his work itself: “Though 
your poetry may well be of the quality you claim for it, practically speaking, reputation must precede 
translation” (53).  
The problems faced by “Envy’s” protagonist, Edelshtein, are essentially those of any young 
author searching for professional success.  Translation, of course, places an additional hurdle in 
Edelshtein’s path to readership, but his desire for publication, and his frustration at finding his work 
essentially unpublishable is remarkably close to the autobiographical narrative that Ozick outlines in 
her review of Cyril Connoly’s Enemies of Promise.  In this sense, the ordinary, arbitrary, operation of 
the literary marketplace renders the specific role of Yiddish in determining Edelshtein’s obscurity 
opaque.  Focusing our attention not on the way that Yiddish is depicted in “Envy,” but on the 
story’s construction of the writer’s profession raises the question of how Yiddish is made to 
function as a foil for and microcosm of the trials of a young writer.  In the person of the struggling 
writer, the (ethnic) particularity of Yiddish dissolves into the (professional) particularity of the 
writing profession.  Thus, what begins in Ozick’s 1970 “America” essay as the littleness of ethnic 
particularity eventually transforms in her later comments about the autonomy of the literary writer 
into a littleness of idiosyncratic authorial consciousness.  The seeds of this change are present in 
“Envy,” written shortly before her well-known polemic, and in the story’s attitude toward the short 
story form.  As the next chapter’s analysis of Philip Roth’s The Ghost Writer will argue, the 
transformation of ethnic particularity into professional particularity, latent in “Envy” and traceable 
in the development of Ozick’s non-fiction writing over the course of her career, might also be seen 
146 
 
as part of a larger meta-narrative of American Jewish socio-economic ascent, for which 
professionalization is both the keynote of the American Jewish story and a process into which the 
particular and varied content of American Jewish culture fits only unevenly. 
 “Envy,” like Ostrover’s mocking tales, brings the people it represents into literary history not 
as writers, but as characters.  Or, rather, as the title of a later Ozick essay, “Portrait of the Artist as a 
Bad Character” suggests, Ozick sees the writer as herself a kind of character.  But if the writer is a 
character—if, as Elaine Kauvar has written, “The interlacing of [fiction and biography] has always 
set Cynthia Ozick’s imagination ablaze and continues to as tale after tale illuminates one form with 
the other, suggesting the inseparability of writer from work” (58)—then her treatment of the short 
story in Envy suggests that the constraint of aesthetic ambitions is central to the story of the writer’s 
life, and that this constraint is also a liberation into both ethnic and formal narrowness.
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Appendix: “Little fathers, little uncles,” Edelshtein’s Poem, In Situ 
She recited: “Little fathers, little uncles, you with your beards and glass and curly hair. . . .” [. . . .] 
“Listen,[” said Edelshtein, “]I’ll say the rest for you.  I’ll take a minute only, I promise.  
Listen, see if you can remember from your grandfather—” 
Around him, behind him, in front of him Ostrover, Vorovsky, Baumzweig, perfumed ladies, 
students, the young, the young, he clawed at his wet face and declaimed, he stood like a wanton stalk 
in the heart of an empty field: 
How you spring out of the ground covered with poverty! 
In your long coats, fingers rolling wax, tallow eyes. 
How can I speak to you, little fathers? 
You who nestled me with lyu, lyu, lyu, 
lip-lullaby. Jabber of blue-eyed sailors, 
how am I fallen into a stranger’s womb? 
Take me back with you, history has left me out. 
You belong to the Angel of Death, 
I to you. 
Braided wraiths, smoke, 
let me fall into your graves, 
I have no business being your future. 
He gargled, breathed, coughed, choked, tears invaded some false channel in his throat—meanwhile 
he swallowed up with the seizure of each bawled word this niece, this Hannah, like the rest, boots, 
rough full hair, a forehead made on a Jewish last, chink eyes— 
At the edge of the village a little river. 
Herons tip into it pecking at their images 
when the waders pass whistling like Gentiles. 
The herons hang, hammocks above the sweet summer-water. 
Their skulls are full of secrets, their feathers scented. 
The village is so little it fits into my nostril. 
The roofs shimmer tar, 
the sun licks thick as a cow. 
No one knows what will come. 
How crowded with mushrooms the forest’s dark floor. 
 Into his ear Paula said, “Hersheleh, I apologize, come home with us, please, please, I 
apologize.”  Edelshtein gave her a push, he intended to finish.  “Littleness,” he screamed, 
I speak to you. 
We are such a little huddle. 
Our little hovels, our grandfathers’ hard hands, how little, 
our little, little words, 
this lullaby 
sung at the lip of your grave, 
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CHAPTER FOUR: “I am the kind of person who writes this kind of story”: 
The Jewish Writer as Jewish Professional in Philip Roth’s The Ghost Writer 
 
 A popular narrative of postwar Jewish American success runs like this: In the period after 
the Second World War, American Jews experienced a large-scale occupational shift of considerable 
significance, both actual and symbolic, moving into the professions in unprecedented numbers.  
With the Eastern European immigration of 1880–1924, the composition of American Jewry 
changed from a collection of comparatively small communities occupied mostly as traders and 
businesspeople to one defined by a substantially larger contingent of new arrivals from Eastern 
Europe, who found employment in the American working class, and as small-scale entrepreneurs, 
many of them as peddlers and workers in the garment industry.  With the functional end of 
European Jewish immigration after the passage of the National Origins Immigration Act in 1924, 
the economic development of American Jews proceeded without supplementation by new arrivals 
entering America at lower rungs of the economic ladder.  Thus, as Jews employed in industries with 
relatively small start-up capital requirements and straightforward paths for advancement (e.g., 
peddling and garment manufacture) moved into positions of management, store or shop ownership, 
or out of these industries entirely, no other Jewish workers replaced them, shifting the aggregate 
economic position of American Jews into the middle class.  By the end of the Second World War, 
this economic mobility was paired with advantageous federal loan and housing policies, combined 
with a broad acceptance of Jews as whites in America’s racial imaginary, resulting in a smoother 
passage for Jewish acculturation to American norms, establishment in the middle class, and large-
scale participation in white-collar work, particularly in the professions (i.e., broadly, those 
occupations, like medicine, the law, academia, engineering, etc., which involve mental labor, often 
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salaried, and generally require the possession of formal professional credentials).48  During this same 
period, post-immigration American Jewish writing experienced a surge in critical appreciation and 
popular visibility.49  The prominent Jewish presence in American letters thus became emblematic of 
the master narrative of American Jewish socio-economic success that I have sketched above.  The 
terms of this retelling of Jewish American experience link professional identity with ethnic identity, 
casting professionalization as a hallmark of American Jewish acculturation (a version of the model 
minority narrative).  Despite actual variation in class among American Jews, professional white-
collar employment became, in the symbolic structure of this historical narrative, emblematically 
Jewish. 
 But while professional labor became a key marker of American Jewish upward mobility, 
professional identity itself depended on a person’s Jewishness being invisible from the perspective of 
their professional performance.  The structural logic of the professions, in which one’s credentials 
depend upon a depersonalized certification of professional ability, militates against Jewishness 
marking a person’s professional identity in the same way that membership in the professions could 
mark their Jewish identity.  The logic of professional credentialing depends on the separation of 
vocational abilities from the extra-professional conditions of a person’s life.  Indeed, professional 
certification by objective and depersonalized institutions developed as an alternative to modes of 
professional validation that rely on status and social connections.50  Professional credentialing 
                                                 
48 Hasia Diner, The Jews of the United States. 
49 See, for example, Louis Harap’s In the Mainstream, and, in the immediate post-War period, Leslie 
Fiedler’s “The Breakthrough” Midstream (1958), and Ted Solotaroff’s “A Vocal Group” TLS (1959) 
50 Magali Sarfatti Larson summarizes the shift to formalized systems for certifying professional 
competence as a turn from the informal regulation of professional access to clients via the clients’ 
social circles to one following a market logic: “The first market-oriented phase of professionalization 
introduced a principle of objectification at the core of the professional commodity.  Standards of 
value derived from this principle tended to displace (though never entirely to replace) pre-capitalist 
standards based on narrow monopolies of status, on the social position of the clientele, or on the 
personality or idiosyncratic biography of the professional.  The particular aspects of use-value in the 
professional commodities limited the scope of this transformation.” Since the idiosyncratic skills of 
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therefore depends in theory, if not necessarily in practice, upon the idea that the professions are 
meritocracies.  The professions justify the social power that they wield by reference to the 
disinterested and socially beneficial performance of their functions.  And though the ethics of 
professionalization are circumscribed, nominally applying only to the conduct of professionals as 
they perform the activities of their field, within the professional fields the claims of professionalism 
are total and absolute. 
The principle of conduct which links the professions with the outside world, and which 
justifies professional autonomy, is the service ethic: an understanding that the professions exist in 
the service of a greater social good, and that, taken as a whole, the professions are dedicated to the 
just and rational distribution of social resources. During the 1970s, considerable theoretical attention 
was directed to the rise of what was known variously as “The New Class” and the “Professional-
Managerial Class” (PMC): a class of laborer that fit poorly within the traditional Marxian categories 
of bourgeois and proletariat, exercising control but not ownership of the means of production.51  
                                                                                                                                                             
the professional—including relevant aspects of their personality and, in some cases, their social 
connections (a client may, for example, prefer a doctor with whom they have an easy rapport or a 
lawyer well known and respected in their community)—are germane to their job performance, their 
services are not as easily or wholly objectified as unskilled labor.  Nonetheless, the idea of objective 
skill certified by a professional’s peers became an important and internally coherent basis for claims 
of professional ability.  Magali Sarfatti Larson, The Rise of Professionalism, 212–13. 
51 See Barbara and John Ehrenreich, “The Professional-Managerial Class” (1976) and Alvin 
Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the New Class (1979).  The Ehrenreichs define the PMC as 
“consisting of salaried mental workers who do not own the means of production, and whose major 
function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist 
culture and capitalist class relations” (12).  This analysis understands the relationship of the PMC to 
the working class to be “objectively antagonistic” (17); the PMC, in its capacity as reproducer of 
capitalist culture, functions, the Ehrenreichs argue, to atomize working class leisure activities, to 
privatize and commodify culture, and to institute the supervisory control that allows working class 
labor to be routinized and degraded. 
Gouldner’s view of what he calls “the New Class” is considerably more optimistic (and more 
focused on the norms of conduct internal to the professions) than the Ehrenreich’s: 
The fundamental objectives of the New Class are: to increase its own share of the 
national product; to produce and reproduce the special social conditions enabling 
them to appropriate privately larger shares of the incomes produced by the special 
cultures they possess; to control their work and their work settings; and to increase 
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Writing in 1978, sociologist Magali Sarfatti Larson argued that the ideological function of 
professionalism is to obscure the mechanisms by which the socially produced competencies of the 
professional are expropriated into private hands.  In Sarfatti Larson’s analysis of the social and 
                                                                                                                                                             
their political power partly in order to achieve the foregoing.  The struggle of the 
New Class is, therefore, to institutionalize a wage system, i.e., a social system with a 
distinct principle of distributive justice: “from each according to his ability to each 
according to his work,” which is also the norm of “socialism.” (19–20) 
Furthermore, 
Like the working class, the New Class earns its living through its labor in a wage 
system; but unlike the old working class, it is basically committed to controlling the 
content of its work and its work environment, rather than surrendering these in 
favor of getting the best wage bargain it can negotiate.  The New Class’s 
consciousness is thus not “economistic.” It is committed to producing worthy 
objects and services and to the development of the skills requisite for these.  It is, 
therefore, not simply a proletariat alienated from work which is experienced—in 
Marx’s image—as a process in which the dead products of past human labor 
dominate its own living labor in the present.  Aspiring to produce worthy objects and 
services, the New Class must also be concerned to control its work environment.  
The New Class thus embodies any future hope of working class self-management 
and prefigures the release from alienated labor. (20–21) 
Thus, for Gouldner, “The paradox of the New Class is that it is both emancipatory and elitist.  It 
subverts all establishments, social limits and privileges, including its own” (84). 
Indeed, Gouldner sees the primary emancipatory contribution of the New Class as a 
“Culture of Critical Discourse” (CCD): “an historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse, 
which (1) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of justification does not proceed by 
invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the 
basis of arguments adduced” (28).  This new discourse: 
is the grounding for a critique of established forms of domination and provides an 
escape from tradition, but it also bears the seeds of a new domination.  Its discourse 
is a lumbering machinery of argumentation that can wither imagination, discourage 
play, and curb expressivity.  The culture of discourse of the New Class seeks to 
control everything, its topic and itself, believing that such domination is the only road 
to truth.  The New Class begins by monopolizing truth and by making itself its 
guardian.  It thereby makes even the claims of the old class dependent on it.  The 
New Class sets itself above others, holding that its speech is better than theirs; that 
the examined life (their examination) is better than the unexamined life which, it says, 
is sleep and no better than death.  Even as it subverts old inequities, the New Class 
silently inaugurates a new hierarchy of the knowing, the knowledgeable, the reflexive 
and insightful.  Those who talk well, it is held, excel those who talk poorly or not at 
all.  It is now no longer enough simply to be good.  Now, one has to explain it.  The 
New Class is the universal class in embryo, but badly flawed. (84–5). 
 For its critics on the left, the general point of definitional agreement about the New 
Class/PMC is its unique position of social power and non-ownership of capital—a situation that 
Gouldner articulates as one in which the New Class’s interests are directed toward professional 
autonomy rather than compensation. 
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economic logic of professionalism, the economic advantage of the professions in a capitalist labor 
market consists in their production of monopolies of specialized training, and restrictive definitions 
of what constitutes professional competence.  In this view, the professions serve the ideological 
function of legitimizing the private appropriation of socially produced knowledge, through appeals 
to a professional ideal of service—the ideology of professionalism, that is, exists to justify the 
transformation of social resources into private competence: a construction relevant, I will argue, to 
the relationship between the Jewish writer and the Jewish community.  “The ideal of service,” 
Sarfatti Larson writes, “cannot solve the contradiction between the monopoly of training, which is 
the goal of professionalization projects, and the market situation, in which services are sold (in the 
classical personal professions) or skilled labor power is bought (in the case of salaried professionals). 
[. . . .] The revelation that socially produced knowledge is privately monopolized (and artificially 
limited) challenges the egalitarian and democratic legitimations built into the dominant ideology” 
(223).  Professional objectivity, in this reading, necessarily emphasizes the instrumentality of 
professionals and de-emphasizes the gain that accrues to them as private citizens.  Indeed, Sarfatti 
Larson argues, precisely because access to professional training presents itself, in principle, as being 
open to all, and because professional services (through the intervention of the welfare state) are in 
principle also available to all, the ideology of professionalism understands professional labor as a 
solution to social inequities. The justification of professional prerogatives that the service ideal 
provides operates not only on society at large, but on the professional as well—that is, the ideology 
of professionalism justifies the social position of professionals to the professionals themselves.  
Distinct from routinized manual labor, the intellectual labor of the professions stakes its claim to 
autonomy precisely on the promise that the professional’s creative intellectual work will serve 
professional ideals.  This ideal of professional independence, according to which responsible 
professional performance is the professional’s main vehicle for contributing to the common welfare, 
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holds the professional to a canon of ethics that outweighs all other concerns, even the direct 
preferences of their immediate employer, in the execution of professional responsibilities. 
Professional ethics both justify and demand autonomy.  And the posture of professional 
objectivity required by the service ideal turns the professions into institutions that could, in the 
middle of the twentieth century, simultaneously signal broad Jewish class mobility and provide a 
space in which one’s Jewishness is understood not properly to matter.  Indeed, it is in part by virtue 
of this property of professionalism—its avowed indifference to the identity of its practitioners—that 
medical school and university quotas limiting Jewish enrollment presented American Jews with an 
enduring symbol of social injustice and eventual collective triumph.52  The figure of the Jewish 
author and the category of secular Jewish writing, however, unsettle the clear distinction between 
Jewish and professional identities.  Authorship would seem to lack many of the elements that define 
the traditional professions, particularly in the absence of a formal process of credentialing.  Mark 
McGurl has noted the increasingly central presence of formal education (in the form of the MFA 
program) in American literary production in the twentieth century—a move, in the writing trade, 
toward a principal structure of professional culture: a well defined educational apparatus that 
terminates in a degree.  But McGurl’s enlightening commentary on the rise of the “program era” 
notwithstanding—and notwithstanding, too, the undoubted importance of the development of this 
institutional writing culture to the picture of authorship that I present here—the occupation of 
writing doesn’t inherently demand specialized training (the field is in principle open to a self-tutored 
                                                 
52 It is also on the basis of this property of professionalism that opponents of affirmative action 
stake their claims.  As we shall see, the particular case of professional authorship foregrounds the 
significance of idiosyncratic aspects of writers’ lives to their professional performance.  Indeed, 
support of affirmative action policies often argues for the necessity of minority representation within 
the professions would reject such absolute claims of professional objectivity, and would note the 
salience of a professional’s identity to their work with or for minority clients (among others).  Such 
support, moreover, begins with an acknowledgement of the correlation of life history and 
professional and educational opportunities, and seeks to remedy inequities in access to professional 
training that are correlated with race and, to some degree, class. 
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amateur, turned professional by the sale of a book or a story).  Authors labor toward the production 
of discrete commodities, rather than the services that are the typical form of professional work: 
poems and prose narratives distributed (at least in the mid-twentieth century) in the relatively 
durable forms of books and magazines.  Nonetheless, authorship generally shares many of the 
justifications and understandings that Sarfatti Larson and others identify as central to the 
professions’ shared conceptions of themselves—a service ideal (a sense of the social good of one’s 
occupation), an avowed dedication to the craft of the profession, and a sense of the importance of 
autonomy and professional self-determination.  Authorship is situated, then, between a cultural 
affiliation with the professions (an association bolstered by the high proportion of working writers 
employed in higher education), and an ambiguous relationship with the process of certification that 
generally ratifies professional competence. 
This chapter considers Philip Roth’s 1979 novel The Ghost Writer as an attempt to situate the 
“Jewish writer”—in the novel, a writer of Jewish origins, writing about Jewish subjects—within a 
discourse of Jewish American professionalization that casts social progress in terms of the 
independence of professional opportunities and Jewish identity.  The novel places its protagonist, 
Nathan Zuckerman, at a moment of personal conflict between his thus-far straightforward Jewish 
identification, expressed mainly through his family attachments, and a career breakthrough in the 
form of an ambitious story that estranges the author from his father and from the Jewish 
community of his father’s generation.  But though the story centers upon conflicting demands of 
ethnic and professional identification, it ultimately recognizes the interpenetration and limitations of 
each.  Roth’s novel, featuring a protagonist of roughly Roth’s background in a professional situation 
that tracks well-known episodes in Roth’s career, plays with the inter-permeability of the author’s 
work and the author’s life.  The shared Jewishness of author and character, in particular, has had a 
special place alongside correspondences of gender, profession, age, and location in authorizing the 
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apparent biographical link between Roth and many of his protagonists.  In this chapter in particular, 
professional identity emerges as the main counter-category to Jewish identity in classifying a Jewish 
writer’s fiction, as Roth’s protagonist, developing in craft and reputation, stakes a claim for 
professional activity that falls outside the purview of the organized Jewish community and his own 
family alike, even as it draws heavily on their experiences and cultural codes.  But though The Ghost 
Writer’s conflict depends on the idea that a sharp line between Jewish and professional obligations is 
desirable for a maturing young writer, more directly posing a writer’s Jewish and professional 
affiliations against one another than the works that were the focus of the previous chapters, it also 
contests the terms of the Jewish/professional distinction more directly than those other works.  For 
The Ghost Writer’s artist, writing is not a Jewish activity, but the profession and professional 
achievement are inseparable from American Jewish self-understanding.  In The Ghost Writer, 
moreover, however professional literary performance might be fetishized as an impersonal devotion 
to craft, it nonetheless affects and draws upon the writer’s personal self and extra-literary communal 
ties. 
The hallmark of professionalism is the elevation of objective professional competence to an 
ethical good—essentially a defense of the instrumentalization of professionals in the performance of 
their tasks.53  In the case of the story written by The Ghost Writer’s protagonist, this task is defined as 
                                                 
53 Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Ethics of Identity, important in the formulation of this chapter’s 
argument, argues that ethical decisions and ethical judgments are necessarily determined by 
processes of identification: that is, decisions about what type of person to be.  Following John Stuart 
Mill, Appiah understands the liberal tradition to ground its ethical judgments about a life in the 
evaluation of that life’s plan: “the measure of my life, the standard by which it is to be assessed as 
more or less successful, depends, if only in part, on my life’s aims as specified by me. [. . . M]y life’s 
shape is up to me (provided that I have done my duty toward others), even if I make a life that is 
less good than a life I could have made” (xii).  Contra what many commentators have understood to 
be liberalism’s emphasis on the autonomous individual, however, Appiah advances an understanding 
of liberalism that begins with a socially and historically situated individual: “But [the task of shaping 
my life] doesn’t take place in a vacuum; rather, it is itself shaped by the available social forms.  And it 
can involve obligations that seem to go beyond my voluntary undertakings, and beyond the basic 
requirements of morality” (xiii).  This construction of identity vis-à-vis ethics leans heavily, as we 
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a writer’s representation of an unflattering episode in his Jewish family’s life.  Roth’s career stages a 
complicated intervention into this understanding of professional conduct.  Roth defends his work as 
the product of a creative mind (i.e. intellectual labor) rather than a transcription of experience, while 
producing work that, to a reader aware of his popular reputation, inevitably recalls the biography of 
the writer himself.  If Roth frequently defends his writing against reductively biographical 
interpretation by asserting that the fiction writer’s vocation is to transform the raw materials of life 
into crafted art, his fiction foregrounds the convergence of work and life. By focusing on the close 
connection between the personal and the professional identity of its writer-protagonist, The Ghost 
Writer emphasizes the liminality of literary labor to the discourse of professionalization discussed 
above.  But far from presenting writing as therefore alien to the norms of the professions, The Ghost 
Writer casts the connection between personal and professional life as fundamentally inescapable—
particularly for the writer—consequently positioning the writer as an ideal example of a tension 
present in all professional labor: that between an ideal of objectivity and the necessarily subjective 
professional worker. 
Indeed, The Ghost Writer was written at a point in Roth’s career when his reputation was 
enough to command much of two issues of the New Yorker for the novel’s original publication,54 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
might expect, on race, gender, nation, and religion (though less often, class), as common modes of 
identification, but Appiah also, perhaps more surprisingly, frequently lists profession—distinct from 
class—as another key vector of identity formation.  This, to my mind, is a crucial move in his 
argument and one that receives surprisingly little direct attention in the book.  In contrast to other 
modes of identification, which present themselves as ontological categories, the professions, built 
around the structure of the career, bear a close relationship to the “life plan” that, for Appiah, is the 
hinge of ethical judgment. 
54 June 25, 1979: 23 pages; July 2, 1979: 29 pages.  The conclusion of the novel is the only longform 
piece in this issue.  Roth’s first publication in the New Yorker was “The Kind of Person I Am” 
(1958), an essay in which Roth finds himself cornered by a young woman at a party, and identified, 
though trenchant guesses at his habits (a subscription to the Partisan Review, writing, largely 
unpublished) as one of a well-defined type, sending him into a dizzying uncertainty about his 
authenticity.  Following an encounter in which the woman “had examined me as though she knew 
not only my title but the quality of glue that kept me bound together” (173), Roth decides that he 
will give up the trappings of the cultural elite: “I would leave the hi-fi set unfixed. I would cut out 
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when a reader might be expected to recognize the correspondences between author and protagonist.  
In the print space that it was able to command in a major national magazine, in the gambit that it 
would remain viable as a single-volume publication even after its complete publication in the New 
Yorker, in its overt engagement with the model of mastery presented by Henry James (about which 
more below), and in its assumptions about the reader’s familiarity with Roth’s career, The Ghost 
Writer amounts, as well, to an assertion of Roth’s status in the profession—an assertion which brings 
together the significance of his writing and the significance of his fame.  Roth’s mid-career novel 
may not seem like an intuitive venue for extending this dissertation’s investigation of the uses Jewish 
American writers made of short stories in negotiating their relationships with the category of Jewish 
fiction, especially considering the availability of significant (and widely taught and read) stories by 
Roth written about distinctly Jewish subjects. The Ghost Writer, however, offers a sustained and subtle 
engagement with short fictional forms both in its own form—it is brief enough to fit into a premier 
commercial venue for short fiction, long enough to sprawl across two issues—and in its thematic 
treatment of the genre through its protagonist’s potential break-out story and its invocation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
buying the Times Literary Supplement. I would never return to Paris, or, for that matter, to the 
basement of Kroch & Brentano’s bookstore. There would be a change in the kind of person I was” 
(176).  After trying the trick of armchair sociology himself, however, he finds that there is no escape 
from being some kind of type—“Ah, of course—you’re the kind of person who doesn’t work in 
advertising” (177)—he decides to return to being the type of person he was to begin with, walking 
down to the store to get the hi-fi fixed, and back home carrying the TLS with the cover out (178).  
This light commentary identifies Roth with the community of letters that the New Yorker embodied, 
particularly under the editorial direction of William Shawn (ed. 1952–87), and identifies, as well, an 
anxiety about individuality common to the period and presumably shared or at least recognizable by 
Roth’s readers.  The gesture of choosing his tribe that Roth makes lightly here seems to forecast a 
similar concern, refracted through Jewishness, in The Ghost Writer and other of his writings that I 
discuss below.  Roth’s only other New Yorker publications predating The Ghost Writer are “Defender 
of the Faith” (1959) and “Novotny’s Pain” (1962).  For an account of the New Yorker under editors 
Harold Ross and William Shawn addressing the relationship with its readers and with mass culture 




Jamesian nouvelle as a vehicle for literary mastery.55  Indeed, through its various permutations of the 
story form, the novel uses the short story to interrogate two distinct and related moments of 
professional development: the beginning of a career and the consolidation of an author’s reputation. 
The Ghost Writer casts the struggle for professional autonomy as one between the author, 
Zuckerman, and the stated preferences of the Jewish community.  The status of secular Jewish 
writing as “Jewish culture” thus becomes a crucial point for determining the nature of Zuckerman’s 
claims to professional autonomy.  While Zuckerman understands his work to be responsible to 
literary standards alone, his critics in the Jewish community hold his writing responsible to standards 
of Jewish communal self-interest.  In so doing, they cast Zuckerman as a Jewish writer—that is, a 
professional whose intellectual labor is a matter of specifically Jewish cultural production and who is 
therefore responsible for upholding what they see as the interests of American Jews.  Zuckerman, 
however, draws a distinction between professional and ethnic / religious affiliations—in composing 
his story, he acts as a writer, bound solely by the ethics of writing, and not predominantly as a Jew.  
And yet The Ghost Writer suggests the failure of such compartmentalization: what the writer’s mentor 
refers to as a “turbulence” that powers Zuckerman’s talents.  The novel’s conflict stems from the 
category of Jewish writing itself, and from the tensions internal to the synthesis of Jewish and 
professional identities.  The conflict between what Zuckerman sees as the demands of his profession 
and those of the Jewish community of which he is a part—which receives significant treatment in 
Roth’s essays and interviews—causes Zuckerman’s dilemma.  I do not propose that this tension is 
experienced by all Jewish writers (certainly some write with a profound sense of professional 
integrity without coming into any conflict with Jewish communal expectations of their writing), nor 
do I propose that this tension is felt equally across historical periods.  What I do argue, however, is 
that Roth’s novel crystallizes a structural conflict within professional categories that invoke Jewish 
                                                 
55 Thanks to Jonathan Freedman directing me toward the significance of Roth’s engagement with 
James via the nouvelle. 
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content.  The Ghost Writer is set in a period during which Jewish participation in the professions 
encoded the new potential for a person’s Jewishness to be invisible, or at least irrelevant to their 
work.  The substance of Zuckerman’s professional performance is Jewish, and yet it is directed 
toward a general audience.  A key component of The Ghost Writer, then, is the compromise that 
Jewish authorship represents for idealized notions of professional objectivity. 
 
Roth Talks Shop; or, P. R. and “The PR Man” 
The primary conflict facing Nathan Zuckerman, the protagonist of The Ghost Writer, closely 
recalls (but does not mirror) an experience faced by Philip Roth early in his career.  After Roth’s 
short fiction had begun to achieve significant critical attention, but before the stir that attended the 
publication of Portnoy’s Complaint, he was accused by several rabbis and other members of the Jewish 
community of writing stories that amounted to defamations of the Jewish people—accusations to 
which Roth responded in print.  Though the connections and ruptures between this episode in 
Roth’s life and his novel are of some interest, I won’t map them out here.56  Instead, I will analyze a 
selection of Roth’s responses, in essays and interviews, to this and similar episodes, in order to lay 
out the author’s statements, in his own voice, about the ethics of representing Jewish characters.  In 
this analysis, I read Roth’s essays and his novel as two modes of professional response to extra-
professional claims on his work.  In essays and interviews with the author published between 1963 
and 1984, Roth, in dialogue with critics who disparaged his work’s treatment of its Jewish content, 
developed a position on the ethics of fiction writing that privileged writing as something valuable for 
its own sake and without reference to its effects on the unwritten world.  These essays and 
interviews represent a shift in Roth’s position from an ethics that understands fiction writing as a 
vehicle for human betterment toward an ethics rooted in craft for its own sake—a shift that 
                                                 
56 Debra Shostak’s Philip Roth: Countertexts/Counterlives (2004) considers the author’s canny 
manipulations of the correspondences that readers have drawn, and with which Roth himself flirts, 
between the novelist and his characters. 
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develops in reaction to what Roth presents as the claims that both formal and informal 
representatives of the Jewish community make on his fiction. 
In “Writing about Jews,” an essay published in Commentary in 1963, Roth responded to the 
case against his short fiction, which had been “attacked from certain pulpits and in certain 
periodicals as dangerous, dishonest, and irresponsible” (446).  “When I speak before Jewish 
audiences,” Roth wrote, “invariably there have been people who have come up to me afterward to 
ask, ‘Why don’t you leave us alone?  Why don’t you write about the Gentiles?’—‘Why must you be 
so critical?’—‘Why do you disapprove of us so?’—this last question asked as often with incredulity 
as with anger; and often by people a good deal older than myself, asked as of an erring child by a 
loving but misunderstood parent”57 (446).  These readers, Roth argues, who see themselves named 
and maligned in Roth’s stories, harassed by the author’s criticism, and wishing, above all, for the 
author to take someone else as his fictional subject, misread his fiction on two counts: reading 
disapproval where none is intended and reading for disapproval where they should instead read for 
understanding: 
Not always, but frequently, what readers have taken to be my disapproval of the lives 
lived by Jews seems to have more to do with their own moral perspective than with 
the one they would ascribe to me: at times they see wickedness where I myself had 
seen energy or courage or spontaneity; they are ashamed of what I see no reason to 
be ashamed of, and defensive where there is no cause for defense. 
 Not only do they seem to me often to have cramped and untenable notions 
of right and wrong, but looking at fiction as they do—in terms of “approval” and 
“disapproval” of Jews, “positive” and “negative” attitudes toward Jewish life—they 
are not likely to see what it is that the story is really about. (446) 
 
As is implicit in this characterization of his stories’ Jewish critics, Roth understands his authorial 
vision to entail a more nuanced, finely tuned, and realistic moral sensibility than that of these 
readers.  The reader attuned to the novel’s “attitude” toward Jews, in this argument, necessarily relies 
                                                 
57 This framing evokes that which Cynthia Ozick deployed in discussing the reaction to her story 
“Envy; or, Yiddish in America,”: “I felt as if I had held a gift up to my mother and father, and in 
return they had struck me a blow on the skull” (“Bintel Brief” 60), discussed further in chapter three 
of this dissertation. 
163 
 
upon moral categories limited by bourgeois propriety, whereas the writer, who understands, for 
example, that, “[f]or all that some people experience [an adulterer] as a cheat and nothing else, he 
usually experiences himself as something more” (446), is drawn by fiction into expressive and 
imaginative empathy—ultimately a more humane position.  The novel, therefore, is a laboratory for 
the development of moral understanding:  
The world of fiction [. . .] frees us from the circumscriptions that society places on 
feeling; one of the greatnesses of the art is that it allows both the writer and the 
reader to respond to experience in ways not available in day-to-day conduct; or, if 
they are available, not possible, or manageable, or legal, or advisable, or even 
necessary to the business of living. [. . . .] And this expansion of moral 
consciousness, this exploration of moral fantasy, is of considerable value to a man 
and to society. (446–7) 
 
The experience that fiction enables, in this defense of fiction writing, is valuable because it allows 
the reader to render moral judgment outside of his or her social context.  Fiction therefore has a 
value “to a man and to society,” and not primarily or solely a value intrinsic to the experience of 
reading itself.  “Writing About Jews” presupposes the imaginative independence of the author from 
his or her community, and defends Roth against his critics precisely on the grounds of the moral 
importance of free literary expression and open literary interpretation.  Though Roth claims in this 
essay that what draws most readers and writers to fiction is “all that is beyond simple moral 
categorizing” (446), this claim grounds an appeal to a more sophisticated moral good, one in which, 
“[c]easing for a while to be upright citizens, we drop into another layer of consciousness,” which 
itself constitutes an “expansion” (ibid.).  If fiction thereby stands against communal responsibility 
(upright citizenship), it affirms a moral imagination that is far from anarchic, but rather supports a 
more thoughtful and, presumably, forgiving basis for social relations. 
Responding to the vocal criticism of representatives of the Jewish community, Roth’s essay 
approaches the author’s moral position in society through a consideration of the burdens placed 
upon the author called upon to represent the Jews well in both senses of the term: as an 
164 
 
embodiment of Jewish achievement and as a writer depicting Jewish characters.  In this context, 
Roth’s primary concern is to defend as morally necessary the autonomy of writing from partisan 
interests.  “The concerns of fiction, let it be said, are not those of a statistician—or of a public-
relations firm. The novelist asks himself, ‘What do people think?’; the PR man asks, ‘What will 
people think?’ But I believe this is what is actually troubling the rabbi, when he calls for his 
‘balanced portrayal of Jews.’ What will people think?  Or to be exact: what will the goyim think?” 
(448).  The novelist’s function is diagnostic, his or her responsibility: professionally objective vision.  
When the rabbi masquerades as PR figure, he, too, fails to do his job, as Roth makes explicit in his 
ascerbic closing line: “If there are Jews who have begun to find the stories the novelists tell more 
provocative and pertinent than the sermons of some of the rabbis, perhaps it is because there are 
regions of feeling and consciousness in them which cannot be reached by the oratory of self-
congratulation and self-pity” (452).  In other words, if novelists are taking the rabbi’s audience, it is 
because they are unconcerned with pleasing any audience at all, but are focused instead on the object of 
their craft.  Roth’s argument meets the rabbis on what Roth suggests should be their own terms.  In 
later essays and interviews, Roth rejects this idealized reader response and the salience of moral 
improvement to the reader’s or the writer’s experience of fiction altogether.  In 1963, however, 
taking off from an unexpectedly acrimonious confrontation with ordained and informal 
representatives of Jewish culture, Roth presents fiction as an extension, and a more successful 
realization, of the rabbi’s task. 
Against the censure of “the rabbis,” Roth claims not an abstract freedom of conscience, but 
a specifically professional freedom to practice his craft.  His question—what do people think—isn’t 
necessarily the right question, per se, but it is the novelist’s question.  All the same, in writing against 
the censure of members of the Jewish establishment, Roth maintains a link between what is good 
for his profession and what is good for the culture of which novel writing is a part: “I should agree 
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to sacrifice the freedom that is essential to my vocation, and even to the general well-being of the 
culture, because—because of what?” (450).  As Roth’s direct criticism of a rabbinical “oratory of 
self-congratulation and self-pity” suggests, the novelist’s candor is also a general human good.  Self-
congratulation and self-pity encode problems of perspective and judgment—the gratification of 
each, unconnected to any comparative standard, has no objective measure. 
As will become more clear when we turn to Roth’s later essay “Imagining Jews,” “Writing 
about Jews” roots its consideration of the ethical import of fiction in a concern for the reader, 
figured alternately as Jewish reader and as a “general” reader whose extraliterary concerns and 
affiliations remain, for the purposes of Roth’s argument, obscure.  I will return to this point in my 
discussion of the novel The Ghost Writer.  For now, however, it is enough to indicate just how central 
the reader is to Roth’s 1963 defense of his fiction.  If the defensive Jewish reader finds himself or 
herself targeted by Roth’s representational attention, this reader misses an opportunity to transcend 
his or her limited, moralizing, bourgois perception of others through the medium of the fiction 
itself.  The problem facing the writer is external to the writer and to writing: it is the problem of 
misreading and of attempts to infringe the writer’s autonomy that flow from it. 
Where “Writing About Jews,” published in Commentary (a magazine sponsored until 2006 by 
the American Jewish Committee), engages with Jewish communal discourse, performing a writer’s 
response to being received negatively by the Jewish community,58 “Imagining Jews,” published ten 
years later in the New York Review of Books, focuses, as its title suggests, on the pressures that pre-
existing conceptions of Jewish virtue have on the writer’s ability to conceive rounded Jewish 
characters.  The earlier essay concentrates on the pressures of reception; the later essay turns its 
                                                 
58 While the bulk of the essay castigates Roth’s critics, he is careful to note that their antagonistic 
response is no more representative of “the Jews” than are his stories.  “When I did begin to receive 
speaking invitations, they were from Jewish ladies’ groups, Jewish community centers, and from all 




attention to pressures affecting composition.  “Imagining Jews” shifts the ethical frame that Roth 
uses to imagine the writer’s task from the text’s effect on the reader to the writer’s responsibility to 
the text, a change of emphasis which alters the salience of Jews to the writer’s task.  Here, it is not 
the Jewish audience that is the writer’s concern, but the ways in which the writer’s own 
preconceptions of the virtues that make a Jew a Jew limit his or her imagination of Jewish 
characters.  “Writing About Jews” addresses Jews as the writer’s audience.  “Imagining Jews” 
collapses the Jew and the writer on fundamentally different grounds: not only does this essay 
understand the Jewish writer to be prone to the same tendency to conceptualize Jewishness as 
another name for virtue experienced by a certain kind of Jewish reader, but it also depicts the writer, 
like the Jew, as an identity in need of demystification. 
“Imagining Jews” (1974) focuses on the particular problems that Roth finds in attempts by 
contemporary Anglophone Jewish writers (exemplified by Saul Bellow and Bernard Malamud) to 
imagine Jewish characters. Roth argues that when Jewish writers imagine the Jew, as such, they tend 
to fall into the trap of imagining not a character, but a caricature: a figure who, insofar as he or she59 
is Jewish, is also improbably virtuous.  The figure of the Jew, however, doesn’t stand alone as an 
object of idealizing misconception.  Roth introduces his critique of the figure of social acceptability 
cut by the Jew of myth by debunking the equally mythic figure of the morally authentic writer.  
“Alas,” Roth opens his essay, under the section-heading “Portnoy’s Fame—and Mine,” “it wasn’t 
                                                 
59 More often “he” than “she.”  The examples Roth offers from novels by Saul Bellow and Bernard 
Malamud are all male, and the understanding of “virtue” to which Roth most often refers has to do 
with heterosexual masculine sexual conduct, which in Portnoy in particular stands apart from 
professional performance—another mode of performing masculine competence.  While The Professor 
of Desire thematizes another transgression of the division between professional and sexual interests, 
and The Counterlife offers a picture of an affair between a dentist (Zuckerman’s brother) and his 
hygienist, perhaps the most pointed consideration in Roth’s work of the link between professional 
competence coded as masculine and sexual conduct comes in the glove factory episode in American 
Pastoral.  Here, Swede Lvov’s erotic interest in his daughter’s friend Rita is almost entirely sublimated 
into his demonstration of his work, the glove that his factory produces mediating an enveloping 
contact with Rita’s body. 
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exactly what I’d had in mind.  Particularly as I was one of those students of the Fifties who came to 
books by way of a fairly good but rather priestly literary education, in which writing poems and 
novels was assumed to eclipse all else in what we called ‘moral seriousness’” (22).  This “moral 
seriousness” is distinct from conventional respectability: “As it happened,” Roth continues, “our use 
of that word ‘moral’—in private conversations about our daily affairs as easily as in papers and 
classroom discussions—tended to conceal vast reaches of naïveté, and served frequently only to 
restore at a more prestigious cultural level the same respectability that one had imagined oneself in 
flight from in (of all places) the English department.” (22)  The English department, and the 
profession of writing itself, serve the young Roth as a place where it seems possible to be in 
respectable flight from conventional respectability.60  And yet “morality,” whatever its specific 
content, remains, for Roth, more of an exercise—an artifact of the classroom—than a descriptor of 
life as it is lived.  The flight from bourgeois prudery to a higher morality is merely a flight into a 
more sophisticated prudery.  The English department, it seems, is no place to rebel. 
But if a classroom disavowal of conventional morality is necessarily naïve, or at least ironic, 
Roth’s interpretation of the scandal surrounding Portnoy’s Complaint suggests that the conditions are 
somewhat different when a writer leaves the classroom to become a professional author, and that 
the idea of the respectable position, signified alike by one’s identity as writer and one’s identity as 
Jew, is itself a fertile ground for scandal.  His novel, he argues, came in for condemnation because it 
dared to introduce a psychological realism that recognizes the desire to be bad, itself honest and 
lustful, into the literary discourse of Jewishness, formerly dominated by symbolic treatments of the 
Jew as a representative of ethical conduct in a corrupt world, and the suffering that such conduct 
often entails. 
[T]he impious and unseemly in Portnoy’s Complaint would still not have been so 
alluring (and likewise, to many, so offensive) if it weren’t for the other key element 
                                                 
60 See Ross Posnock, Roth’s Rude Truth. 
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which, I think, worked to make the wayward hero a somewhat more interesting case 
than he might otherwise have been at that moment for those Americans whose own 
psychic armor had been battered by the Sixties: the man confessing to forbidden 
sexual acts and gross offenses against the family order was a Jew.  And that was true 
whether you read the novel as a novel or as a thinly veiled autobiography. [. . . . T]hat 
not even a Jew could put up a successful fight any longer against non-negotiable 
demands of crude anti-social appetite and vulgar aggressive fantasy. (23) 
 
The scandal of Portnoy’s Complaint, as Roth presents it here, arises from the failure of the label 
“Jewish writer” to signify a virtuous identity. 
The student Roth’s embrace of art as a noble calling, introduced and disparaged at the 
essay’s opening, depends upon a symbolic reading of literary production in which the act of writing 
itself assumes a moral seriousness.  While the essay goes on to disavow this position, casting writing 
as no more of an inherently moral occupation than anything else, the essay’s critique of the symbolic 
status of Jews in the work of Roth’s successful Jewish colleagues nonetheless understands craft in a 
way that imbues a particular mode of writing—psychological realism attentive to the internal 
contradictions of characters and the messiness of human desire—with a moral weight.  This mode 
of writing certainly has its own moral code, but it is a code which neither leads Roth’s writing to 
model ideal relations between people, nor to present some specimen of conduct for moral critique.  
Instead, the ethical case that Roth makes in “Imagining Jews” has to do with the responsibility to 
mimetic accuracy that this form imposes upon its author.  Roth’s essay, then, ultimately advocates 
fiction that judges only the presumption to judgment—or, in positive terms, fiction unclouded by 
the author’s own moral response to his or her characters.  The essay advocates, in other words, an 
ethic of professional objectivity. 
In “Imagining Jews,” the writer and the Jew are linked by their reputations for virtue.  In 
defending the writer’s prerogative to draft Jewish characters who are far from figures of virtue, Roth 
also offers an account of his own realization that to be an author is not itself a signal of personal 
morality.  For Roth, in this essay, to be a writer is just that: to be a writer, and not to possess a moral 
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status elevated above that of other professionals.  Indeed, Roth’s attempt here to disabuse his 
readers of any illusions that they might have had about the uprightness of the author hints at a larger 
dismissal of any such leap from professional to personal virtue (a separation thematically central to 
Portnoy’s complaint, whose Alexander Portnoy, no paragon of private respectability, is Assistant 
Commissioner of New York City’s Human Opportunity Commission).  And to be a Jew is likewise 
no guarantee of moral conduct.  But for a writer to treat either identity as if they did signify an a priori 
righteousness is to transgress against the professional obligation of the craft, the standard that 
justifies the writer’s other habitual transgressions.  “I am not interested in writing about what people 
should do for the good of the human race and pretending that’s what they do do,” Roth states 
elsewhere, “but writing about what they do indeed do, lacking the programmatic efficiency of the 
infallible theorists” (“Paris Review Interview” 133).  Writerly virtue, then, comes in the writer’s clear 
vision and in the ability to construct a fiction that differs from the events of the world but that 
nonetheless presents people as they are, not as the author would like them to be.  Roth’s ultimate 
obligation is to character, not to category. 
 The controversy that met Portnoy’s Complaint is then, in Roth’s explanation, a function of two 
related transgressions: the public airing of shameful private desire, based in a titillated confusion of 
fiction with confession (that is, the desire on the part of the mass reading public for a scandalous 
real life tale to disapprove of), and the novel’s refusal to represent Jews as symbols of virtue. 
Portnoy’s resonance, Roth argues, is based in the character’s (and Roth’s) refusal to conform to the 
powerful myth of the “good” Jew, paradigmatically oriented towards untroubled social integration, 
and in the consonance of this refusal with the popular late-sixties reevaluation of normative moral 
categories.  Roth’s point about the misreading of Portnoy as a confessional novel is twofold: 1) that 
he, Roth, is not Portnoy, but, 2) that he, or a Jewish man like him could be Portnoy.  That is, just as he 
was incorrect in his understanding of literature as “the domain of the truly virtuous” (22), so too are 
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his critics and the Jewish writers of Jewish characters he goes on to discuss incorrect in assuming 
that to be a Jew is to be a virtuous pursuer of righteousness, and only that.  By refusing to allow a 
Jew to be at the same time a character determined by the symbolic resonances of Judaism and a 
character with psychological complexity, Roth argues, the objects of his critique—primarily Saul 
Bellow and Bernard Malamud—fail to deal with the often contradictory forces of conventional 
symbolic significance and personal desire that make for strong characters motivated precisely by the 
conflict between the ideals of their identities and their actual lives.  Roth argues that Jewish people 
and Jewish characters remain Jewish even when doing “un-Jewish” things and thinking “un-Jewish” 
thoughts. 
In both the case of Roth’s understanding, as a student, that writing is an inherently moral 
occupation and the case of the elevation of the Jew to a moral ideal, Roth understands the 
substitution of typological legend for psychological and moral complexity not simply as a social 
problem, but as a professional failing.  Roth’s 1974 essay is concerned primarily with the problem of 
accurate characterization.  The writer’s task, as he constructs it, is to craft honest characters whose 
inner conflicts, while inevitably affected by the conditions of their lives, are not constrained by 
popular mythical constructions of their identities.  On one level, Roth’s critique of Bellow and 
Malamud hinges on the effects that their representations of Jews have for other Jews (namely, Roth, 
for whom this is a professional rather than a personal issue), whose own lives are constrained from 
free public expression by the myths that characters like The Victim’s Asa Leventhal and Pictures of 
Fidelman’s Arthur Fidelman perpetuate.  About Bellow, he writes: “reading Bellow, what does one 
find? That almost invariably his heroes are Jewish in vivid and emphatic ways when they are actors 
in dramas of conscience where matters of principle or virtue are at issue, but are by comparison only 
faintly marked by their Jewishness, if they are Jews at all, when appetite and quasi or outright 
libidinous adventure is at the heart of the novel” (24); about Malamud: “[f]or Malamud, generally 
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speaking, the Jew is innocent, passive, virtuous, and this to the degree that he defines himself or is 
defined by others as a Jew; the gentile, on the other hand, is characteristically corrupt, violent, and 
lustful, particularly when he enters a room or a store or a cell with a Jew in it” (25).  But on another 
level Roth faults these authors not for wrongs against Jews, for whom their novels’ reinforcement of 
myths of Jewish virtue reinforces constraining stereotypes about Jewish conduct, but for wrongs 
against their craft. “Imagining Jews” argues that however interesting the image of a Jew might be as 
a subject of fiction and a contribution to the background and social circumstance of a character, this 
image poses the danger of pre-empting an author’s imaginative freedom when the author imagines 
that it describes not an ideal, but a realistic account of the psychology or tendencies of actual Jews.  
Equally important as the harmful ideal of the good Jew, for the author of “Imagining Jews,” is the 
idea that writing exists in the service of a higher moral purpose and that there is therefore an ethical 
exculpation for lazily imagined characters.  Instead, the position outlined in “Imagining Jews” holds 
mimetic fidelity to the complicated psychology of actual people as the overriding ethical concern of 
the fiction writer.  While this framing relies upon moral presuppositions that are not specifically 
about fiction (i.e., that it is good to approach human character as it is, rather than as one believes it 
should be), it also subordinates broader moral concerns to their effects on fiction.  Malamud and 
Bellow, in other words, aren’t primarily at fault for holding limiting conceptions of the moral life of 
the Jew, but for letting these conceptions into their writing.  Writing is not the moral pursuit that 
Roth once understood it to be, but it nonetheless has a morality of its own, demanding rigor, 
precision, and unshielded perception for the sake of art.  This professional ethic applies to its 
practitioners and constitutionally avoids making claims on the ethics of others.61 
 For Roth, the conventions of Jewish representation, as expressed in the work of Saul Bellow 
and Bernard Malamud, are at odds with the full and accurate representation of the possibilities that 
                                                 
61 Cite Jonathan Freedman, Professions of Taste, JF’s articulation of the close relationship between fin-
de-siécle art for art’s sake and the professionalization of literary labor. 
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real life presents for Jewish transgression and Jewish libido—the final two-thirds of his essay aims to 
explain “just how strongly the Jew in the post-Holocaust decades has been identified in American 
fiction with righteousness and restraint, with the just and measured response rather than with those 
libidinous and aggressive activities which border on the socially acceptable and may even constitute 
criminal transgression” (24), and to critique this tendency from the position of a working novelist.  
But the question raised and never quite answered by the suggestive pairing of image of writer and 
image of Jew in the essay’s opening section is that of the extent to which writing itself is one of 
those “libidinous and aggressive activities” that the essay insists is open to Jews, and should be open 
to Jewish characters as well. Roth dismisses “the idea that literature was the domain of the truly 
virtuous” as a symptom of a young writer’s naïveté (22).  But he also maintains that there is a 
meaningful distinction between the artist’s depiction of transgression, and transgression itself.
 The connection between Roth’s discussion of the popular biographical interpretation of his 
novel and his broader point about the dominant image of the Jew as a figure for responsibility and 
restraint centers on the shared Jewish identity, and related transgressions, of author and protagonist.  
For scandal-hungry readers of Portnoy, the novel’s impact can be explained by the fact that “the man 
confessing to forbidden sexual acts and gross offenses against the family order was a Jew.  And that 
was true whether you read the novel as a novel or as a thinly veiled autobiography. [. . . .] Going wild 
in public is the last thing in the world that a Jew is expected to do[. . . .] He is not expected to make 
a spectacle of himself, either by shooting off his mouth, or by shooting off his semen, and certainly 
not by shooting off his mouth about shooting off his semen” (“Imagining Jews” 23).  Thus, the 
scandal of Portnoy’s Complaint is not just the scandal of personal disclosure suggested by the line that 
Jacqueline Susann delivered to Johnny Carson, that she would like to meet Roth, but she wouldn’t 
want to shake his hand (ibid. 22), it is also the scandal of Roth’s making of his literary art a burlesque 
of Jewish stereotypes and sexual mores.  In Roth’s reading of the novel’s reception, his Jewishness 
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and Portnoy’s are key to the popular connection of the writer with his protagonist—the resonance 
of the Jew as a symbol of virtue allows Jewishness to be the focus of readings that conflate the 
author and his character, commenting on the sexual transgressions of each.  That authorship is also 
a putatively virtuous profession amplifies Portnoy’s function as a boundary-breaking novel. 
Insofar as Roth’s essay concerns itself not only with the reception of his character, but with 
the confusion of his character’s exploits and his own, and insofar as his essay addresses not just any 
writer’s imagination of Jewish characters, but the ways in which Jewish writers imagine Jews, we 
might consider his essay as an embrace of the interpenetration of Jewish and authorial identity.  The 
essay features an ironic riff on the degraded state of deference to the artist in Roth’s time, in which 
Roth compares his reception by an agent of the charge department at Bloomingdale’s to that which 
Thomas Mann’s Aschenbach, decorated and pedophilic protagonist of Death In Venice, would 
presumably have received: 
Finally, in May, at about the time I was considering returning to New York, I 
telephoned down to Bloomingdale’s one day to try to correct an error that had 
turned up in my charge account for several months in succession. At the other end, 
the woman in the charge department gasped and said, “Philip Roth? Is this the Philip 
Roth?” Tentatively: “Yes.” “But you’re supposed to be in an insane asylum!” “Oh, 
am I?” I replied lightheartedly, but knowing full well that the charge department at 
Bloomingdale’s wouldn’t talk that way to Gustav von Aschenbach if he called to 
report an error in his charge account.  Oh no, Tadzio-lover though he was, it would 
still be, “Yes Herr von Aschenbach, oh we’re terribly sorry for any inconvenience, 
Herr von Aschenbach—oh do forgive us, Maestro, please.” (22) 
 
The status that Gustav von Aschenbach commands is rooted in a now defunct vision of the author 
as “maestro”: a serious person whose public profile is defined entirely by professional mastery.  The 
comedy in this scene, in which the Bloomingdale’s employee addresses Roth not in the guise of the 
corporate “we,” but as a private person who reads the celebrity pages and who thus casts Roth not 
as the private consumer whose charge account has an error, but as a character in a public drama, 
himself in error and out of place, comes from the collapse of high-status renown into low-status 
mass celebrity.  This adds up, however, not to a curmudgeonly diatribe about the state of the culture, 
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but to an account of the damage done to the writer’s work when too great a concern for status seeps 
into the writing, whether that concern is for the status of the writer or for the status of Jews.  The 
project of writing, as a Jewish writer, fiction that allows Jews to be recognizably Jewish at the same 
time as they transgress against conventional morality unites Roth’s practice as a writer with the 
subject of his writing. 
Mark Shechner’s comments on the difficulty of determining Roth’s take on his characters’ 
actions crystallizes the issue of how to handle the relationship between Roth’s Jewishness, his Jewish 
characters, and an apparently “Jewish” ethical focus in his fiction.  “I’m certain that Roth would be 
no more at ease being mistaken for a moral agent than he ever was when mistaken, as he has 
sometimes been, for an immoral one,” writes Shechner, “and while his books are brimful of ethical 
considerations—he is, after all, a Jewish writer—there is seldom a place where one can firmly place a 
finger on a moral issue and say for certain: ‘Here is where Roth comes down’” (4).  The 
compartmentalization of life and art (or life and work) as separate spheres of ethical evaluation 
reaches a crisis in Shechner’s argument at the point at which he labels Roth “after all, a Jewish 
writer.”  Here, the Jewishness of Roth’s career consists in his literary attention to the drama of 
ethical life (even in the absence of pronounced ethical judgment), but his career is not as easily 
incorporated into a Jewish frame that understands itself in terms of ethical conduct, precisely 
because it privileges drama (the literary) over ethics.  Being a Jewish writer, in this analysis, consists 
of balancing each side of the label: being “Jewishly” attuned to ethical dilemmas, while maintaining a 
“writerly” distance from direct interest in their resolution.  The Jewish identification of an author 
becomes an issue precisely at the moment that Jewishness crosses over from de facto component of 
an author’s biography to a component of their fiction itself—that is, when it is presumed to have 
ethical content that bears on the work itself.  In identifying Roth as he does—as a “Jewish writer” 
whose Jewishness leads to an interest in ethical problems but not in conclusive ethical judgment—
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Shechner echoes a key component of Roth’s construction of his professional self: his indeterminate 
relationship with a Jewishness that is at once distanced from his writing self and the intimate subject 
of his fiction, of a piece with the playful “he is and he isn’t” identification of Roth with his 
protagonists.  
The audience, in 1963’s “Writing About Jews,” was a concept that the writer was obliged to 
reject for that audience’s own good—a fundamentally social and political force whose interests were 
aligned against those of writing, and in 1974’s “Imagining Jews” the audience became a counterpart 
to the personalized author, inappropriately interested in the writer’s biography, rather than the work. 
By Roth’s 1984 interview for the Paris Review, however, he portrays the “ordinary reader” as in 
some ways beside the point, and in most ways a mystery to the writer.62  In this interview, Philip 
Roth stresses the limits of the novelist’s power to affect the world outside the novel: 
But don’t you feel powerless as a writer in America? 
Writing novels is not the road to power.  I don’t believe that, in any society, 
novels effect serious changes in anyone other than the handful of people who are 
writers, whose own novels are of course seriously affected by other novelists’ novels.  
I can’t see anything like that happening to the ordinary reader, nor would I expect it 
to. 
 
What do novels do then? 
To the ordinary reader? Novels provide readers with something to read.  At 
their best writers change the way readers read.  That seems to me the only realistic 
expectation.  It also seems to me quite enough.  Reading novels is a deep and 
singular pleasure, a gripping and mysterious human activity that does not require any 
more moral or political justification than sex. 
 
But are there no aftereffects? 
[. . . .]  If you ask me if I want my fiction to change anything in the culture, the 
answer is still no.  What I want is to possess my readers while they are reading my 
                                                 
62 The Paris Review interview, intended to provide readers with a window on the writer’s personal 
process, as well as on her or his thoughts about writing in general, is perhaps the pre-eminent 
American venue for authorial self-mythologization in this period.  Usha Wilbers, in her fascinating 
review of the magazine’s editorial practices, argues that, considering the significant degree of 
interviewee involvement in the Review’s editorial process, Paris Review interviews would be better 
considered as conscious constructions of a writer’s professional mystique, recording not only the 
writer’s responses during the period of the interview, but also their reflective revision for the 
historical record, than as authoritative factual statements of these writers’ creative practice. 
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book—if I can, to possess them in ways other writers don’t.  Then let them return, 
just as they were, to a world where everybody else is working to change, persuade, 
tempt, and control them. (147) 
 
Whatever the writer’s political or social goals, Roth argues, the novel is certainly not the best means 
to achieve them.  The novel’s power is private and the duration of its effects, brief.  Moreover, in 
those instances in which novels do affect changes in the world, those changes are likely to have little 
to do with the author’s will: “Novels do influence behavior, shape opinion, alter conduct—a book 
can, of course, change somebody’s life—but that’s because of a choice made by the reader to use the 
fiction for purposes of his own (purposes that might appal the novelist) and not because the novel is 
incomplete without the reader’s taking action” (“Interview on Zuckerman” 155).  The novelist acts 
on the reader as reader, Roth argues, and on the actions of reading and writing, and that is “quite 
enough.”  For Roth, the issue with the moral or political implications of the novel is not only that 
the writer can’t influence the world in predictable ways, or even that the novel is an almost singularly 
inefficient means of staging a political or social intervention, but also that such action is to him, as a 
novelist, undesirable.  Against the pervasive apparatus that acts outside of fiction to persuade a 
reader to a particular action (to buy a product, support a candidate, to act morally; in short, to do 
something), Roth conceives of the novel as something that doesn’t ask the reader to do anything at 
all.  Instead, the novel’s demands are ontological: rather than acting, the reader is to surrender their 
action—to be possessed by the novel (and thus by its writer)—severed from the world outside the 
text and existing in the imaginative world that the text generates. 
This programmatic separation of the reader from the author denies any unmediated 
obligation between one and the other.  Roth’s desire to possess his readers and then return them 
right where they began is a matter of aesthetic compulsion.  The possessed reader doesn’t owe 
anything to the author or even to the book, he or she simply can’t put it down.  Similarly, Roth, in 
this model, doesn’t appear to owe anything to the reader (even a good time).  His obligation, as 
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author, is to the object he creates.  Roth’s contention that reading doesn’t ask anything in particular 
of the reader outside of their attention is signally important to his construction of the moral status of 
the writer, as writer.  If the effects of writing are limited to the period during which the reader holds 
the book in her or his hands, then the writer’s chief moral responsibility falls not to the community 
of readers, on whom his influence is at best obscure, but rather to the community of writers, and, 
more directly, to the craft of writing itself. 
 
 “How exhaustive [she] had meant to be [. . .] with the ringing words, ‘higher education’”: 
Professionals and Amateurs in The Ghost Writer 
The primary conflict affecting Nathan Zuckerman, The Ghost Writer’s protagonist, is a 
conflict between the demands of his family (to an extent metonymic for the Jewish community) and 
the demands of his art.  This conflict is staged as a contest between two figures: his biological father, 
“Doc” Zuckerman (“for a time his class-conscious little boy used to think that if only there had 
been no quotas and he’d become a real physician [instead of a chiropodist], they would have greeted 
him as ‘Doctor Zuckerman’” [84–5]), and the writer E. I. Lonoff, for whom the young writer feels 
“a son’s girlish love for the man of splendid virtue and high achievement who understands life, and 
who understands the son, and who approves” (56–7).  A central theme of The Ghost Writer, then, 
concerns the relationship between professional success and parental approval: a question, 
fundamentally, about the divergence of success within a profession from the symbolic resonance of 
such success outside of the profession’s social boundaries. The apparent conflict between 
professional and personal loyalties is closely connected with the question of what Zuckerman’s 
Jewishness has to do with his writing, that is, whether he writes as a representative of the Jewish 
people, with the obligation to be a credit (or at least not a disgrace) to the community, or whether, as 
a writer, his relationship to Jewishness is primarily one of the exploitation of the biographical and 
social resources of his Jewishness for artistic production. 
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The novel finds its protagonist, Nathan Zuckerman, at the house of the novelist Lonoff, a 
Jewish writer out of favor with the New York literati, who lives a life of professional dedication and 
personal deprivation in a Berkshires house near the artist colony where Zuckerman sits in residence.  
Zuckerman arrives at Lonoff’s primed for professional and paternal guidance.  Before leaving for 
the Quahsay Colony, Zuckerman began a quarrel with his father over the contents of a story, 
“Higher Education,” which draws on an episode of family scandal (about which more below), which 
quarrel remains unresolved for the duration of the narrative.  At Lonoff’s, however, Zuckerman 
finds not one but two models for considering his predicament: “the great man” himself (3), who, 
too, struggles to balance personal and professional obligations, and Amy Bellette (perhaps the 
novel’s most well-known invention), a young writer like himself, newly graduated from Athena 
College where she studied writing under Lonoff, in frustrated love with the self-denying author, and, 
Zuckerman fantasizes, Anne Frank, absorbed into belles lettres, still alive and living under an assumed 
name.  How Jewishness figures into the secular profession of writing is, for Zuckerman, a live 
question.  Zuckerman’s relationship with Lonoff consists, in part, in his attempt to pin down a 
“family resemblance” between Lonoff, Isaac Babel, and the fictional Jewish author Felix Abravanel, 
a resemblance explicitly channeled through the authors’ shared Jewishness.  “I think of you as the 
Jew who got away,” Zuckerman tells Lonoff.  “You got away from Russia and the pogroms.  You 
got away from the purges—and Babel didn’t. You got away from Palestine and the homeland.  You 
got away from Brookline and the relatives.  You got away from New York— [. . . .] Away from all 
the Jews, and a story by you without a Jew in it is unthinkable” (50–51).  Zuckerman’s burning 
question for this figure of literary mastery who pairs personal Jewish disaffiliation with literary 
concern for the Jewish subject, is just what this story of Lonoff’s career proves, and, implicitly, what 
it might suggest about Zuckerman’s own fate as a writer and as a Jewish son.  Lonoff’s answer, 
however, is less than completely revealing: “He thought about it for a moment. ‘It proves why the 
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young rabbi in Pittsfield can’t live with the idea that I won’t be “active.”’ I waited for more, but in 
vain” (ibid.).  The riddle of the “Jewish writer,” as such, whose relationship with Judaism flows 
exclusively through his work and isn’t paired with biographical ties to the Jewish community is a 
question, Lonoff’s answer suggests, not for the writer, but for the Jewish community—for the rabbi 
for whom Jewish literary activity finds its necessary counterpart in activity within the synagogue 
community.  For Zuckerman, however, this is not enough.  His own engagement with this issue 
focuses on the convergence of personal and professional Jewish identities, and he approaches 
Lonoff not only in search of a professional mentor, but, as the novel makes clear, of a surrogate 
father who might provide an alternative mediation of his relationship with Jewishness. 
But if Lonoff and Doc Zuckerman represent two possible fathers for Zuckerman, the 
literary and the biological, a third character, Judge Leopold Wapter, extends Zuckerman’s Jewish 
concerns from the family, immediate and metaphoric, to the broader Jewish community.  Wapter’s 
authority in the Jewish community distinctly diverges from that of the rabbis who bear the brunt of 
Roth’s 1963 argument.  Wapter’s significance in the Jewish community depends upon his 
significance in the non-Jewish world.  Thus the Judge, unlike Roth’s rabbis, is a voice speaking from 
what appears to be a position analogous to the author’s own, or at least one which he assumes the 
writer aspires to occupy: one of social eminence underwritten by professional success, and of 
personal, rather than professional interest in the Jewish community.  Wapter appears in the novel as 
a figure of Jewish professional attainment, and as an éminence grise of the Newark Jewish community: 
“after [actor Robert] Ellenstein and Rabbi Joachim Prinz perhaps the city’s most admired Jew” (96).  
While Zuckerman’s relationships are structured in terms of direct descent, Judge Wapter’s claim on 
Zuckerman’s loyalty is, for the writer, less clear.  In contradistinction to the idealized reader of 
Roth’s essays and interviews, one who would respond to Zuckerman’s writing as an appeal to their 
individual sensibilities abstracted from the obligations of social affiliation, Wapter reads 
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Zuckerman’s story in the capacity of a social representative.  “I do believe that, like all men, the 
artist has a responsibility to his fellow man, to the society in which he lives, and to the cause of truth 
and justice,” Wapter writes to Zuckerman. “With that responsibility and that alone as my criterion, I 
would attempt to give [your father] an opinion on the suitability for publication in a national 
magazine of your latest fictional effort” (101). 
As Zuckerman describes it, the story titled “Higher Education,” is at once a major step in his 
career—“the most ambitious I had written—some fifteen thousand words” (79)—and a troubled 
link between the writer’s professional and family lives: a story “that borrowed from our family 
history instances of what my exemplary father took to be the most shameful and disreputable 
transgressions of family decency and trust” (81). Zuckerman’s story, summarized in the novel, 
concerns a family conflict between, on the one hand, a woman’s aspirations for her children’s 
professional success, and on the other, her brother’s desire for a smooth and easy, if not 
professionally distinguished, life.  Centering around a family dispute over the disposition of an 
inheritance, “Higher Education” essentially retells an event in the life of the fictional writer’s family.  
Per Zuckerman’s synopsis, the writer’s aunt Essie, left a large sum of money to put towards the 
higher education of her children by his grandmother, Meema Chaya, would like to use the money to 
send her sons to medical school.  His uncle Sidney, however, counts on using the inheritance to buy 
a parking lot in downtown Newark, for a source of comparatively low-maintenance income.  The 
dispute, opposing Essie’s dreams of her family’s upward class mobility against Sidney’s desire for 
continued ease and a steady income, aligns the majority of the family with Essie, leaving Sidney 
defended only by his wife, his mistress, and the teenaged Nathan.  The argument eventually issues in 
a lawsuit, “whose outcome hinged on how exhaustive Meema Chaya had meant to be in her will 
with the ringing words ‘higher education’” (82).  Sidney wins the case but is forced to sell his lot to 
the mob for a tenth of its value and subsequently, to the family’s shame, dies in a non-Jewish 
181 
 
woman’s bed.  Essie puts her sons through medical school without the inheritance, selling siding and 
shingles to raise the funds.  At the story’s end, Essie, in a movie theater on a rare break from her 
sales canvassing, raises a hammer that she keeps for personal protection, poised to break the wrist of 
a stranger in the next seat who, getting too familiar, has reached his hand onto her knee. 63 
The story, “long for a magazine,” and thus, Nathan imagines, unlikely to be published by 
one (90), signifies a peculiar point in the advancement of Zuckerman’s career: following on a write-
up of Zuckerman as one of “A Dozen to Keep Your Eye On” for the Saturday Review and preceding 
his residency at the fictional Quahsay artists’ colony, “Higher Education” marks the beginning of 
Zuckerman’s passage from story writer to novelist—from the appearance of his name among other 
names in a magazine’s table of contents and his face among other faces in the Saturday Review spread 
to the production of texts to be produced and sold as a single volume, marketed primarily under his 
own name.  This, I would argue, is a crucial shift for the novel’s treatment of “Jewish writing.”  As a 
story that might be published in a national magazine, as Judge Wapter’s letter makes clear, the story 
might be understood as a foray into gentile cultural venues: a mode of representing Jews to others.  
At the same time, such publication links the author’s cultural capital with that of the magazine.  The 
magazine brings the author’s work to the attention of those who might not otherwise have read it, 
rendering recognition the author’s name less responsible for bringing the work to public notice.  As 
a story long for magazine publication, however, “Higher Education” represents a move toward 
                                                 
63 The drama between Essie and Sidney replays what recent scholars have seen as a transition as a 
move in the middle class away from ownership of productive capital and towards the possession of 
intellectual capital in the form of skills.  Where Sidney wants to use the money to buy land on which 
to build a parking lot, Essie uses it to finance her sons’ acquisition of the social and symbolic capital 
of a professional degree.  That Sidney’s parking lot is expropriated by organized crime seems to 
verify the prudence of her decision.  For a further elaboration of how this socio-economic dynamic 
affected the American middle class literary imaginary, see Schryer, Fantasies of the New Class, and 
Hoberek, Twilight of the Middle Class.  The work that Essie undertakes for the benefit of her sons’ 
professional opportunities is also a gendered instance of the deferred gratification of social 
advancement.  In this sense Roth’s novel is briefly in dialogue with Tillie Olsen’s stories discussed in 
the second chapter of this dissertation. 
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independence from print publications in which any individual work shares space with other features 
of the publication, including ads, event listings, reviews, and non-fiction articles.  If “Higher 
Education” is not quite novel-length, it might nonetheless be fit for publication in a collection 
organized under the rubric of the author’s identity.  The significance of the shift to single volume 
publication (and of the story’s liminality in this regard) is in the increased centrality that such 
publication gives to the author as a key link between the text and the unwritten world.  If magazine 
publication brings the story to its readers by situating it among other texts, the single volume, 
through the mechanisms of book tours, alphabetical shelving, cover design, advertising, and author 
interviews (surely among others), advances the author’s name as a primary reservoir of cultural 
capital.  Such a configuration of a text’s identity, in which the author becomes more clearly the final 
agent of responsibility for the text (consider the difference, for example, between a letter to the 
editor and a letter to the author) appears to offer more solid ground for considering the author’s 
biographical Jewishness in understanding the text’s reception.  The Ghost Writer, it is important to 
note, has it both ways.  First published over two issues of the New Yorker, it at once plays on the 
cultural capital of the magazine as a pre-eminent venue for cultural production with a tone of 
worldly and sophisticated gentility and a significant readership; asserts Roth’s own cultural 
significance as a figure who can command so much of such precious literary real estate; calls 
attention from the magazine to the writer through the device of serialization (which extends, in fact, 
over the rest of the Zuckerman series and on into others of Roth’s works, including the biographical 
The Facts, which features a rebuttal from Zuckerman); and flies under the writer’s own flag in its 
eventual issue by Farrar, Straus and Giroux as a single volume. 
Sent to Zuckerman’s idol, Lonoff, the story proves Zuckerman’s chops: “‘Look, I told [my 
wife] Hope this morning: Zuckerman has the most compelling voice I’ve encountered in years, 
certainly for somebody starting out. [. . . .] I don’t mean style’—raising a finger to make the 
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distinction. ‘I mean voice: something that begins at around the back of the knees and reaches well 
above the head” (72).  To Zuckerman’s father, however, the story is something entirely different: an 
exposure of family shame and grist for the antisemitic mill.  Indeed, the motivating conflict of the 
novel—the event which sends Zuckerman in search of a “father” to approve of his literary 
activity—is the conflict between the professional success that Zuckerman’s story represents and the 
father’s unexpected refusal to respond to this success with approval.  As Zuckerman describes it, he 
is blindsided by his father’s chagrin: “Oh, what sitting ducks I had for parents!  A son of theirs 
would have had to be a half-wit or a sadist not to make them proud.  And I was neither” (80).  
“Higher Education” thus marks the moment at which Zuckerman discovers the limits of 
professional success as a guarantor of parental pride—his first inkling that the demands of his 
professional dedication might be at odds with the desires of his family, and that staking a claim for 
professional autonomy could mean claiming autonomy from his background. 
Zuckerman does not consciously make a bid for autonomy from the Jewish community by 
composing “Higher Education.”  The story seems to him a fulfillment of the same desire for a 
child’s professional achievement that motivates Essie as he sends it to his parents to stoke their 
pride, and as a celebration of the Jewish milieu in which he grew up.  Nathan Zuckerman is no 
alienated intellectual on the model of an earlier generation of Jewish writers (like, for example, 
Delmore Schwartz)—he is instead very much at home with his parents and surprised that they don’t 
read his story as an affectionate gesture.  So if Zuckerman imagines the story not to be a display of 
alienated artistic consciousness but rather of intimate familiarity with his family’s way of conducting 
itself, his failure to anticipate his father’s reaction comes from a break that he doesn’t recognize 
between professionalization and family pride.  Since the story frames Essie’s desire for children’s 
professional success as her most clearly expressed and zealously pursued desire, then that success is 
a way for them to display their affection for Essie.  But her sons’ passage through medical school is 
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depersonalized: their achievement reflects well on her but their work itself has nothing to do with 
her.  Zuckerman’s story, however, makes the family’s life the center of his professional performance.  
This tension between affection displayed by professional achievement and affection displayed through 
professional achievement is foregrounded in a turn of phrase that appears both in Roth’s essay, 
“Writing About Jews,” and in Zuckerman’s conversation with his father: “As I see it,” Roth writes in 
Commentary, “one of the rabbi’s limitations is that he cannot recognize a bear hug when one is being 
administered right in front of his eyes” (197); and in The Ghost Writer, with Roth’s rabbi transmuted 
into Zuckerman’s father, “‘I thought,’ I said angrily, ‘I was administering a bear hug, to tell you the 
truth’” (94).  In both cases, the author characterizes his story as a bear hug in order to deflect 
criticism of the story’s depiction of the Jewish community.  If the story’s objectors read it as unduly 
harsh or too focused on those actions of Jewish characters that defy moral convention, the author’s 
defense casts those aspects of the story as part of a vigorous embrace of all that is messy in lived 
Jewish life.  The image of the bear hug, however, is not entirely innocent.  Suggesting more a 
smothering intimacy than a gentle exchange of physical affection, the bear hug is excessive, 
overwhelming, animalistic—an aggressive display of fondness.  But more striking than the simple 
fact of the bear hug is the verb that describes its performance.  The hug is not “given,” or even 
“hugged,” but “administered,” a description that divorces it from colloquial usage (when was the last 
time you were “administered” a hug by someone you love?) and casts hugging as a transaction 
subject to professional norms.  The idea of an administered hug suggests a distance antipathetic to 
the closeness that a hug otherwise necessarily implies.  The hug administered is the hug managed, 
shifted from a personal to a clinical discursive context and delivered by the expert to his charge.  
Perhaps in the bear hug the dosage is off.  All the same, however awkward and possessive the 
language of administration may be, the image of the hug itself still implies real affection on the part 
of the writer to subject.  It is hard to say whether the administered bear hug, in the transition from 
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Roth’s authorial voice to the voice of his character, becomes an object of self-parody.  But in either 
context—that of the essay or that of the novel—the term expresses an intimacy rendered 
uncomfortable by the lay / professional divide that it must bridge. 
Wapter’s response to Zuckerman’s story is an exercise in the performance of social 
obligation.  In his letter to Zuckerman, as in his courtroom, the judge sits in judgment as a 
representative of social responsibility.  Moreover, since the judge’s letter was composed as a favor to 
Zuckerman’s father, the judge, in writing it, places his own agency at the service of Doc Zuckerman.  
Judge Wapter’s employment as the father’s representative, like his assumption of the ability to judge 
“the suitability [of ‘Higher Education’] for publication in a national magazine,” extends the structure 
of his official duties beyond the courtroom.  Just as Wapter’s role as a judge depends upon him 
sublimating his (aesthetically responsive) self into the exercise of official responsibility (a fealty to 
the community’s trust and its legislated will), the letter that he writes to Nathan frames his response 
to the story in terms of responsibility, both to Zuckerman’s father and to the wider Jewish 
community. 
This chain of obligation, in particular, that implicates Nathan in a way that is harder for him 
to escape than the simple censure of the Jewish community’s doyens.  Begging Wapter’s 
intervention with his son, Zuckerman’s father expends social capital.  “To approach the judge, my 
father had first to contact a lofty cousin of ours—an attorney, a suburbanite, and a former Army 
colonel who had been president for several years of the judge’s Newark temple” (97).  When Nathan 
receives Wapter’s letter, his father’s agency has thus been filtered from the father through cousin 
Teddy and Wapter himself, incurring social debt for the elder Zuckerman at each step.  Wapter, too, 
expends a certain amount of capital, which is also added to Zuckerman’s father’s account.  
Answering Teddy’s request, the judge risks a blow to his ego if Nathan refuses (as he does) to reply.  
Indeed, the judge’s entire role in the story is defined through acts undertaken (or frames as being 
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undertaken) on other people’s behalf: as judge, he acts as an agent of the state; recommending 
Nathan for college admission, he extends himself in support of Nathan and Newark’s Jewish youth; 
writing to Nathan, he performs a favor for Nathan’s father.  But where his earlier composition of a 
letter recommending Nathan for admission to the University of Chicago cements his standing in the 
community as an emissary between Newark’s Jews and the gentile-controlled world of professional 
attainment and creates a meaningful and productive relationship of patronage to the younger 
generation, the fact that Nathan can ignore his rebuke not only suggests that his ties to Newark’s 
promising youth are not as strong or as mutually felt as he might imagine, but also recasts the 
exercise in self-aggrandizement that was his publicized recommendation of five Jewish Newark 
youths as merely instrumental in the ascent of the young generation, if it matters at all.  Thus, when 
Zuckerman’s mother contacts him at his writer’s colony to find out why he hasn’t responded to the 
judge’s query, it is not only his father, but also Teddy, who is “a little fit to be tied” (105). 
Though the judge’s questions to Zuckerman (e.g., “1. If you had been living in Nazi 
Germany in the thirties, would you have written such a story? [. . . .] 7. What in your character makes 
you associate so much of life’s ugliness with the Jewish people?” [102–3]) primarily invoke 
Zuckerman’s responsibility as a Jew to other Jews, the concern that sends Zuckerman searching for 
paternal validation in the Jewish author E. I. Lonoff is more immediate and more personal: that he is 
dodging an obligation to his father, whose support of his son is more tangible and more emotionally 
significant than the more nebulous support offered by the Jewish community.  “[W]hat about sons?” 
Zuckerman asks himself, straining to balance his filial disobedience with professional responsibility: 
It wasn’t Flaubert’s father or Joyce’s father who had impugned me for my 
recklessness—it was my own.  Nor was it the Irish he claimed I had maligned and 
misrepresented, but the Jews.  Of which I was one.  Of which, only some five 
thousand days past, there had been millions more. 
 Yet each time I tried again to explain my motives, the angrier with him I 
became.  It’s you who humiliated yourself—now live with it, you moralizing ass!  




The anger that Zuckerman expresses at his father, “moralizing ass,” who has humiliated himself, 
reflects some level of guilt at refusing to help his father to a graceful exit from his obligations to 
Wapter and Teddy.  Only Nathan, by answering Wapter’s letter, can repay the debt that his father 
had incurred on Nathan’s behalf.  To get his father out of this bind, however, would be to submit to 
the validity of judge Wapter’s “court” and to betray the validity of Lonoff’s judgment of his talents.  
It would also mean acceding to the relevance of his parents’ ethnic network of social uplift to his 
own shot at success in the ostensibly meritocratic field of literature.  He doesn’t answer the letter. 
What this leads to, in effect, is a broader critique of the objectivity of professional judgment, 
ultimately extending from the legal professions to the profession of writing.  Wapter’s judgment of 
Zuckerman’s story is predicated on the sublimation of his own aesthetic response into a 
depersonalized paradigm of social responsibility; Lonoff’s judgment of Zuckerman’s voice is rooted 
in the qualifications offered by his talents and sensibility, and by his fastidious sense of responsibility 
to serious writing.  “He [Lonoff] did not do justice to a writer unless he read him on consecutive 
days and for no less than three hours at a sitting.  [. . . .]  Sometimes, when he unavoidably had to 
miss a day, he would go back to begin over again, rather than be nagged by the sense that he was 
wronging a serious author” (67).  Judge Wapter’s critical authority derives from his respectability—
the close match between his own judgments and those condoned by his community, and the 
substantial overlap between his symbolic and practical professional achievements and the organized 
interests of the Jewish community.  In exercising judicial judgment, he repays his debt to 
community.  All the same, Wapter is a figure of ridicule in the novel precisely for his overweening 
extension of his authority as a judge from the judicial bench to the reading chair.  To the extent that 
Judge Wapter understands his judicial authority to certify the authority of his judgments over other 
areas of experience, he presents a burlesque of the Jamesian author, specialized generalist, a figure of 
“human expertness” (Attridge 31).  Lonoff’s judgment, more wholly contained within the sphere of 
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his professional expertise, repays a different kind of debt: that incurred by another writer’s talent and 
craft. 
Zuckerman’s father and Judge Wapter are both characteristically interested readers.  If 
readings governed by the category of art demand a degree of disinterested critical appraisal, then the 
interest in how Zuckerman’s story reflects on the Jews and, more narrowly, on Zuckerman’s family, 
exemplify an unprofessional, vernacular approach to literature.  These non-professional readers, 
however, are not only readers, but also practical theorists of reading, filtering their readings through 
the imagined consciousness of an altogether other, oppositional reader.  Consider, for example, the 
reaction of Zuckerman’s father to his son’s story, which vacillates between universalistic and 
particularistic theories of literary reception: 
[F]rom a lifetime of experience I happen to know what ordinary people will think 
when they read something like this story.  And you don’t.  You can’t.  You have been 
sheltered from it all your life.  [. . . .]  It’s not your fault that you don’t know what 
gentiles think when they read something like this.  But I can tell you.  They don’t 
think about how it’s a great work of art.  They don’t know about art.  Maybe I don’t 
know about art myself.  Maybe none of our family does, not the way that you do.  
But that’s the point.  People don’t read art—they read about people. (91–2) 
 
For Nathan’s father, the gentile reader is at once universal (the “ordinary people” whose reaction he 
projects) and particular: “Nathan, your story, as far as Gentiles are concerned, is about one thing and 
one thing only.  Listen to me before you go.  It’s about kikes.  Kikes and their love of money.  
That’s all our good Christian friends will see, I guarantee you” (94).  This reading doesn’t endow the 
text with the power to transform social understandings or to affect social change, but rather to 
reinforce existing prejudices.  The distinction between reading about art and reading about people is, 
in this context, another way of talking about the power or powerlessness of art.  In this 
configuration, interestingly, it is Nathan whose commitment to craft, echoing Roth’s statements in 
contemporary interviews, assumes that the danger of literature is limited, while his father assumes 
that the story represents a real threat.  Considering the emphasis that Roth’s interviews and essays 
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place on the importance of rounded characters, the greater problem with the elder Zuckerman’s 
analysis is not his contention that “people [. . .] read about people”—that is, that they read through 
the literariness of a text to its characters—but the collapse of “people” into the category “kikes.”  In 
this theory of the text’s reception, Zuckerman’s father leaps from an understanding of fiction that 
Roth might conceivably approve to one close to that which Roth denounces in Bellow and 
Malamud: the understanding that reads through the idiosyncrasy of written characters and past the 
author’s creative action to draw generalizations, from characters, about the world outside the text. 
The father’s and the judge’s reactions to Zuckerman’s story are the reactions of non-
specialists.  They thus, in a sense, represent a universalized (i.e., untutored, popular) response, as 
opposed to the particular response of initiates to the world of literary exegesis.  At the same time, 
the local controversy surrounding the story also revolves around different questions of particularist 
interpretive paradigms: Zuckerman experiences his story’s reception by readers whose interpretive 
lens focuses on representations of Jews, and on the question of whether a given work is “good for 
the Jews.”  Roth’s own comments on how he imagines his audience suggest that, contrary to Doc 
Zuckerman’s concern with the gentile response to his son’s story, Roth would to hesitate to project 
what a general reader might think about his story, but finds the imagined response of a Jewish 
readership to be a productive component of his professional life: 
I’ve had two audiences, a general audience and a Jewish audience.  I have virtually no 
sense of my impact upon a general audience, nor do I really know who these people 
are.  [. . . .]  I don’t think anymore about them when I’m at work than they think 
about me when they’re at work.  They’re as remote as the onlookers are to a chess 
player concentrating on the board and his opponent’s game. [. . . .] 
 Counterbalancing the general audience has been a Jewish audience, affording 
me the best of both worlds.  With my Jewish audience, I feel intensely their 
expectations, disdain, delight, criticism, their wounded self-love, their healthy 
curiosity—what I imagine the writer’s awareness is in the capital of a small country 
where culture is thought to mean as much as politics, where culture is politics: some 
little nation perpetually engaged in evaluating its purpose, contemplating its meaning, 
joking away its shame, and sensing itself imperiled in one way or another. (“Interview 




The turn Roth’s analogy takes toward the artist’s place within a state places his Jewish audience (and 
the Jewish community in general) in an interestingly liminal position.  Indeed, the analogy is almost 
unnecessary. Roth could just as easily argue that these characteristics apply directly to the Jewish 
community: “For Jews…” or “For American Jews, culture is thought to mean as much as politics,” 
etc.  Instead, Roth’s analogy privileges citizenship in a nation over cultural affiliation, just as he 
argues that his relationship with a Jewish audience furnishes him with a unique imaginative resource: 
that of the community’s engaged attention.  That he re-imagines this audience in national terms both 
links literary to national projects and indicates a less fraught relationship between Roth as writer and 
the concept of citizenship than the one which links Roth’s writing to his ethnicity.  It also gestures 
toward the gap between the claims that ethnic and civic affiliation can make upon the writer—
namely, those dictated by the author’s relationship to state power a subject of particular resonance 
during this period of Roth’s career, at which time he was taking regular trips to Prague, and was 
actively engaged in arranging the translation and publication, in the West, of writers working in 
communist countries.64 
Compare this with Roth’s earlier (1969) comment that he doesn’t write for any particular 
audience: 
To write to be read and to write for an ‘audience’ are two different matters.  If you 
mean by an audience a particular readership which can be described in terms of its 
education, politics, religion, or even by its literary tone, the answer is no.  When I’m 
at work I don’t really have any group of people in mind whom I want to 
communicate with; what I want is for the work to communicate itself as fully as it 
can, in accordance with its own intentions.  Precisely so that it can be read, but on its 
own terms.  If one can be said to have an audience in mind, it is not any special interest 
group whose beliefs and demands one either accedes to or challenges, but those ideal 
                                                 
64 Roth’s fiction treats this most directly in Operation Shylock, in which the issue of authorial identity is 
at once a matter of nationality, ethnicity, the confluence of the two (the book’s protagonist, “Philip 
Roth,” runs a mission for the Mossad, mobilizing his Jewishness for the interests of the Israeli state), 
the stability of one’s sense of self (Roth begins the novel suffering a psychological break caused by 
Halcion, a sleeping pill that he has been prescribed), and transferability (the novel’s Roth is 
impersonated by another “Philip Roth,” masquerading as the famous author to advance the cause of 
“Diasporism,” and whom Roth renames Moishe Pipik. 
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readers whose sensibilities have been totally given over to the writer, in exchange for 
his seriousness. (“On Portnoy’s Complaint” 15) 
 
Here, Roth constructs the concept of audience as a threat to the integrity of the work, and to its 
autonomy from political concerns, broadly conceived.  On this understanding, the audience (as 
opposed to the reader) can only obtrude into the writer’s aesthetic design, prompting the writer to 
make choices that are not in the best interest of the work, which, the true object of the writer’s 
vocation, must exist as an end in itself.  Roth claims the novel as a refuge from the temptations and 
manipulations that characterize commercial and political culture, but not a refuge from the author’s 
control.  Stressing the limits of the novel’s power to generate lasting and predictable effects on its 
readers, Roth instead emphasizes the particular interchange through which the novelist exercises 
power over the reader, to which the reader consents, for as long as the reader chooses to continue 
reading the book.  But if the novel’s power to shape the world is (by the author) unpredictable, the 
pleasures of writing a novel are nonetheless connected to the pleasures of power.  At its root, Roth’s 
understanding of the pleasure of authorship is linked with the free exercise of his talent. 
Max Weber’s comments in “Science as Vocation” are particularly relevant to the conception 
of writing that Roth presents here and in “Imagining Jews,” according to which the writer’s 
professional performance depends upon a clear-eyed and objective social vision.  “[I]n the realm of 
science,” writes Weber:  
the only person to have “personality” is the one who is wholly devoted to his subject. And 
this is true not just of science.  We know of no great artist who has ever done 
anything other than devoted himself to his art and to that alone. [. . . .] Nor is it the 
sign of a personality to go on to ask: How can I show that I am more than just a 
mere “expert”? How can I manage to prove that I can say something, in form or 
substance, that no one has ever said? [. . . .] It always diminishes the man who asks 
such questions instead of allowing his inner dedication to his task and to it alone to 
raise him to the height and the dignity of the cause he purports to serve.  And in this 
respect, the situation with the artist is no different. (10–11) 
 
In Weber’s terms, the personality of the scientist or the artist inheres in their work to the exclusion 
of their non-professional life.  Indeed, Lonoff, whose professional persona is bound up with a 
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regimen of personal self-denial personifies this Weberian professional ideal.  But this model of 
vocational dedication cannot work for Zuckerman.  Though early in the novel Zuckerman takes 
stock of Lonoff’s life and muses, “All of one’s concentration and flamboyance and originality 
reserved for the grueling, exalted, transcendent calling.  I looked around and thought, This is how I 
will live” (5), the stark choice between “perfection of the life, or of the work” posed in Yeats’s 
poem, “The Choice,” (wryly referenced by Zuckerman in describing his failure, as a young magazine 
salesman, to be propositioned by any housewives) is not conducive to Zuckerman’s writing.  As 
Lonoff acknowledges in The Ghost Writer’s first chapter, “an unruly personal life will probably better 
serve a writer like Nathan than walking in the woods and startling the deer.  His work has 
turbulence—that should be nourished, and not in the woods” (33). 
In the context of the novel, what Lonoff identifies as “turbulence,” encompasses not only 
the trials of Zuckerman’s romantic life, but also the connection between his Jewishness and his art.  
The ascetic devotion with which Lonoff abjures literary fame implicitly rejects biographical keys to 
reading his work (the writer “chose not to be photographed, as though to associate his face with his 
fiction were a ridiculous irrelevancy”), but leads to work which engenders, in Zuckerman, not only a 
literary but also a Jewish response.  “In fact, my own first reading through Lonoff’s canon—as an 
orthodox college atheist and a highbrow in training—had done more to make me realize how much 
I was still my family’s Jewish offspring than anything I had carried forward to the University of 
Chicago from childhood Hebrew lessons, or mother’s kitchen, or the discussions I used to hear 
among my parents and our relatives about the perils of intermarriage, the problem of Santa Claus, 
and the injustice of medical-school quotas” (12).  Lonoff’s fiction, moreover, “seemed to me a 
response to the same burden of exclusion and confinement that still weighed upon the lives of those 
who had raised me, and that had informed our relentless household obsession with the status of the 
Jews” (ibid.).  Lonoff’s writing, then, is not just a professional model for Zuckerman the aspiring 
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writer, but also a key text in the development of his Jewish consciousness, and the connection of his 
Jewish and his intellectual life. 
As much as lay readers, with their propensity to read stories for their own ends, are 
something of a problem for Zuckerman (and Roth) as a writer, Zuckerman’s relationship with 
Lonoff, a matter of professional aspiration and personal fulfillment, begins with Zuckerman’s 
reading of Lonoff’s stories as a way to mediate between his literary sensibility and his Jewish self-
recognition: a way to find the personal in the professional.  Indeed, as Zuckerman’s description of 
masturbating to the imagined encounter between Lonoff and Bellette suggests, any public, 
communicative composition implies a relevant subject position that draws on personal experience as 
well as writing-specific competence. Masturbation, however, is the literary outlet of the amateur—a 
counterpart to professional writing but also the generative spark for the novel’s most inventive 
section: the narrative re-animation of Anne Frank as a living writer:  
The rest of what I’d been waiting up for [that is, some kind of sexual encounter with 
Lonoff’s guest, Amy Bellette] I had, of course, to imagine.  But that is easier work by 
far than making things up at the typewriter.  For that kind of imagining you don’t 
even have to know the alphabet.  Being young will usually get you through with 
flying colors.  You don’t even have to be young.  You don’t have to be anything. 
(112) 
 
The imaginative apparatus supporting masturbation is a radically democratic model of literary 
production.  Not only is it “easier work by far than making things up at the typewriter”—that is, 
something which makes no professional demands—but it also, in Zuckerman’s interpretation, 
makes no ontological demands: “You don’t have to be anything.”  The kind of freedom that 
Zuckerman finds in the masturbatory fantasy is the opposite of the pressure that he feels from his 
family’s expectations.  If Zuckerman doesn’t have to be anyone in particular to invent some scene 
that will get him off, this is perhaps because the imaginative work of masturbation is so thoroughly 
functional, and thus indifferent in its particulars.  It doesn’t much matter what Zuckerman imagines, 
so long as it gets the job done.  In contrast, the specific content and texture of the writer’s work 
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does matter, and to achieve the ends of literature the writer implicitly does need to be something—at 
the very least, he or she needs to be a writer. 
 The compositional theory that Zuckerman implies in his discussion of masturbation links 
literary production to the possession of a particularly literary subjectivity.  Indeed, in this framework, 
the successful creation of a literary work is an act with ontological authority, proving, for example, 
that one has a voice “that begins at around the back of the knees and reaches well above the head.”  
What matters for Zuckerman is that talent which is exercised in the public sphere and amenable to 
public judgment.  Zuckerman may, in fact, be a world-class masturbatory fantasist, but such a talent 
won’t prove who he is, in the terms he desires, and won’t win him any prizes. 
 And yet, the narrative that I have sketched, drawing a clean line between the private talents 
of erotic imagination and the public talents of literary composition, is at odds with the development 
of the novel itself and with Zuckerman’s career over the succeeding Zuckerman novels. The Ghost 
Writer’s most audacious section, “Femme Fatale,” which imagines the life of an Anne Frank who has 
survived the war, made her way to America, found her diary in print, and determined to remain 
unknown, is thus a way for Zuckerman to raise his masturbatory fantasy-making from the realm of 
anonymous and unlettered jerking off to the level of professional activity. 
Virtuous reader, if you think that after intercourse all animals are sad, try 
masturbating on the daybed in E. I. Lonoff’s study and see how you feel when it’s 
over.  To expiate my sense of utter shabbiness, I immediately took to the high road 
and drew from Lonoff’s bookshelves the volume of Henry James stories containing 
‘The Middle Years,’ the source of one of the two quotations pinned to the bulletin 
board.  And there where I had indulged myself in this most un-Jamesian lapse from 
the amenities, I read the story two times through, looking to discover what I could 
about the doubt that’s the writer’s passion, the passion that’s his task, and the 
madness of—of all things—art” (112–13). 
 
The James volume, however, doesn’t remain an escape from the shabby shame of self-gratification 
in the house of Zuckerman’s idol.  After several reads through “The Middle Years,” Zuckerman 
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hears Lonoff and Bellette arguing in the room upstairs and stands on the book to bring his ear to the 
ceiling.  High literary achievement becomes the literal step-stool to private gratification. 
Zuckerman’s fantasy of Amy Bellette as Anne Frank, alive, well, and potentially open to a 
relationship with the young writer, presents marriage to Frank as an ideal (if farcical) bridge between 
the personal and the professional.  “I kept seeing myself coming back to New Jersey and saying to 
my family, ‘I met a marvelous young woman while I was up in New England.  I love her and she 
loves me.  We are going to be married.’ ‘Married? But so fast? Nathan, is she Jewish?’ ‘Yes she is.’ 
‘But who is she?’ ‘Anne Frank’” (157–8).  Anne Frank is the romantic attachment that authorizes all 
that Zuckerman might write about Jews.  Zuckerman’s desire for Frank is thus a desire for authorial 
freedom legitimated by sexual and social union.  Even in this fantasy, it is worth noting, 
Zuckerman’s Jewish sympathies are initially suspect: “Nathan, is she Jewish?” his imagined mother 
asks.  The suddenness of their engagement seems to suggest shame, transgression, some unsavory 
character.  But the name Anne Frank retains the talismanic quality that Judge Wapter engages when 
he urges Nathan to catch the Broadway version of Frank’s autobiography.  Of course, all of this 
takes place under the banner of farce.  The name “Anne Frank” stops the conversation not only 
because it signifies innocent Jewish adolescence, communal pieties, and collective suffering, but also 
because the idea that Anne Frank is alive, well, and Zuckerman’s girlfriend feels like blasphemous 
satire.  The fantasy that marrying Anne Frank will furnish Zuckerman with irreproachable Jewish 
credentials is tainted by the likelihood that claiming to have married Anne Frank would seem 
insane—an abandonment of the real self to the fantasy of fiction. 
In many ways, the fantasy of Bellette as “ghost writer” also casts Bellette / Frank as a mirror 
for Zuckerman’s predicament.  Like Zuckerman, Bellette searches for a new literary father, and like 
Bellette’s “I love you so, Dad-da.  There’s no one else like you” (118), Zuckerman’s attachment to 
Lonoff has a sexual component that acts as a proxy for professional parity—a fantasy at once of 
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apprenticeship and mutual erotic enjoyment: “Suddenly I wanted to kiss him.  I know this happens 
to men more often than is reported, but I was new to manhood (about five minutes into it, actually) 
and was bewildered by the strength of a feeling that I had rarely had toward my own father once I’d 
begun to shave” (74).  But, crucially, Bellette not only occupies a literary position that is in some 
ways similar to Zuckerman’s, she voices a defense of literary realism in the treatment of Jewish 
characters (her family) that echoes Zuckerman’s and Roth’s own. 
What would happen when people had finally seen?  The only realistic answer was 
Nothing.  To believe anything else was only to give in to longings which even she, 
the great longer, had a right to question by now.  To keep her existence a secret from 
her father so as to help improve mankind . . . no, not at this late date. [. . . .] Her 
responsibility was to the dead, if to anyone—to her sister, to her mother, to all the 
slaughtered schoolchildren who had been her friends.  There was her diary’s 
purpose, there was her ordained mission: to restore in print their status as flesh and 
blood . . . for all the good that would do them. (146–7) 
 
What links the diary to Zuckerman’s story is a sense that the highest professional standard of 
representational literary art is its ability to give flesh to the characters it portrays.  That is, Frank’s 
mission to “restore in print their status as flesh and blood” is, in the end, strikingly close to 
Zuckerman’s defense that his Uncle Sidney, the heel of his father’s version of the story behind 
“Higher Education,” “actually existed [. . .]—and no better than I depict him!” (93).   
In The Ghost Writer presents the psychologically real mimetic representation of characters as a 
writer’s sacred obligation: a responsibility that demands that authors cut ties with their communities, 
their families and their friends when they sit down at the writing desk to become, for as long as they 
lay fingers to the keyboard, professionals.  And yet Roth’s novella also reveals the impossibility of 
the writer’s willed alienation from all that provides material for her or his creations.  The 
gratifications of literary composition are neither exclusively public nor exclusively private, nor are 
the terms of professional conduct.  In Roth’s novella, Jewishness provides the shape and the context 
for this confluence of personal and professional concerns in a writer’s work, and the key to the 
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For all of the obvious enthusiasm that Harold Ribalow, editor of This Land, These People, 
displays for his subject and for the volume’s claims to represent Jewish literary achievement, a 
comment in his introduction betrays some reservations about the short story as a vehicle for Jewish 
literary excellence. On the one hand, he writes, “In the field of the short story in particular, the 
contributors to this volume have done their best work when they have written about Jews.”  That is, 
the Jewish theme spurs Jewish writers to achievement in the short story form.  On the other, 
however, “Although the list of Jewish writers who describe Jewish life can easily be expanded [from 
those Ribalow lists], the impression remains that, in the main, those writers have comparatively little 
stamina where Jewish themes are concerned.” (This Land 3).  If the short story is a pronounced site 
of Jewish literary productivity and a premier venue for the then-contemporary expression of Jewish 
themes in American literature, it is also a symptom of a broader hesitation among Jewish writers 
who, though they “have concerned themselves with Jewish subjects with the same artistry and 
feeling that characterize all their work, [. . .] do not write as often as they might on Jewish themes” 
(ibid.).  The suggestion that the shortness of the short story marks it as a genre of secondary 
importance underlies the restrained ruefulness of these remarks.  Ribalow’s introduction intimates 
that while the short story provides a crucial window into Jewish literary creativity, the window is a 
narrow one.  In Ribalow’s discussion, the short story signifies Jewish literary energies that are at 
once latent insofar as the short story form enables literary productivity that is for whatever reason 
less prevalent, he argues, in the novel, and limited insofar as the short story itself represents a 
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constrained horizon for Jewish literature—a symbol of the stamina that Jewish writers lack when 
approaching Jewish subjects. 
It is not coincidental that the works on which this dissertation focused, with the exception of 
the anthologies treated in its first chapter, are long for the form.  Indeed, Tillie Olsen’s “Tell Me a 
Riddle,” Cynthia Ozick’s “Envy; or, Yiddish in America,” and Philip Roth’s The Ghost Writer could 
all easily be considered novellas—The Ghost Writer, in fact, is a novella (or as its publication, in full, 
across two consecutive issues of the New Yorker in the summer of 1979 identified it, a novel); it is 
primarily its metafictional portrayal of a short story that justifies its inclusion in this study.  And yet 
the engagement of each work with the short story form is also unmistakable: Olsen’s story gathers 
significance as a consideration of intergenerational ideological transmission from the stories that it 
accompanies, and with which it forms a collection; Ozick’s “Envy” draws from the formal smallness 
of the short story a complex collation of Jewish culture, an intimacy that at times becomes 
claustrophobic, and the aspirations and frustrations of a writer pounding on the gates of the 
profession; Roth’s novella outlines, in “Higher Education,” a story in which length at once signifies 
ambition and marginality, as Zuckerman’s story both exceeds his prior efforts in scope and is too 
long for magazine publication.  So what are we to make of the length of these stories—of their 
apparent resistance to the major defining element of the short story form (its shortness) even as they 
productively use the medium to convey meaning about the situation of the Jewish writer? 
Ribalow’s ambivalence about the short story form helps us toward an answer.  In 1842, 
Edgar Allan Poe theorized that the short story “affords unquestionably the fairest field for the 
exercise of the loftiest talent, which can be afforded by the wide domains of mere prose”—a space 
for the display of authorial prowess made possible by the “unity of effect or impression” that the 
story, consumed in a single sitting, could impart to a reader (46).  But the 19th Century also offers an 
alternative genealogy for the short story, on which, in fact, also runs through Poe: the genre as a 
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vehicle for popular literary regionalism—a generic undertaking more closely linked with commercial 
concerns than with aesthetic mastery and, later, with the mass market audience of the pulps than 
with the high- or middlebrow readers of the slicks (Current-Garcia).  Moreover, as several of its 
theorists have noted, the modern short story as a category derives what meaning and coherence it 
has from its (generally agonistic) relationship with the novel—a genre in whose shadow it is 
understood to sit (Ejxenbaum, Pratt).65  This dualistic understanding of the genre, and the tendency 
to read the short story as the novel’s younger sibling illuminates the hesitation in Riblow’s praise of 
Jewish short fiction.  The short story may well mark the literary achievement of American Jewish 
writers, but an overproduction of short stories relative to novels (itself an impressionistic evaluation—
what would be the right ratio of stories to novels?) signifies, in Ribalow’s comments and, as I 
discussed in chapter one, in Bellow’s evaluation of his volume, the continued immaturity of 
American Jewish writing as a literary category.  Part of what haunts the Jewish short story as a genre 
bidding for prestige in the post-war period is its association with local color regionalism (which we 
see explicitly in Irving Howe’s introduction to his 1974 anthology, discussed in chapter one), and the 
pulpy appeal that it makes to Jewish and non-Jewish readers alike.  Moreover, Ribalow’s comments 
suggest that the baggage loading down the short story can easily be seen to migrate to a Jewish 
literature still finding its footing in the American literary landscape. 
Over the course of Tillie Olsen’s, Cynthia Ozick’s, and Philip Roth’s careers, the status of 
Jewish liteature changed.  If in 1950 Saul Bellow could argue, as I discuss below, that Jewish 
                                                 
65 Mary Louise Pratt lists eight characteristics that define the short story in relation to the novel, 
grouped under the general rubrics of “Incompleteness” and “Minorness, Lesserness.”  Particularly 
salient to our discussion are her observations that the short story “is a sample” while the novel “is 
the whole hog” (103), that the novel comprises a whole text (i.e., a self-contained volume), while the 
story is a part of a text, that short stories introduce the new into the literary arena, that stories are 
more commonly associated with (oral) narrative traditions than the novel, which tends to be 
associated with textual traditions, and that the story tends to be associated with craft, while the novel 
is associated with art.  While these characteristics apply unevenly to different stories, and while some 
stories work against some of these assumptions, Pratt’s typology nonetheless offers an invaluable 
summary of general attitudes toward and assumptions about the form. 
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American fiction had thus far proven an insufficient container for high literary ambition, by the time 
Olsen published her first complete volume, Bellow himself had become an exemplar of literary 
achievement in a recognizably Jewish idiom, and by the publication of The Ghost Writer “The Jewish 
Author” was already a well-established archetype (defined in large part by Roth himself) with which 
Roth could expect his readers to be familiar.  Yet it is worth noting that Bellow’s achievement, 
popularly ratified by the 1954 National Book Award for The Adventures of Augie March is defined by a 
maximalist style: sprawling sentences in a picaresque tome; not homely anecdotes of Jewish life in 
Chicago, but a cosmopolitan verbosity whose length constitutes its own argument for the book’s 
significance.  I have argued in this dissertation that the particular professional tensions that attended 
the short story rendered it anything but a neutral choice for authors whose fiction is concerned with 
the relationship between Jewish and professional identities (be they the quasi-professional activities 
of radical political action or the professional situation of working writers.  Extending beyond the 
length at which a short story might comfortably be published in the periodical press without either 
elbowing aside other submissions or extending the publication’s length and production costs, the 
long short story amounts to an assertion of professional privilege: a magnification of the single 
author’s significance in the multiple-author publication. 
In this context, we might read the length of the stories on which I’ve focused as an index of 
their authors’ more general resistance to classification.  Each of these authors has had a vexed 
relationship with the category of “Jewish writer,” despite which, their Jewishness and the Jewishness 
of their subjects has remained relevant to readings of their work.  Likewise, the publication of their 
comparatively lengthy work in traditional venues for short stories (magazines and anthologies in 
particular) classifies their writing in terms of the expectations that attend the short story even as it 
asserts their prerogative to extend, alter, or reject those boundaries altogether. 
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The story of the professionalization of writing did not begin in the post-war period.  But the 
political reconfigurations of the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, as Tillie Olsen’s Tell Me a Riddle forecasts, saw 
the fortification of ethnicity as a political and literary category.  This change amounted to a 
significant shift in how literary professionalism was defined.  Thus, even as Philip Roth interrogated 
the distinction between Jewish and professional conduct, asserting in essays the overriding 
significance of a professional ethic to a Jewish writer’s portrayal of fictional Jews, the profession 
itself, and the related profession of literary criticism, saw the writer’s identity as increasingly 
significant, if not to their professional activities, then to the work that their work does in the world.  
The short story, ripe for categorizing, collecting, republishing, and slotting into a Jewish literature 
syllabus was a key venue in which the categorization of Jewish writing inserted the author into a 
Jewish literary context, naming Jewishness as a professional category.  In their manipulations of the 
form, the Jewish writers that I discussed contested the grounds on which Jewish and professional 
identities were joined, and revealed that constitutive role of professional concerns in the cultural 
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